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Depending on their needs for enhancing and sustaining their business and market values, 
some firms choose to operate with a corporate governance structure of CEO duality, in 
which an executive serves as the CEO and the chairperson of the board of directors. The 
problem addressed in this study is that past empirical and theoretical studies of the 
relationship between CEO duality and firm performance of organizations across different 
industries have generated ambiguous results, and no studies have focused specifically on 
the relationship between CEO duality and financial performance of not-for-profit 
hospitals. Based on agency and stewardship theories, and considering that CEO duality’s 
effects on firms’ financial performance are contextually specific to each type of industry 
and dependent on certain industry conditions, the purpose of this quantitative study was 
to answer 3 research questions that examine the relationship between CEO duality, 
presence of physicians on governance board, hospital size, hospital age, board size, and 
financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. This study used multiple regression 
analyses of data of financial indicators from 146 U.S. not-for-profit hospitals selected 
from the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development database of California, 
for the period from 2009 to 2012. The results of this study suggested CEO duality and 
presence of physicians on healthcare governance were not related to financial 
performance of not-for-profit hospitals. The outcomes of this study can promote positive 
social change by bringing awareness of appropriate healthcare governance structures that 
enhance organizational effectiveness and sustain hospitals’ charitable missions of 
provision of community services and transformation of communities and society. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study  
Introduction 
Good corporate governance is integral to the growth and survival of modern 
corporations. Because of globalization, corporations now conduct business in all parts of 
the world, creating more challenges for governments to control and hold organizations 
accountable for their actions (Addullah & Valentine, 2009). However, the recent crises 
resulting from the global financial meltdown and numerous corporate scandals, which 
researchers linked to immoral management and poor governance, have triggered 
institutional investors, individual shareholders, regulatory entities, and other stakeholders 
to press harder for better corporate governance structures for publicly traded and private 
corporations. As part of an attempt to deter immoral management and corporate debacles, 
both professionals and academics have placed CEO duality and the decision whether or 
not to split the role of CEO/chairperson as central issues in the search for appropriate 
corporate governance structures (Tenello, 2011). According to Tenello (2011), at the 
beginning of 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted policies to 
require public corporations to declare the structures of their board and provide 
explanations and circumstances for why they have opted to operate with their current 
corporate governance structures. 
In a typical modern public corporation, the board of directors exists as a 
governance body as well as a mechanism to ensure the separation of ownership and 
control, facilitating effective monitoring and evaluation of performance processes 




exists in a modern corporation to resolve or keep at bay issues associated with inherent 
conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. Due to a diffuse base, owners, 
shareholders, or stakeholders do not or cannot directly monitor managers. Therefore, the 
board of directors is established to represent all stakeholders and exercise absolute 
fiduciary duty to manage a firm in the best interest of all stakeholders.  
Depending on operational circumstances and business needs, some firms choose 
to operate with a governance structure of CEO duality, in which an executive holds both 
positions of CEO and chairperson of the board of directors. Meanwhile, other 
corporations may opt to fill the CEO and the board chairperson positions with two 
separate individuals, having CEOs reporting to chairpersons, who in turn work 
collaboratively with other board directors to oversee the performance of top executive 
teams. According to Monks and Minow (2008), based on data collected from the 
Corporate Library, about 1,800 out of the largest 3,300 publicly traded companies operate 
with a CEO duality structure. 
Although boards of directors have the legal rights and the ultimate responsibility 
to oversee the management, in reality, the boards may face challenges in fulfilling their 
fiduciary duties due to their own limitations and the advantages of the management they 
are supposed to control and monitor. While the management team has expertise, 
specialized knowledge, control, and time to operate firms, the boards of directors, whose 
members are primarily comprised of independent directors, are limited in time and 
information to execute organizational objectives effectively (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & 




who are also the chairpersons of the boards may attempt to play dominant roles and to 
diminish the effectiveness of board members (Gove & Junkunc, 2013).  
Albeit slowly, the Federal government, the SEC, American stock exchanges, and 
shareholders have pressed public companies to split the dual CEO/chairperson role and to 
adopt a two-tier governance structure in order to enhance business transparency (Abels & 
Martelli, 2011). According to Abels and Martelli (2011), two-tier structures ensure 
independent CEOs manage corporations, while separate chairpersons control activities 
related to board functions, such as recruiting executives, seeking CEO succession, 
compensating executives, and conducting other traditional board activities. Noticeably, in 
the eyes of shareholders and stakeholders, the chairperson should be independent and not 
an employee of the company whose board she or he is heading, resulting in meaningful 
independence between the board of directors and the management.  
Background of the Study 
Under stewardship or administrative theory, executives and managers are viewed 
as trustworthy stewards who act for organizational goals rather than for their personal 
objectives, and the relationship between the shareholders and the management should be 
built upon trust, thus minimizing the costs of controlling and monitoring the actions of 
the management (Adbullah & Valentine, 2009). Accordingly, stewardship theorists have 
argued that CEO duality empowers CEOs to manage organizations efficiently with clear 
and unambiguous leadership, resulting in improved firm performance (Boyd, 1995; Kang 
& Zardkoohi, 2005; Nicholson & Kiel 2007). In the same vein, David, Schoorman, and 




boards of directors, and managers, leading to a system that is more effective and efficient 
in reaching organizational objectives of profit maximization. 
In contrast, agency theorists have argued that when acting as CEO and 
chairperson of a corporate board, a CEO may become too powerful and adversely 
influence the monitoring function of the board, thus potentially decreasing its 
effectiveness in governing the organization and evaluating the performance of the top 
executive team (Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 2008; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Rechner & Dalton, 1991). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the 
relationship between shareholders and the management of a corporation is the 
relationship between principals and agents, and the agents will not always act in the best 
interests of the principals. Therefore, under the agency theory, there is a need to have a 
controlling and monitoring mechanism. Farma and Jensen (1983) argued that if the CEO 
is also the chairperson of the board, the CEO might dominate the decision process, thus 
diminishing the controlling and monitoring function of the board. According to Farma 
and Jensen, under CEO duality, corporations lack the true separation of decision control 
and decision management, which are integral functions of principals and agents, 
respectively.  
Semadeni and Cannella (2012) claimed that for more than 2 decades, these 
opposing and divergent views between stewardship and agency theories about the effects 
of CEO duality to organizational performance have motivated researchers to conduct 
empirical studies to understand the real influences of CEO duality and organizational and 




and professional empirical studies of the relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance have generated inconsistent and unsettled results (Kang, 2005; Lawal, 2011; 
Shukeri, 2012; Tenello, 2011). Some researchers reported that there was no negative 
relationship between CEO duality and firm performance (Chugh, Meador, & Kumar, 
2011; Pandya, 2011; Yang, Lu, & Li, 2011), or that CEO duality constrained board 
independence and aversively affected firm value and operating performance (Bliss, 2011; 
Harjto 2008). Nevertheless, Rechner and Dalton (1991) suggested firms with CEO and 
chairperson positions held by two individuals consistently outperform those with CEO 
and chairperson invested in one executive. In a recent review, Lawal (2012) examined 
several past studies of corporate performance and board dynamics in which CEO duality 
was included and suggested that past researchers have made some errors in being too 
focused on a single theory and using inappropriate statistical tools, consequently 
generating ambiguous findings.  
Problem Statement 
Considering the healthcare system’s economic size and potential impacts on 
society and people, the importance of the role of governance in healthcare should not be 
overlooked. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2012) reported that 
hospital spending in the U.S in 2012 represented one-third ($882.3 billion) of the total 
healthcare spending ($2.8 trillion). According to the American Hospital Association 
(2014), hospitals provide about 35% of employment in the healthcare industry. 
Furthermore, healthcare boards are increasingly charged with managing rising costs, 




for patient safety, efficiency, effectiveness, ethical issues, and sustainability (Barnett, 
Perking, & Powell, 2001; Hamilton, 2008).  
Although researchers have generated substantial work on the influences of roles, 
size, structure, composition of boards, and CEO duality on firm performance for more 
than 2 decades (Lawal, 2012; Krause, 2013), no researchers have sought specifically the 
relationship between CEO duality and financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. 
Bennington (2010) asserted that researchers have not conducted specific studies on the 
correlation between strategies and board compositions, CEO duality, overall hospital 
performance, and nonprofit hospital board members’ levels of involvement in strategic 
decisions. According to Bennington, while healthcare governance environments have 
changed drastically, professionals and academics have provided few suggestions for 
better models of healthcare boards.  
Furthermore, the corporate governance model for private healthcare organizations 
might not be the appropriate corporate board model for not-for-profit hospitals due to 
their unique challenges (e.g., unpaid board members and absence of physicians on the 
boards) and total dependence on awarded commitment and support from external donors 
and benefactors (Howard & Seth-Purdie, 2005). Not-for-profit hospitals need effective 
healthcare governance boards and consistent support of external stakeholders in order to 
continue meeting their community service obligations. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this quantitative research was to investigate the relationship 




hospital size, board size, and financial performance of not-for-profit U.S. hospitals. 
Considering the inclusiveness of the outcomes of past studies, the insufficient studies on 
the effects of governing boards on the performance of hospitals, the not-for-profit 
hospitals’ unique organizational nature, and their dependence on awarded commitments, 
which make them face higher risks of failure, this study contributed by providing 
additional insights regarding the effects of CEO duality and clinical governance on the 
performance of organizations. Furthermore, as the SEC has started issuing regulations 
requiring firms to reveal and provide explanations for their chosen board models, this 
study provided critical information for not-for-profit healthcare organizations seeking a 
corporate board structure that might be most appropriate for their organizations.  
Nature of the Study 
Using a quantitative research approach, I analyzed available secondary data to 
investigate the relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on the 
governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board size, and financial performance. 
Specifically, the goal of this study was to answer questions regarding the relationship 
between CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, hospital age, 
hospital size, board size, and financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. Using 
secondary data for this study was advantageous because of the massive availability of 
existing data pertaining to financial statements and corporate governance reported by not-
for-profit organizations. The remainder of this chapter includes research questions, null 




Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research Question 1: Was there a positive, statistically significant relationship 
between CEO duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, 
hospital size, board size, and total margin of not-for-profit hospitals? 
H10: There was no significant statistical relationship between CEO duality, 
presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board size, 
and total margin of not-for-profit hospitals. 
H1a: There was a positive, statistically significant relationship between CEO 
duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board 
size, and total margin of not-for-profit hospitals. CEO duality and presence of physicians 
on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, and board size enhance total margin 
of not-for-profit hospitals. 
Research Question 2: Was there a positive, statistically significant relationship 
between CEO duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, 
hospital size, board size, and operating margin of not-for-profit hospitals? 
H20: There was no significant statistical relationship between CEO duality, 
presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board size, 
and operating margin of not-for-profit hospitals. 
H2a: There was a positive, statistically significant relationship between CEO 
duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board 




physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, and board size enhance 
operating margin of not-for-profit hospitals. 
Research Question 3: Was there a positive, statistically significant relationship 
between CEO duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, 
hospital size, board size, and free cash flow of not-for-profit hospitals? 
H30: There was no significant statistical relationship between CEO duality, 
presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board size, 
and free cash flow of not-for-profit hospitals. 
H3a: There was a positive, statistically significant relationship between CEO 
duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board 
size, and operating margin of not-for-profit hospitals. CEO duality and presence of 
physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, and board size enhance 
free cash flow of not-for-profit hospitals. 
Statistical Model 
The premise of this study was to find if there was a relationship between CEO 
duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board 
size, and the financial indicators of not-for-profit hospitals. By design, this study 
involved the analysis of the relationship between several independent and dependent 
variables. Multiple regression was the most appropriate statistical model for 
understanding the relationship between several independent variables and dependent 
variables (Field, 2009). Therefore, I used the multiple regression model to test the 




for the method design, data, and statistical model used to test hypotheses based on the 
research questions. 
Independent and Dependent Variables 
The research questions and the associated hypotheses were designed to investigate 
the relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, 
hospital age, hospital size, board size, and financial performance of not-for-profit 
hospitals. The independent variables for the three hypotheses and the three alternative 
hypotheses were CEO duality, the presence of physicians on the governance board, 
hospital age, hospital size, and board size. While the first independent variable was 
categorical, the last four independent variables were continuous. The dependent variables 
for the three hypotheses and the three alternative hypotheses were total margin, operating 
margin, and free cash flow, respectively. 
To calculate the independent variable, CEO duality, a value of 1 was assigned to 
firms with CEO duality and a value of 0 was assigned to firms without CEO duality. The 
second independent variable, the presence of physicians on governance boards, was 
measured by assigning 1 to each physician present on the board. If no physician was 
present on the board, a value of 0 was assigned. The hospital size was measured by the 
logarithm of total assets of the hospital. The hospital age was derived from the logarithm 
of the difference from the year of this study (2014) and the year of the hospital’s 
incorporation. The board size was measured as the number of directors of the governance 
board. The same measurement of the independent variables applied to the three 




For measuring the dependent variable in Hypothesis 1, the total margin value was 
calculated by dividing net income by total operating revenue. For the dependent variable 
in Hypothesis 2, the operating margin was measured by dividing the difference between 
total operating revenue and total operating expenses by the total operating revenues. The 
dependent variable, free cash flow, in Hypothesis 3 was estimated using annual growth 
rate of 7.3% reported by the American Hospital Association and adopting the formula 
used by Singh, Wheeler, and Roden (2012). More details of calculation of the free cash 
flow variable are explained in Chapter 3, the methodology of the study.  
Theoretical Framework 
A theoretical framework serves as a lens that guides and focuses a research study. 
As noted by Ennis (1999), a theoretical framework identifies and describes major 
elements and constructs of the research of interest. By elaborating on a theoretical 
framework, I hypothesized and explained the meanings of CEO duality and clinical 
governance as attributes of effective healthcare governance that affected the financial 
performance of not-for-profit hospitals. Specifically, as shown in Figure 1, agency and 
stewardship theories and clinical governance served as lenses to guide the focus of this 
study, which examined the relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on 
governance board, and financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. 
 The agency theory explained the conflicts of interest inherently existing in 
corporations, creating the need to separate ownership and control in order to facilitate 
effective monitoring and control mechanisms of corporate board. The stewardship theory 




leadership inherited from CEO duality, justifying the rationale of CEO duality as an 
appropriate governance structure for not-for-profit hospitals. The clinical governance 
construct elaborated the advantages of having physicians, who often possess and acquire 
intensive clinical experiences, as members of governance boards of organizations in the 
healthcare sector.  
As Figure 1 shows, the two components of healthcare governance of not-for-
profits hospitals include CEO duality and physicians as board members. Financial 
performance measures include operating margin, total margin, and free cash flow. The 
multiple regression models designed for determining the relationships between variables 
of interest contain the components of healthcare governance board and financial 
measures. The identified variables used in the regression model were based on the 
literature related to studies of corporate governance, specifically the financial measures of 
not-for-profit organizations. Researchers and practitioners use operating margin, total 
margin, and free cash flow as the most common indicators for measuring financial 
performance of hospitals (Cleverley, Song, & Cleverley, 2010; Schuhmann, 2008). The 
operating margin of a hospital indicates the total operating revenue in comparison to its 
total operating expenses. If total operating revenue exceeds total operating expenses, the 
hospital operates with a profit. The total margin or total profit margin compares a 
hospital’s net income against its total operating. Free cash flow shows the cash inflows 
and outflows rather than its accounting earnings and represents the amount of cash left 
over after undertaking the firm’s operations and making all investments necessary to 




flow indicator shows the minimal survival strength of an organization (Schuhmann, 
2008). 
Healthcare scholars have addressed the corporate model and the philanthropic 
model as the governance models in healthcare sectors (Alenxander, Morlock, & Gifford, 
1998). Table 1 illustrates the attributes of the corporate model and the philanthropic 
model that differentiate each model from one another. According to Alexander and Lee 
(2006), while hospitals with corporate models emphasize competition position and 
changes to enhance operational efficiency, market standing, and financial viability, 
hospitals operating with philanthropic models tend to focus primarily on preserving 
hospital assets and fiduciary obligations to the community. Morlock, Nathanson, and 
Alexander (1988) posited that for not-for-profit hospitals, governance boards perform 
mostly ceremonial functions, largely dedicating decision-making processes to CEOs and 
medical staff or a few active board members. There is a need for researchers to identify 
governance models that not-for-profit hospitals can adopt to enhance their effectiveness 
and performance.  
Researchers have tested empirically and showed that healthcare organizations, 
specifically hospitals, with governance structures having the attributes characterizing a 
corporate model performed better than hospitals with philanthropic models in terms of 
quick responses to changing environmental conditions (Alexander, Lee, Weiner, & Ye, 
2006). However, the impacts of the philanthropic model on the performance of hospitals 
have not been explored fully. According to Alexander and Lee (2006), different 




profit hospitals. Therefore, I expected the two components of healthcare governance of 
not-for-profits hospitals, CEO duality, and physicians as board members providing 
corporate expertise and clinical experience and bridging the gaps of different attributes 
and organizing principles between philanthropic and corporate models, resulting in an 
ideal governance model for not-for-profit hospitals.  
The goal of this study was not to establish causation of financial performance 
because in order to determine all of the possible causes of firm performance, I would 
have had to include other variables such as business, social, and legal environments and 
many others factors. Identifying and accounting all potential variables that cause financial 
performance was beyond the scope of the study. Chapter 3 of this dissertation addresses 
an in-depth discussion of the research design, resources of data, financial measurement, 



































Philanthropic and Corporate Models of Hospital Governing Boards 
Philanthropic model Corporate model 
Large board size Small board size 
Wide range of perspectives/backgrounds Narrow, more focused 
perspectives/backgrounds 
Small number of inside directors Large number of inside directors 
Little management participation on board Active management participation on  
board 
No formal management accountability to 
board 
Direct management accountability to  
board 
No limit to consecutive terms for board 
members 
Limit to consecutive terms for board 
members 
No compensations for board services Compensation provided for board  
service 
Emphasis on asset preservation Emphasis on strategic activity 
Note. Adapted from J. A. Alexander  & S. Y. Lee (2006). Does governance matter? 
Board configuration and performance in not-for-profit hospitals. Milbank Quarterly, 




Definition of Terms 
There are several terms used in this research study. The following terms are 
assigned with special operational definitions because of their relevance to the theoretical 
framework and this research study. 
Board of directors: A body of appointed members who oversee the activities of 
an organization. Duties of the board include establishment of policies and objectives, 
selection and evaluation of CEO performance, securing of adequate financial resources, 
approval of fiscal budgets, design of compensation contract of company management, 
and responses to stakeholders on the performance of the organization. 
Board monitoring/control: Activities of a board of directors in performing 
ongoing monitoring, internal control, and evaluation of executives or top management of 
corporations. 
 CEO duality: A governance structure or situation in which the CEO also holds the 
position of the chairperson of the board of directors.  
Clinical governance: Systematic approach health care organizations that employ 
to maintain and improve the quality of patient care. Clinical governance parallels with 
corporate governance with respect to corporate accountability for clinical quality, 
leadership, organizational culture, and organizational quality structures (Wright, 
Malcolm, Barnett, & Hendry, 2001). Furthermore, clinical governance entails three 
attributes comprised of high standards of care quality, responsibility and accountability 




Corporate governance: The system designed to direct and control a corporation. 
Through corporate governance structure, corporations design mechanisms for monitoring 
policies and decision making processes, and for responses to social, regulatory, and 
market environments. Through corporate governance, corporations pursue their 
objectives, align interests of involved parties, and distribute rights and responsibilities 
among stakeholders, such as boards of directors, managers, employees, shareholders, and 
others (Ballinger & Marcel, 2010). 
Healthcare financial indicators: As noted by Schuhmannn (2008), 11 financial 
indicators of hospital financial performance include bed occupancy (percentage), average 
length of stay (days), operating margins (percentage), current ratio, cash on hands (days), 
accounts receivable (days), average payment period (days), inpatient gross revenue 
(percentage), outpatient gross avenue (percentage), contractual allowance write-off 
(percentage), and personnel expense (percentage of operating revenue). Researchers use 
data of these financial indicators to derive profit margin, total margin, and free cash flow 
for study of financial performance of healthcare organizations.  
Immoral management: The management style that is devoid of ethical principles 
and conducts business activities and decisions considered opposite to ethical standards. 
Organizations practicing immoral management have short-term focus, often view and 
exploit employees as means of production, and have no concerns for the needs, rights, 
and expectations of their employees (Inoue & Aubrey, 2014). 
Intrinsic motivation: A motivation in which individuals engage in activities that 




individuals will engage in intrinsically motivating activities for the interest and 
enjoyment associated with those activities rather than for the reward.  
Not-for-profit hospitals: Hospitals that operate as nonprofit entities, for charitable 
purposes, and frequently as affiliations of religious denomination. In the United States, 
not-for-profit hospitals coexist with their counterparts, such as government owned public 
hospitals and privately owned for-profit hospitals, to deliver medical care (Singh, 2013). 
Residual claimants: Individuals or agents, such as employees, suppliers, 
bondholders, and shareholders, who receive a residual amount after the corporation 
accounts all of the costs of productions or services (Brink, 2010). 
Residual claims: The right of individuals or agents, such as employees, suppliers, 
bondholders, and shareholders, to the profit after the company has met all obligations of 
payment (Brink, 2010; Srinivasan & Phansalkar, 2003). 
Residual risks: The remaining risks that arise after other known risks have been 
foreseen and eliminated. Residual risk is the term popularly used in disciplines such as 
economic and finance (Schneider & Valenti, 2011).  
Specialized knowledge: Advanced level of knowledge and expertise in 
organizational processes and procedures. Individuals such as physicians, surgeons, 
engineers, lawyers, and others in very specialized fields often possess specialized 
knowledge.  
Assumptions 




1. The theoretical framework built on agency, stewardship, and identified 
constructs was appropriate for the study of the effects of CEO duality on firm 
performance of not-for-profit hospitals.  
2. Clinical governance enhances the effectiveness of governance boards, which 
in turn affects financial performance.  
3. Physicians possess knowledge of clinical governance. 
4. CEO duality, presence of physicians on board, hospital size, hospital age, 
board size, and financial performance are logical for the testing of the 
hypotheses formulated for this study.  
5. The list of not-for-profit hospitals randomly selected from databases 
containing governance and financial data of targeted organizations represented 
all not-for-profit hospitals in the State of California.  
6. The secondary data, which were not originally collected for the study, used for 
the analysis of the current study were accurate and complete.  
Limitations 
Patton (2003) emphasized that when developing research plans, researchers 
should consider and anticipate limitations, thus addressing and providing details of steps 
undertaken to minimize the effects of the identified limitations. The primary limitation of 
this study is the use of secondary data, which were not originally collected for the study. 
The secondary data used for analysis in this study only approximate the kind of data 
intended for testing the hypotheses, and thus can potentially introduce errors to the 




triangulation of data to reduce the potential error and to enhance the accuracy of analysis 
and outcomes of the study (Patton, 2003). However, the triangulation of data was not 
feasible for this study. Therefore, I planned to collect financial and governance data of 
the not-for-profit hospitals listed in the Office of Statewide Health Planning and 
Development (OSHPD), which contained reliable and comprehensive data of healthcare 
organizations operating in the State of California. The conclusions and generalization of 
this study would be applied only to the not-for-profit hospitals in the State of California. 
Furthermore, due to the scope of the current study of the relationship between CEO 
duality and financial performance, some variables relevant to corporate governance 
constructs (i.e., organizational leverage, market environments, board independence, and 
organizational identification of CEO) may be missing from the research design or the 
analysis model. Future researchers can expand this study by exploring different variables 
using different constructs or assumptions.  
Delimitations 
The focus of the current study was CEO duality, presence of physicians on the 
governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board size, and financial performance of 
not-for-profit hospitals. The sample size was 146. The data used for analysis were public 
records and financial reports filed and reported publicly by healthcare organizations. The 
financial reports, the board structures, and executives of not-for-profit hospitals were 
obtained from the OSHPD websites databases, which contain reports published and filed 
by healthcare organizations from multiple years. Specifically, the proxy statements and 




2012 were the primarily targeted data used to compile statistical analysis using SPSS 
software. The OSHPD database contains nonprofit, for-profit, and publically owned 
healthcare organizations. The not-for-profit hospitals were selected from the OSHPD 
database as the population for the study. The websites of not-for-profit hospital were 
obtained the Healthcare ATLAS websites. The board size and hospital age information of 
not-for-profit hospitals were acquired from the websites of each hospital. The outcomes 
of this study should be applied only to not-for-profit hospitals in the State of California. 
The findings of the study cannot be broadly used to explain circumstances surrounding 
CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, hospital size, hospital age, 
board size, and financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals operating in other states 
and other countries.  
Significance of the Study 
Past studies of corporate governance and financial performance of firms have not 
focused on the healthcare industry. Moreover, the presence of physicians on governance 
boards is relevant to healthcare governance because clinical governance is a critical part 
of healthcare. This study is different from prior research because its outcomes may 
contribute to the extant body of knowledge in the field regarding the implications of CEO 
duality, the presence of physicians, hospital age, hospital size, and board size on the 
financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals.  
Unlike other industries in which clinical governance is not relevant to the 
operation of business, the successful function of healthcare governance boards and the 




clinical governance (Colin-Thome, 2013). Furthermore, results of past studies on CEO 
duality’s effects on firms’ financial performance have been ambiguous, and CEO 
duality’s effects are contextually specific to each type of industry (Young et al., 2000) 
and dependent on certain industry conditions (Boyd, 1995). This study may generate 
findings on the effects of CEO duality and presence of physicians providing clinical 
governance, hospital age, hospital size, and board size, specifically as applied to not-for-
profit hospitals.  
Political and community leaders have increasingly pressed not-for-profit hospitals 
to enhance their effectiveness and performance for the benefit of communities (Owen, 
2005). Not-for-profit hospitals are also faced with challenges associated with pay-for-
performance initiatives strongly endorsed by the government (Lee, Chen, & Weiner, 
2004). Moreover, although primarily applied to corporations, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 has affected the external regulations and external oversight of governance board 
structures and conduct for various not-for-profit hospitals (Greene, 2005). These 
developments have highlighted the importance of having effective governance for not-
for-profit organizations. The results of this study may assist not-for-profit hospitals or 
their administrators to implement appropriate and effective governance that would 
enhance their organizational performance and fulfillment of external regulation and 
oversight regulations. 
Walden University defines positive social change as any transformation that 
would deliver positive outcomes (Laureate Education, n.d.). Walden students, in their 




development of individuals, communities, organizations, and institutions that would 
promote improvement of human and societal conditions (Laureate Education, n.d). The 
focus of this study is organizational governance, which is a core subject and application 
of the principles of social responsibility (ASQ & Manpower Professional, 2010). 
Corporate governance is a control mechanism that ensures the optimum use of the 
human, physical, and financial resources of an enterprise (Khiari, Karaa, & Omri, 2007). 
Good governance has a positive impact on corporate performance, particularly financial 
performance (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008). By examining the effects of CEO duality and 
exploring the impacts of the presence of physicians on governance boards on the 
financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals, this study may potentially generate 
results that help not-for-profit hospitals become successful and efficient with their 
governance and financial management. Therefore, the results of this study may help not-
for-profit hospitals adopt and operate with an appropriate corporate governance structure, 
which would enhance their organizational effectiveness and allow them to continue their 
charitable missions of providing community services and transforming communities and 
society. 
Summary and Transition 
This chapter established that there was a deficiency in prior studies of the 
relationship of corporate governance and financial performance of not-for-profit 
hospitals. Despite their charitable mission and economic importance, the integral function 
of corporate governance to their survival and growth, the potential implication of CEO 




organizations, researchers have not yet sought to understand the relationship between 
CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, hospital size, hospital age, 
board size, and financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. Having a clear 
understanding of the implications of CEOs on financial performance could be critical to 
the governance process and operations for not-for-profit hospitals, thus possibly 
suggesting an appropriate corporate governance structure for not-for-profit hospitals that 
would contribute to the survival and continuation of delivering medical care of nonprofit 
hospitals. In the process, the purpose of this research was to seek the relationships 
between CEO duality, the presence of physicians on boards, hospital age, hospital size, 
board size, and the financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. 
The conceptual model guiding this study portrayed the aspect of specialized 
organizational knowledge of CEOs, informed by the theoretical framework of 
stewardship and agencies theories with respect to the intrinsic motivation and proper 
monitoring and control of CEO duality on the effectiveness of corporate board. As 
another dimension of the model, physicians’ clinical experiences are critical to clinical 
governance and integral components of healthcare governance boards, necessitating the 
rationale for the presence of physicians as members of the board, contributing to the 
effectiveness of the board, and thus enhancing financial performance. 
Despite of the limitations and delimitations associated with using secondary data 
for statistical analysis and the targeting of organizations that may not represent the entire 




study that may advance the existing knowledge of the field. The findings of this study 
might offer an appropriate model of corporate governance board for nonprofit hospitals. 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation reviews corporate governance theories, 
contemporary research on corporate governance, CEO duality, and financial 
performance. The healthcare governance board, clinical governance, financial 
performance, and not-for-profit organizations are also reviewed. Chapter 3 lays out the 
research design and methodology, details the selection and rationale of research 
strategies, and presents the data analysis used to determine the relationship between CEO 
duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, hospital size, hospital age, board 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
In this chapter, I review prior studies on corporate governance and financial 
performance. The review proceeds from general to specific, discussing aspects of 
corporate governance and CEO duality with respect to organizational performance. The 
goal of this chapter is to provide an understanding of the link between corporate 
governance, specifically CEO duality, and firm performance. The literature contained in 
this review establishes the foundation for addressing the relationship between CEO 
duality and financial performance of not-for-profit healthcare organizations. 
In the first section, I present the concept of separation of ownership and control, 
depicting basic reasons for controlling and monitoring the entrenchment of executive 
management groups. The second section addresses the concept of CEO duality. The third 
section shows corporate governance theories with an emphasis on the agency and 
stewardship theories dominantly used in studies related to corporate governance. The two 
theories constitute the theoretical framework of the study. The fourth section addresses 
major themes of studies of the relationship between corporate governance, specifically 
CEO duality, and financial performance of organizations across different industries. The 
fifth section indicates healthcare governance. The last section shows hospital financial 
indicators. This literature review assists in conveying the existing knowledge related to 
the field, the knowledge gap, and the focus of this research project. 
The key terms for the research for literature materials included CEO power, CEO 
duality, corporate governance, boards of directors, board dynamics, agency theory, 




governance, healthcare financial indicators, and not-for-profit hospitals. Business, 
management, and health science databases within the Walden University library, such as 
Business Source Complete/Premier, ABI/Inform Complete, Emerald Management 
Journals, SAGE Premier, MEDLINE, and PubMed, provided the relevant research 
articles for the review. Google Scholar was also used in the search. The review includes a 
significant number of articles published within 5 years of the current study. However, 
because studies related to corporate governance and firm performance have spanned 
more than 2 decades (Krause, Semadeni, & Cannella, 2013), this literature includes 
reviews of articles that are over 5 years old in order to define theories of corporate 
governance and the history of the discipline. Furthermore, the literature review includes 
published books by authors popularly known in the field.  
Separation of Ownership and Control 
Fama and Jensen’s (1983b) discussion of the separation of decision and risk 
bearing functions, or the separation of ownership and control, provided a foundational 
proposition for agency theory and monitoring mechanisms for decision making in large 
corporations, financial mutual organizations, professional partnerships, and nonprofit 
entities. According to Fama and Jensen, the organizational decision process includes 
initiation, ratification, implementation, and monitoring. In the initiation step, managers 
generate resource utilization and structure contractual proposals. The ratification step 
allows the organization to consider and choose decision initiatives. In the implementation 
step, managers execute the ratified decisions. Lastly, in the monitoring and rewarding 




decisions and implements rewards (Alchian, & Demsetz, 1972). Fama and Jensen 
emphasized that the initiation and implementation steps represent the decision 
management function, while the ratification and monitoring activities entail the decision 
control function. 
Depending on the nature or type of business, an organization chooses an 
appropriate structure for its decision process. Proprietorships, small partnership, and 
closed corporations may decide to have decision management and decision control 
handled by one or a few agents because it is possible and efficient to deter agency 
problems between decision makers and residual claimants by restricting residual claims 
to the decision makers (Fama & Jensen, 1983a). However, in a complex organization, 
because specific and critical information relevant to decision making often inherently 
diffuse among several agents throughout an organization, it is difficult and less efficient 
to have the residual claimants involved in both decision management and decision 
control. To avoid this limitation, the organization may delegate decision making or 
decision management to all agents of different organizational levels who have specific 
knowledge (Fama, 1980). Regarding compensation establishment, organizations set up 
incentive structures to reward agents who initiate and implement decisions and 
compensate parties who represent principals to ratify and monitor decision management 
functions. 
Furthermore, in complex organizations, due to residual claims diffusing among 
many agents, it is costly to involve all agents in decision control. Therefore, in complex 




agents at higher levels for ratification and monitoring (Fama & Jensen, 1983b). The 
board of directors, often comprised of decision agents who ideally do not gain financially 
from their decisions, ensures the separation of the management and control of the most 
important decisions of organizations (Clarson, 1995; Connelly & Limpaphayom, 2004; 
Dalton & Dalton, 2005; Krause et al., 2013).  
Farma and Jensen (1983b) emphasized that the separation of residual risk bearing 
from decision management generally promotes decision systems in which decision 
management functions are distinct from decision control functions. Furthermore, Fama 
and Jensen argued that investing decision management and decision control in a few 
agents leads to situations where these few agents are the primary residual claimants. 
Therefore, the separation of decision management and decision control restricts or 
minimizes the power of individual agents to expropriate the interests of residual 
claimants, avoiding agency problems, which explains the rationale for CEO duality with 
respect to firm performance. 
CEO Duality 
CEO duality refers to a governance structure in which one executive serves as the 
CEO and the chairperson of the corporate board of directors of the company (Abebe, 
Angriawan, & Liu, 2010; Chien, 2008; Krause et al., 2013; Lawal, 2012). The key factor 
of CEO duality in relation to corporate governance and firm performance is the notion of 
CEO power. According to Mueller and Barker (1997), a powerful CEO can command a 
strong and unambiguous organizational leadership, which could result in good 




CEO duality) positively affected firms’ values and operating performance (Carty, 2012), 
too much CEO power (e.g., CEO plurality, defined as a CEO who is also chairperson and 
a member of compensation committees, audit committees, or nominating committees) has 
brought negative effects on operations and values of organizations (Harjoto, 2008). Even 
CEO duality alone can negatively affect firm performance and the independence of 
director board (Amba, 2013; Bliss, 2011; Brawn & Sharma, 2007). 
Splitting roles of CEO and chairperson within public companies has occurred in 
the United States. Based on the 2008 data, approximately 61% of CEOs of U.S. firms 
held the positions of CEO and chairperson, and 26% held the positions of CEO, 
chairperson, and president (Abels & Martelli, 2011). However, according to Abels and 
Martelli (2011), data from 2010 showed there was a decline in CEO duality as companies 
moved away from that governance structure in an attempt to improve transparency and 
corporate independence. Furthermore, there was a decline in the number of firms 
retaining their retired CEOs as chairpersons of their boards of directors. Importantly, 
Abels and Martelli emphasized that some industries accepted CEO duality more than 
others did due to the complexities of their business environments. The following section 
addresses corporate governance theories that underlie the philosophy and implications of 
CEO duality.  
Corporate Governance Theories 
Dubey (2008) explained that the literature in social science includes two types: 
conceptual and empirical. While the conceptual type concerns concepts and theories, an 




proposed research. Manmu, Yasser, and Rahman (2013) posited that multiple theories, 
such as agency, stakeholder, stewardship, and institutional theories, deliver a better 
understanding of corporate governance in the context of CEO duality and firm 
performance. To review in detail the findings of past studies on the relationship between 
CEO duality and firm performance, the discussion now turns to descriptions of the 
agency and the stewardship theories prominently used by past and current researchers 
studying CEO duality and firm performance.  
Agency Theory 
Research studies in CEO duality have largely been associated with agency theory, 
which mainly focuses on the different functions of agents and principals as well as 
agency costs. While agents (e.g., executives and high-level managers) hired by principals 
(e.g., owners, shareholders, or other stakeholders) perform day-to-day operations, boards 
of directors represent principals to serve as governance bodies, overseeing CEOs and 
other executives. Specifically, directors monitor and evaluate management performance 
of the CEO and the executives of an organization (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Shen, 2005). 
In approaching studies arguing that CEO duality is not a desired option for 
effective corporate governance, researchers used agency theory to establish the view that 
separating the CEO and corporate board chairperson positions enhances the board 
function (Aguilera et al., 2008). According Manmu  et al. (2013), a CEO who is also the 
chairperson of the board could potentially undermine the effectiveness of the monitoring 
and control mechanism of the corporate board, whose job as a governance body is to 




tend to act opportunistically for their own benefits rather than those of the principals 
(Drucker, 1954; Levy, 1981; Rechner & Dalton, 1991). Therefore, a powerful CEO might 
establish goals that vary from those of shareholders, causing agency costs (Jensen, 1976). 
To reduce agency costs and to ensure board independence, Mamum et al. (2013) 
posited that organizations established controlling and monitoring mechanisms in the form 
of proper and effective board structures to help deter CEOs and executives from pursuing 
their own interests at the expense of the organizations and the immediate stakeholders. 
Specifically, as agency theorists would argue, corporations attempt to avoid or reduce 
agency problems by having a corporate governance structure with one position for CEO 
and a separate position for chairperson of the corporate board (Farma & Jensen, 1983; 
Levy, 1981; Rechner & Dalton, 1991). In addition, firms with good corporate governance 
protect shareholder interests by establishing suitable incentive schemes for CEOs, which 
could help align the interests of the CEOs with those of the shareholders (Donalson & 
Davis, 1991). Therefore, according to agency theory, CEO duality is negatively 
associated with firm performance because it could incur agency costs and impede board 
independence. Reversely, CEO nonduality, in which one individual holds the CEO 
position while a different one serves as the chairperson of the board, would be the 
desirable form because, theoretically, CEO nonduality governance structures could 
facilitate board independence and minimize agency costs.  
Stewardship Theory 
Contrary to the argument of agency theorists, stewardship theorists have asserted 




(i.e., CEO duality) provides the CEO with ultimate autonomy and the unity of command 
to make decisions that serve the best interests of the organizations in a timely manner 
(Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). For instance, with the knowledge of an insider, CEO duality 
offers the CEO a clear direction and faster responses to external events critical to the 
success of an organization (Boyd, 1995).  
Stewardship theorists view corporate managers as motivating individuals whose 
interests align with the objectives of corporations (Davis, Schoorman, & Donalson, 
1997). Resonating with the perspective of McGregor (1960), who through the theory of Y 
suggested people are self-directed individuals, corporate managers work hard to meet 
corporate goals. Similarly, analogous to Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of human needs, 
steward theorists have argued that in trying to be good stewards, people achieve self-
actualization, social standing, and recognition. Arguably, placing the control and 
monitoring mechanisms with executives would discourage self-motivating individuals 
from being productive and proactive in maximizing benefits for the principals (Argyris, 
1981). Therefore, considering the adverse effects of separating the CEO/chairperson 
position and the associated control and monitoring, under stewardship theory, CEO 
duality is good for firm performance. 
Reconciliation of Agency and Stewardship Perspectives  
Despite the opposing propositions of the two theories, agency and stewardship 
theories can work complementarily. Recently, Boivie, Lange, McDonald, and Westphal 
(2011) focused on psychological factors that could mitigate agency problems in corporate 




on organizational behaviors. Specifically, Boivie et al. sought empirical evidence of a 
positive relationship between CEO organizational identification and the decoupling of 
firm performance from CEO pay or perquisites and demonstrated how internal 
psychological factors, such as organizational identification, could influence the agency 
costs.  
Boivie et al. (2011) argued that a CEO who identifies strongly with her or his 
organization tends to find it difficult to justify personal enrichment to himself or herself 
when firms are not performing well, and CEOs with higher levels of organizational 
identification would be least likely to incur expensive perquisites. Furthermore, Boivie et 
al. asserted that board control is less necessary with CEOs who have higher 
organizational identification, and high organizational identification would moderate the 
negative effects of board independence on the decoupling of high CEO pay and generous 
perquisites from firm performance. Boivie et al.’s data analysis suggested that high levels 
of CEO organizational identification related to less subsequent decoupling of CEO cash 
compensation from firm performance and less subsequent use of perquisites. In addition, 
CEO organizational identification moderated the tendency for board independence to 
reduce CEOs’ self-serving activities. The findings of Boivie et al.’s study seemed to 
suggest that, even in CEO duality structures, CEOs who a have high levels of 
organizational identification act in the best interests of their organizations and do not 
always pursue narrow self-interests. The organizational identification of CEOs helps 
integrate the agency perspectives with those of stewardship with respect to corporate 




Importantly, the findings of Boivie et al.’s (2011) study also indicated that neither 
agency theory nor stewardship theory alone could fully explain the influence of CEO 
duality on organizational performance. Lawal (2012) advised that researchers studying 
board dynamics and CEO duality should not rely on a singular theory. Recently, some 
researchers in the field have advocated for using a multiple theories paradigm or other 
theories in studies of CEO duality performance implications (Krause & Semadeni, 2013; 
Lawal, 2012; Manmu et al.,  2013). In the next section, I elaborate on the implications of 
the multiple theories approach.  
Multiple Theories Approach 
Some researchers have pressed for a better research method using various theories 
comprised of agency theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory, and institutional 
theory in order to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship 
between corporate board performance, CEO duality, and firm performance. For instance, 
by comparing and contrasting each theory with respect to CEO duality and the 
relationship between companies and business environments and stakeholders, Manmu et 
al. (2013) attempted to depict how a multiple theories model would help researchers 
understand the effects of corporate governance on corporate performance. Agency 
theorists argued for managing and monitoring roles of the board on the CEO to eradicate 
agency costs associated with opportunistic activities of the CEO (Boyd, 1995; Jensen, 
1993; Watts & Zimmerman, 1978). In contrast, stewardship theorists opposed, arguing 
that restraining monitoring and controlling mechanisms could motivate executives and 




(Block, 1996; Davis & Donaldson, 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1988; Peggy & Hugh, 
2001). 
The stakeholder theory is also concerned with corporate governance mechanisms 
in the context of the rights to information about organizational operation. As important 
entities such as shareholders, employees, customers, lenders, suppliers, governments, 
local charities, and various interest groups could help companies become successful, they 
have the rights to information about how executives govern their businesses with respect 
to transparency and societal responsibility (Freeman, 2004; Friedman & Miles, 2006; 
Robert, 1992). Regarding the application of the institutional theory to corporate 
governance, due to high levels of regulation, companies strive to meet certain corporate 
governance standards to establish their business legitimacy to operate in markets 
(Kathleen, 1988; Krishna, 2005; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Manmu et al. (2013) 
emphasized that one theory could not explain effective corporate governance, and when 
combined, agency theory depicts the management and principals while stakeholder and 
institutional theories address social relationships, regulations, and enforcement. 
Major Themes in Studies of CEO Duality 
With foundational propositions, theoretical approaches, and the theories 
dominantly used in studies of the relationship between corporate governance, CEO 
duality, and firm performance introduced, this section addresses  past research studies 
and their findings. The findings of extant literature related to CEO duality mainly include 
five major categories comprised of the consequences, the antecedents, and the firm 




The review outlines these major themes of the effects of CEO duality, contextualizing the 
focus of the current study. 
Consequences of CEO Duality 
Regarding the consequences of CEO duality with respect to succession effects, 
Krause et al. (2013) recognized that (a) CEO duality increases power and comes with a 
corresponding increase in accountability; (b) a more powerful CEO is more accountable 
for firm performance; and (c) separating CEO and chairperson does not often lead to 
more effective monitoring. Secondly, regarding the consequences of CEO duality on 
entrenchment activity, boards with CEO duality tend to adopt antitakeover measures to 
undermine the value and the voting power of a potential takeover (Sundaramurthy, 1996). 
In addition, boards with CEO duality often devote less effort on monitoring activities, 
and organizational factors such poor performance and CEO duality moderated this effect 
(Bierman, 2010). 
Antecedents of CEO Duality 
Researchers examining antecedents of CEO duality with respect to the role of 
firm performance in determining how firms choose duality suggested that, historically, 
strong firm performance often precedes consolidation of CEO and chairperson positions, 
while poor firm performance often leads to the splitting of the top roles (Harrison, Torres, 
& Kukalis, 1988). In terms of the antecedents of governance characteristics, according to 
Harrison et al. (1988), when the board has already possessed a high level of 
independence, the independence of chairperson might not benefit organization more. 




structure. Reversely, when CEO power is low, the CEO may need more supports rather 
than monitoring, and thus a vigilant board would adopt a duality structure (Findelstein & 
D’ Aveni, 1994). Furthermore, when monitoring activities appear to be more costly, 
especially under conditions of strategic complexity, boards tend to reduce monitoring and 
prefer the separation of CEO and chair positions simply as a means of accessing 
information rather than for monitoring (Krause et al., 2013). 
With respect to the individual-level antecedents, CEO tenure and age play a role 
in a firm’s decision to adopt CEO duality (Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2008). Specifically, 
according to Linck et al. (2008), firms often consolidate the two top positions as the CEO 
ages. Furthermore, in apprentice separations, in which the former CEO remains chair, and 
demotion separations, in which the CEO still remains in that role but relinquishes the 
chair position to a director of the board, CEOs tended to be oldest, and middle-aged, 
respectively, whereas boards use demotion separation to give young CEOs who are not 
performing optimally a second chance.  
Firm Performance 
Past research of the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance 
showed no concrete direct and simple relationship (Krause et al., 2013; Lawal, 2013). 
Rechner and Dalton (1989), the first researchers in the field, began the study of the 
relationship between CEO duality and firm performance by analyzing Fortune 500 
companies. When measuring firm performance using accounting-based measures of 
return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and return on investment (ROI), Rechner 




duality. In contrast, when examining the mean shareholder return of U.S corporations in 
various industries, Donaldson and Davis (1991) found that the shareholder return for 
firms with CEO duality was significantly greater than that for those without CEO duality. 
Nevertheless, Daily and Dalton (1992, 1993) found CEO duality had no effect on firm 
performance in either accounting or market-based measures for small firms. 
Given the conflicting evidence of the relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance, researchers studying CEO duality focused on the organizational outcomes 
immediately after announcements of changes in the leadership structure of the boards. 
Baliga, Moyer, and Rao (1996) studied the performance effects of CEO duality on three 
circumstances: reactions of the market in response to changes in board leadership 
structure, companies’ operating performance after changes in board leadership structure, 
and the market values gained by firms with CEO duality and firms without CEO duality. 
Baliga et al. analyzed a sample of Fortune 500 firms and found no support for a 
relationship between CEO duality and firm performance. 
Attempting to identify patterns of findings in prior studies related to board 
composition, leadership structure, and company performance, Dalton, Ellstrand, and 
Johnson (1998) performed a meta-analysis. Dalton et al. noticed that different 
performance measures used in studies did sometimes change the relationships between 
variables. According to Dalton el al., while the market-based measures gave slightly 
positive correlation between CEO duality and performance, the accounting-based 




Researchers continued CEO duality scholarship by examining its effects on 
interim CEO succession and strategic change. Arguing that in a CEO succession a firm 
might face risks of top management dissolution, Ballinger and Marcel (2010) argued that 
CEO duality fosters top management unity. Ballinger and Marcel’s analysis of S&P 500 
firms supported this argument. Quigley and Hambrick (2012) investigated the effects of 
CEO duality on strategic change in firms going through CEO succession in which former 
CEOs were retained as board chairs. Based on an analysis of U.S high technology 
companies, Quigley and Hambrick concluded that firms that retained their CEOs as board 
chairs following succession events faced obstacles with strategic change, negatively 
affecting their ultimate performance.  
Contributing to the literature on CEO duality’s effects on firm performance 
following CEO succession, Krause and Semadeni (2013) focused on three types of 
splitting the CEO and corporate board chairperson positions: apprentice, departure, and 
demotion. Krause and Semadeni explained that, in apprentice separation, the former CEO 
remains chair, whereas in departure separation, the CEO/chair leaves the company, and 
the company installs two separate individuals to hold the CEO and board chair positions. 
In demotion separation, the former CEO remains CEO but relinquishes the corporate 
chairperson position to another director of the board. Based on their analysis of S&P 500 
companies, Krause and Semadeni asserted that the performance benefits achieved from 
the separation depend on the circumstances in which the separation happened. 
Specifically, according to Krause and Semadeni, demotion separation positively 




according to Krause and Semadeni, the search for the link between CEO duality and firm 
performance is far from finished and should continue, and CEO duality’s performance 
implications are conditional and complex.  
Board Independence  
Bliss (2011) investigated whether CEO duality undermined or compromised the 
role of boards of directors in higher quality audits. Bliss argued that independent directors 
on the board would most likely demand more audit work, resulting in higher quality 
audits, and there would be an association between the audit fee pricing and the 
proposition of an independent board. Secondly, Bliss theorized that CEO duality would 
moderate the higher quality audits demanded by independent boards of firms with CEO 
duality, and the positive association between audit fee pricing and the proposition of 
independent directors would be weaker in firms with CEO duality. Furthermore, audit 
firms tended to perceive larger boards as risky clients, thus requiring greater audit efforts. 
These assumptions set the foundations for Bliss’s examination of the association between 
audit fee pricing and the proposition of independent directors of boards of firms with or 
without CEO duality leadership structures. 
Bliss’s (2011) findings suggested that companies with more independent boards 
demand higher audit quality and efforts and that this association is only present in 
companies without CEO duality, suggesting that CEO duality constrains board 
independence. The findings of this study also supported the proposition against CEO 
duality, as CEO duality might compromise the effectiveness and the independence of the 




Organizational Slack and Firm Performance  
Past researchers explored direct relationships between CEO duality and 
organizational slack and firm performance. Specifically, Peng (2010) examined how 
CEO duality and organizational slack affect the performance of China’s state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and privately-owned enterprises (POEs). Peng defined absorbed slack 
and unabsorbed slack as underutilized capacity and uncommitted cash flows and 
untapped lines of credit, respectively. According to Peng, the integral link between how 
boards monitored and controlled the CEO and how the CEO tapped into organizational 
unabsorbed slack to operate could influence firm performance.  
Peng (2010) argued that, while CEO duality might increase the speed of making 
decisions and reduce potential conflicts at the top, CEOs in CEO duality organizations 
could use organizational slack for their benefit at the expenses of the organizations. 
Specifically, due to inherent agency problem associated with CEO duality, Peng 
proposed that in China’s SOEs, CEO duality reduced the positive relationship between 
organizational slack and firm performance, as the CEO of SOEs would tend to use 
organizational slack for their own benefit at the expense of the company. Furthermore, 
due to the nature of SOEs being passive in decision making, having CEO duality for 
making fast decisions might not be necessary or applicable. Contrary to China’s SEOs, 
Peng argued that POEs were more proactive regarding the turbulent markets, and CEO 
duality enabled CEOs to make faster decisions in strategically utilizing organizational 




The main findings implied that organizational slack was positively related to firm 
performance. However, while CEO duality was positively related to firm performance in 
POEs, it was negatively related to firm performance in SOEs. The practical implication is 
that when judging whether CEO duality or organizational slack are negative or positive 
for companies, Peng (2010) suggested practitioners should contemplate and approach 
organizational slack and CEO duality with an integrative and contingent perspective. 
A Contingency Approach  
Boyd (1995) used the framework of the agency and stewardship theories to 
investigate the relationship between CEO duality and performance. Specifically, Boyd 
applied three dimensions of environmental uncertainty (munificence, dynamism, and 
complexity) to examine these factors in relation to CEO duality. Boyd explained 
munificence depicts the abundance of resources in the environment while dynamism and 
complexity are concerned with environmental volatility and inequalities among 
competitors, respectively. Boyd concluded that CEO duality has positive effects on firm 
performance in some industry conditions and negative effects on other conditions. 
Specifically, CEO duality was good for companies operating in conditions of resource 
scarcity and high complexity. The practical implication of Boyd’s study is that when 
considering the separation of the positions of CEO and chairperson, firms need to 
consider the merit of CEO duality versus the potential abuses associated with agency 





Following Boyd’s (1995) lead in examining the relationship between CEO duality 
and firm performance in various conditions or circumstances, Braun and Sharma (2007) 
examined empirically the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance of 
family controlled public firms (FCPFs). Braun and Sharma assumed that the separation of 
CEO and corporate board chairperson would provide an important check in making sure 
that a single executive did not dominate decision-making processes, and the nondual 
structure suggested the controlling family’s awareness of the noncontrolling 
shareholders’ interests. Furthermore, an FCPF with family members owning large shares 
and a duality governance structure might hurt firm performance due to possible extreme 
entrenchment by the family. Grounded by the perspectives of stewardship theorists, 
Braun and Sharma posited that family members already act like corporate stewards, 
protecting companies and making decisions in the best interests of the organizations. 
Furthermore, the combination of high level of ownership of the family operating the firm 
and a CEO duality structure would stimulate the family to commit to organizational 
effectiveness and commitment. 
 However, Braun and Sharma’s (2007) analysis suggested the separation or the 
unification of CEO and board chair did not have any impact on firm performance. 
Nevertheless, family ownership moderated the relationship between CEO duality and 
firm performance. Specifically, the results indicated that family ownership influences the 
shareholder return in firms without CEO duality structures, but not in their counterparts, 
suggesting that the separation of the CEO and board chair position is more effective when 




(2007) study reinforced the contingent aspect of the relationship between CEO duality 
and firm performance.  
Elsayed (2010) demonstrated the determination of the appropriateness of the 
board leadership structure depends on some contextual variables, such as firm size, age, 
past performance, and ownership structure, and that the CEO nonduality structure (the 
agency theory) and the CEO duality structure (the stewardship theory) were valid in 
certain conditions. According to Elsayed, prior poor financial performance correlated 
positively with CEO duality, and as firms became bigger, the probability that firms would 
split the CEO and chairperson position increased. Secondly, old firms tended to adopt the 
CEO duality structure. In terms of the effects of ownership, managers increased their 
ownership to enhance their voting power and to initiate and press for decisions that 
served their interests and weakened the independence and monitoring power of the board. 
Thirdly, considering the perspectives of agency theory, Elsayed theorized that higher 
employee ownership would serve as an effective insider control mechanism in a CEO 
duality situation, and institutional investors, with their knowledge and ability to hire 
professionals, are more likely to challenge and control firm performance. Furthermore, to 
counteract their inability to control management, private shareholders leaned toward the 
CEO nonduality structure. Moreover, in the developing market, where corporate 
governance was not well established and monitoring would incur more costs, foreign 





The outcomes of Elsayed’s (2010) examination of the relationship between CEO 
duality and firm factors including size, age, managerial, individual, institutional, and 
foreign investors empirically suggested that board leadership structure varies with firm 
size, age, and ownership structure. While CEO duality correlated negatively with firm 
size, it was positively associated with firm age. Old firms tended to adopt CEO duality, as 
they preferred fast response to environmental changes or unified decision-making 
processes as part of efforts to adapt. Moreover, the preference of board leadership 
structure varied with the type of ownership. Specifically, insider shareholders seemed to 
prefer CEO duality structures while institutional, private, and foreign holders sought 
CEO nonduality structures. Similar to the notion of the reconciliation of the opposing 
agency and stewardship theories, Elsayed emphasized that both agency and stewardship 
theories could be complementary to each other under certain business conditions,  
Researchers also studied CEO duality with firms going through restructuring. 
Cashen (2011) focused on the effect of board leadership in firms that decided to execute a 
portfolio restructuring due to poor performance. Cashen suggested that firms adopted or 
moved away from CEO duality structures as corrective actions to align the interests of 
shareholders. Specifically, Cashen explored whether portfolio-restructuring firms 
exhibited a reduction in CEO duality in the postrestructuring period. Cashen’s findings 
supported the proposition that restructuring firms did change governance structures along 
with other restructurings in order to enhance organizational performance. Based on 
Cashen’s analysis, in nonrestructuring firms, poor performance did not have any impact 




eventually chose nonduality structures, while the restructuring firms in the moderately 
performing group exhibited duality structures. Seemingly, companies took these adoptive 
actions as corrective means to align the interests of shareholders. Noticeably, Cashen  
suggested the proposition that firms would need to adopt nonduality governance 
structures to reflect socially valid and desired trends.  
Industry Contingency 
Expanding on the contingency approach of Boyd (1995), Young, Stedham, and 
Beekun (2000) focused on corporate governance and contexts specific to each industry. 
In this study, Young et al. (2000) used multiple theoretical frameworks to study corporate 
governance issues in hospitals. In addition to using agency perspectives stressing the 
need of a control procedure to align interests of the principles (owners) and the agents 
(CEO), and to avoid having a CEO as a chairperson, which could potentially lead to 
problems of conflicts of interest, Young et al. also deployed the approach of institutional 
perspective. From an institutional view, organizations sometimes are under constant 
pressure to conform to accepted norms, and thus establish corporate boards to serve a 
linkage role and to maintain a legitimate relationship with the external environment. 
Young et al. concluded that board independence, competition, and managed care 
penetration are important factors that influence boards to adopt CEO formal evaluation. 
Young et al. emphasized that organizations should not attempt to improve governance 
through policies that aim to increase board independence. Instead, organizations should 




The proposition that the effects of corporate governance vary contingently 
depending on the type of industry resonates with the work of Brickley, Cole, and Jarrell 
(1997). Based on the costs associated with the separation of the CEO and chairperson 
titles, Brickley et al. (1997) asserted no leadership structure obviously worked best for all 
industries, and perhaps the optimal leadership structure depended on the economic 
circumstances facing the firm. Based on the descriptive and regression analysis of the 
characteristics and effects of leadership structures of large U.S. companies, Brickley et al. 
noted that no firms in the samples of interest had an independent outsider as chairperson, 
and after splitting the titles during CEO transitions periods, most firms reverted to CEO 
duality structures over time. The findings confounded the interpretations of past studies 
that compared firm performance with different leadership structures. Furthermore, 
Brickley et al.  concluded that in firms that separated the titles, the chairperson often had 
detailed knowledge of the company and often owned high stock ownership. In addition, 
firms used the titles of chairperson, CEO, and president as incentive in their succession 
plans for CEOs. In contrast to the conclusions of previous studies investigating link 
between CEO duality and firm performance, the researchers found no evidence that CEO 
duality did not have a direct relationship with inferior accounting and market returns. 
Researchers have extensively studied the relationship between CEO duality and 
firm performance across industries in the past two decades. However, as reviewed in this 
section, past empirical results have not been conclusive (Kang, 2005; Lawal, 2011; 
Shukeri, 2012). One of the gaps in extant literature in this field is that prior researchers 




of these researchers has focused specifically on for-profit or not-for-profit organizations 
in the healthcare sector. Considering that CEO duality and firm performance are 
contextually specific to each type of industry (Boyd, 1995; Cashen, 2011; Elsayed, 2010; 
Young et al., 2000), further study of the effects of CEO duality on the financial 
performance of healthcare organizations could potentially deliver some additional 
contributions to the existing knowledge of corporate governance research. The discussion 
now turns to healthcare governance. 
Healthcare Governance  
American hospital boards face greater expectations of management accountability 
and carry the ultimate responsibility for the quality of care provided by their 
organizations and for overall performance (Alexander, Weiner, & Bogue, 2001; 
Chambers, 2012). The roles of hospital boards range from establishing and initiating 
policy, mission, and strategic direction to interacting with key external constituencies, 
organizing fundraising activities, monitoring hospitals, and evaluating management 
performance (Lee, Alexander, & Wang, 2007). Importantly, Flanning and Power (2008) 
claimed healthcare organizations manage both corporate governance and clinical 
governance, making healthcare governance complex. The following section discusses the 
essential aspects of clinical governance in hospital boards. 
Clinical Governance 
Brennan and Flynn (2013) defined clinical governance as standards, structures, 
and systems that healthcare organizations establish and apply to create a culture and to 




governance, clinical accountability and responsibility bestowed on healthcare 
organizations involve the monitoring and oversight of clinical activities, including 
regulation, audit, assurance, and compliance by boards of directors, regulators, and both 
external and internal auditors. Brennan and Flynn emphasized clinical governance is an 
evolving concept in the healthcare sector, and to the extent that patient safety and high 
quality care have become focal points of state and federal regulations, the responsibility 
and the accountability of a typical hospital board continue to increase. As a result, both 
for-profit and not-for-profit hospital boards rely on governance education and best 
practices to assist their members in meeting their fiduciary responsibilities. 
Regulatory entities, communities, and various constituencies have argued that the 
governance and management of clinical governance improve delivery of clinical practice, 
and thus deliver better healthcare quality (Goodman, 2002; Thomas, 2002). The Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organization (JCAHO) has made it clear 
that hospital boards are responsible for overseeing clinical quality (Jonas, Kovner, & 
Knickman, 2008). Faced with these high expectations and demands, boards of healthcare 
organizations have embraced clinical governance as an added responsibility. Hacker, 
Liford, and Jordan (1999) and Stanton (2006) asserted that healthcare boards now 
consider clinical governance as important as corporate governance because it promotes 
and ensures an integrated approach to good practices, improved quality, and most of all 
connects administrative and clinical elements, providing a comprehensive framework for 




Ultimately, healthcare boards pursue effective clinical governance in order to 
meet patients’ high expectations about healthcare quality and safety, to assist in 
collaborative efforts and efficiency among clinical teams, to increase job satisfaction for 
healthcare professionals, to improve clinical outcomes, and to reduce significantly 
medical errors (Gerada & Cullen, 2004). However, in order to achieve effective clinical 
governance, a healthcare board needs to be a collaborative effort between boards, CEOs, 
and executives, as well as leaders of the physicians and other licensed independent 
practitioners (Brennan, & Flynn, 2013). The latter leader group uniquely exists in 
healthcare organizations, but not in other business sectors, and enhances the 
organization’s ability to achieve its goals by providing technical knowledge, clinical 
experiences, and decision making with respect to safety and high quality care. Therefore, 
considering licensed medical staff or physicians as members of the governing body in 
healthcare sector addresses the unique challenges faced by the leadership of healthcare 
organizations. 
Governance in Not-For-Profit Hospitals  
Governance is a critical matter for both for-profit and not-for-profit organizations 
in healthcare sector. However, by some measures, not-for-profit hospitals appear to 
encounter more challenges with respect to governance than their for-profit counterparts 
do. For instance, recruiting volunteer board members with relevant expertise to assist not-
for-profit hospitals manage rapid changes in technology, shifting government policies, 
intense market competition, and burdensome liability exposure can be difficult (Roberts 




leads to poor and detrimental decisions within an organization, resulting in bad 
investment or ill-planned program initiatives, and consequentially creating financial 
troubles or other problems sometimes difficult to recognize and correct for a hospital. 
Essentially, the boards of not-for-profit hospitals have to ensure that the management 
measures risks prudently in order for the organization to survive in the long run to 
continue its mission. Strategically, boards focus on long-term strategies and survival by 
proactively anticipating several years in advance the issues and changes that may arise in 
the marketplace. 
The board of a not-for-profit hospital has greater involvement in operational and 
program management issues because the board must balance its stated mission with the 
need to build financial resources, ensuring the hospital’s long-term viability (Steane & 
Christie, 2001). Moreover, unlike a for-profit organization, a not-for-profit hospital does 
not have to meet owners’ demands for a return on their equity investment. However, a 
not-for-profit hospital has to satisfy mandates from both internal and external 
constituencies, including physicians admitting patients to the hospital, private insurers, 
government payers including Medicare and Medicaid, regulators, and bondholders.  
In the healthcare sector, members of an effective board must have divergent skills, 
including knowledge specific to the healthcare industry and clinical experience. Boards 
also need to understand quality and safety issues, third-party reimbursement 
methodologies, and accounting, legal, and business and investment management. 
Furthermore, to meet challenges adequately, governing boards of healthcare delivery 




efficiently from the management. The following section presents the arguments for 
having doctors on boards and using CEO duality structures for not-for-profit hospitals.  
Doctors on Boards  
Skills for board members entail expertise and qualifications in corporate 
management, finance, audit, law, human resources, capital management, strategic 
information technology, risk management, and clinical governance. Other important 
qualification factors include: (a) integrity and the capacity to understand the needs of the 
community and patients; (b) knowledge of the policy context of health, governance 
processes, strategic thinking, planning, and leadership skills; and (c) experience in high-
level decision making and in effective consultation and collaboration with various 
stakeholders.  
The question is whether doctors should be on healthcare boards. Considering that 
an effective healthcare board needs to be able to execute both corporate and clinical 
governance, and especially to have capacity to understand and reflect the views of the 
community and users of health services, it seems that the absence of physicians on the 
healthcare board would limit or minimize the board’s effectiveness. Eekloo, Delsie, and 
Vleugels (2007) reported that European healthcare professionals have shown vital board 
functions with their clinical expertise. Bass (2008), while acknowledging the possibility 
of the issues of conflict of interest and voting powers, asserted that doctors on boards are 
important and indispensable assets for good governance in healthcare. A survey 
conducted by the United States Center for Healthcare Governance concluded that 67% of 




roles in the organizations, and 42% did so because of their expertise in clinical quality 
(Bennington, 2010). In the United States, healthcare boards tend to have 2-3 doctors as 
board members (Orlikoff & Totten, 2006). If having a doctor as a board director can 
enhance the leadership and governance of health services, then it can be hypothesized 
that having doctors as healthcare board members is positively related with financial 
performance of the not-for-profit hospitals.  
CEO Duality in Healthcare Governance  
Under agency theory, powerful chief executive officers and executive 
management tend to dominate boards, and knowledgeable and independent directors are 
necessary to counterbalance the power of management (Stevenson & Radin, 2009). 
However, despite that much regulation has focused on the importance of independent 
directors for corporations, American hospital governance does not appear to have great 
concern with interlocking directorships, or a number of other practices such as CEO 
duality, that agency theory would view as unacceptable (Chambers, 2012).  
Proponents of the managerial stakeholder and resource-dependency theories view 
directors as independent monitors with consultative functions, using knowledge achieved 
from interacting with a social network (Chamber, 2012). Directors bring human capital to 
firms, assist organizations in reducing dependencies on external resources or seek 
external resources that could benefit the firms, decrease transaction costs, establish 
credibility, expand boundary span, and advise the management with strategies and 
initiatives that ultimately add to firm performance (Shortell, 1989; Umbdenstock, 




According to Wall et al.(2006), the prohibition on CEOs or senior executives on boards 
did not align with approaches and purposes of boards in healthcare organizations. 
Considering that CEOs or executives may possesses specialized knowledge valuable to a 
healthcare organization, having executives on boards potentially results in greater sharing 
of information and opportunities and reduces coordination costs (Brickley, Coles, & 
Jarrell, 1997).  
In addition to being primarily responsible for providing oversight, advice, and 
guidance to CEOs, as well as monitoring and, if necessary, disciplining CEOs, boards 
have become strategic partners working in collaboration with management (Anderson, 
Melanson, & Maly, 2007). In healthcare, different relationships between CEOs and board 
members have emerged (Bevan, 2010; Bjork, 2006). According to Bjork (2006), 
leadership in healthcare has become collaborative, involving an overlap between 
leadership and governance and between leadership and management. Therefore, I 
expected a positive relationship between CEO duality and financial performance of not-
for-profit hospitals.  
Hospital Financial Indicators 
Researchers have used consistently identical performance measures to study 
financial performance of for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals. For instance, Joseph, 
Thomas, and Robert (2009) applied ratios derived from total operating revenue and other 
financial information related to assets, liabilities, and patient admissions to study hospital 
costs and efficiency with respect to hospital size and ownership. Similarly, in a study 




considered critical, Love, Revere, and Black (2008) concluded that healthcare decision 
makers measure operating profit margin, cash on hand, charity care, net profit margin, 
bad debt expenses, and days in accounts receivable. Specifically, Prince (1991) asserted 
healthcare management groups paid attention to financial measures such as net patient 
revenue, other operating revenue, operating expenses, operating margin, and 
nonoperating expenses to access financial outcomes of not-for-profit community 
hospitals.  
Important governmental entities also used similar categories of healthcare 
financial data to evaluate states’ not-for-profit health care facilities. For instance, the 
OSHPD supports the State of California healthcare delivery system (oshpd.ca.gov, 2011). 
OSHPD delivers various services designed to increase healthcare accessibility within 
California. Relevantly, OSHPD mitigates capital needs for not-for-profit healthcare 
facilities in California by providing loan insurance to these organizations. Regarding 
financial measurement, OSHPD uses two financial ratios comprised of operating margin 
and total margin, which it considers the most important key indicators to measure a 
hospital’s financial performance.  
The operating margin. The operating margin, most commonly used in 
measuring a hospital’s financial performance, compares a hospital’s total operating 
revenue against its total operating expenses (Cleverley, Song, & Cleverley, 2010). If total 
operating revenue exceeds total operating expenses, the hospital operates with a profit. 
Conversely, when a hospital achieves total operating revenue less than total operating 




revenue and total operating expenses by the total operating revenues gives the operating 
margin. Total operating revenue is comprised of the sum of net patient revenue (e.g., 
payments received for routine nursing care, emergency services, surgery services, lab 
tests, etc.) and other operating revenue such as cafeteria sales, refunds on purchases, 
vending machine commissions, parking lot revenue, et cetera. Total operating expenses 
include expenses associated with running the hospital, such as salaries, employee 
benefits, purchased services, supplies, professional fees, depreciation, rentals, interest, 
and insurance. However, total operating expenses do not include bad debts or income 
taxes. 
The total margin. The operating margin involves revenue derived from 
operation, the total margin, often called total profit margin, and is considered the most 
popular indicator of hospital profitability (Cleverley et al., 2010). It compares a hospital’s 
net income against its total operating revenue. The total margin includes all other sources 
of revenue and expenses that are not associated with operations, such as nonoperating 
revenues (e.g., investment income, unrestricted contribution, medical office building, gift 
shop revenue, etc.) and nonoperating expenses (e.g., office building expenses, gift shop 
expenses, loss of sale of hospital properties, etc.), income tax, and any extraordinary 
items. Dividing net income by total operating revenue generates the total margin. Net 
income is the excess of revenue over expenses. When hospitals report substantial 
amounts of nonoperating revenue or expense, the total margin differs significantly from 




Free cash flow. Free cash flow shows an organization’s cash inflow and outflow 
rather than its accounting earnings. Importantly, free cash flow represents the amount of 
cash left over after undertaking the firm’s operations and making all investments 
necessary to ensure its continuous operation (Horngren et al., 2006). Calculating the 
change in net assets plus interest and noncash expenses minus investments in fixed assets 
and net working capital generates free cash flow.  
Not-For-Profit Hospitals’ Equity 
Profitable hospitals retain and reinvest their earnings to gain higher growth in 
equity capital. For not-for-profit hospitals, retaining earnings represents the most 
important source of equity. While their counterparts raise equity externally by issuing 
shares, not-for-profit hospitals have to rely on internal operations to build equity and 
supplement growing equity efforts with profitable nonoperating activities, such as raising 
funds through donations and gifts and managing their financial investments (Reiter & 
Song, 2011).  
Most recently, Singh, Wheeler, and Roden (2012) attempted to explore whether 
effective revenue cycle management helped not-for-profit hospitals improve their 
profitability, strengthen their ability to grow equity, and thus remain financially viable in 
the long term. Using fixed effects regression analysis assessing four key financial 
indicators, namely operating margin, total profit margin, free cash flow, and the value of 
the hospital’s equity capital, Singh et al. found a strong relationship between revenue 
cycle management and profitability and equity capital of 1,397 bond-issuing not-for-




As previously mentioned, the goal of this study was to determine the relationship 
between CEO duality and the financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals, as well as 
the link between healthcare governance boards with doctors as board members and the 
financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. Logistics regression has been used in 
board leadership and firm performance (Darus, 2011; Elssayed, 2010; Gill & Mathur, 
2011; Harjoto, 2008; Peng et al., 2010). The study used a statistical model of estimated 
logistic regression to seek the relationships between the financial performance of not-for-
profit hospitals (the dependent variables) and the five independent variables (CEO 
duality, presence of physicians on hospital boards, hospital age, hospital size, and board 
size). 
Summary  
This literature review focused on corporate governance theories with emphasis on 
the two integral opposing theories, namely agency theory and stewardship theory, which 
are critical to studies of the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance. The 
literature review also elaborated the proposed integration of the agency and stewardship 
theories that would assist in deriving inclusive results of studies related to CEO duality 
and firm performance. Considering that the contextual and contingent aspects of the 
healthcare industry, specifically not-for-profit hospitals, the review of uniqueness of 
healthcare governance provides the rationale for the study of CEO duality’s effects on 
not-for-profit hospitals. Specifically the review covered separation of ownership and 
control, CEO duality, corporate governance theories, major themes in studies of CEO 




Chapter 3: Research Method 
Not-for-profit hospitals face great challenges of competition position and changes 
related to operational efficiency, market standing, and financial viability (Alexander & 
Lee, 2006). According to Owen (2005), political and community leaders have 
increasingly pressed not-for-profit hospitals to enhance their effectiveness and 
performance for community benefits. Pay-for-performance initiatives strongly passed and 
supported by the government have encouraged not-for-profit hospitals to improve their 
performance (Lee, Chen, & Weiner, 2004). Furthermore, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
enacted in 2002 by the U.S. Congress to enforce better regulations of corporations, has 
also been made relevant to the practices of external regulations and the oversight of 
governance boards and conduct of various not-for-profit organizations (Greene, 2005). 
These developments have provided the rationale for designing effective governance for 
not-for-profit organizations. Therefore, there is a need for researchers to identify 
governance models that not-for-profit hospitals can adopt to enhance their effectiveness 
and performance.  
As the literature review of this study indicated, the research problem addressed in 
this study was that no researchers have sought specifically the relationship between CEO 
duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, hospital size, hospital age, board 
size, and financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals of the healthcare sector. The 
objective was to examine the effects of CEO duality, presence of physicians on 
governance boards, hospital age, hospital size, and board size on the financial 




specific for not-for-profit hospitals and their administrators who may seek an appropriate 
corporate governance structure that would enhance their organizational effectiveness. 
The three research questions, three hypotheses, along with three associated 
hypotheses were as follows: 
Research Question 1: Was there a positive, statistically significant relationship 
between CEO duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, 
hospital size, board size, and total margin of not-for-profit hospitals? 
H10: There was no significant statistical relationship between CEO duality, 
presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board size, 
and total margin of not-for-profit hospitals. 
H1a: There was a positive, statistically significant relationship between CEO 
duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board 
size, and total margin of not-for-profit hospitals. CEO duality and presence of physicians 
on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, and board size enhance total margin 
of not-for-profit hospitals. 
Research Question 2: Was there a positive, statistically significant relationship 
between CEO duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, 
hospital size, board size, and operating margin of not-for-profit hospitals? 
H20: There was no significant statistical relationship between CEO duality, 
presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board size, 




H2a: There was a positive, statistically significant relationship between CEO 
duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board 
size, and operating margin of not-for-profit hospitals. CEO duality, presence of 
physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, and board size enhance 
operating margin of not-for-profit hospitals. 
Research Question 3: Was there a positive, statistically significant relationship 
between CEO duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, 
hospital size, board size, and free cash flow of not-for-profit hospitals? 
H30: There was no significant statistical relationship between CEO duality, 
presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board size, 
and free cash flow of not-for-profit hospitals. 
H3a: There was a positive, statistically significant relationship between CEO 
duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board 
size, and operating margin of not-for-profit hospitals. CEO duality, presence of 
physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, and board size enhance 
free cash flow of not-for-profit hospitals. 
In the following sections, I explain the research methodology to test the 
hypotheses. In the first section, I outline the research design and approach as well as the 
justification for using this design and approach, which was derived logically from the 
problem statement of the study. The second section addresses the setting and sampling, 
which comprise components of (a) the population from which the targeted not-for-profit 




selecting organizations for the study, the sampling frame, the sample size, and the 
rationale for the sample size. The instrumentation section shows the instruments that have 
been used to measure variables in past studies examining the relationship between 
corporate governance and financial performance and the definitions and explanations of 
the calculation of dependent and independent variables. In the fourth section, I present 
details of data collection, which include secondary data collected from both public and 
private databases. The fifth section involves the data analysis of the study using a 
multiple regression model. In the sixth section, I elaborate on the hypothesis formulation. 
The last two sections of the chapter include explanations of the protection of the selected 
organizations and the dissemination of findings.  
Research Design and Approach 
This quantitative research included a multiple regression analysis approach using 
secondary data as input variables to determine whether there was a significant 
relationship between CEO duality, the presence of physicians on governance boards, 
hospital size, hospital age, board size, and financial performance of not-for-profit 
hospitals. In the following section, I describe the research design and the justification for 
selecting it.  
Description of Research Design 
The objective was to examine the relationship between several independent and 
dependent variables. The multiple regression model was as follows:  




The subscript i refers to the hospital number and ɛ denotes the error. Yi is the 
outcome or dependent variable, b0 is intercept, b1 is the coefficient of the predictor of X1, 
b2 is the coefficient of the predictor X2, and bn is the coefficient of the nth predictor Xn. 
Justification  
Because the goal of this study was to examine the relationship between 
independent and dependent variables, I determined that the quantitative approach was the 
most appropriate research method. Creswell (2009) suggested that a qualitative research 
approach is designed for exploratory study and used in research in which variables and 
theories are not known. The theories of agency, stewardship, and clinical governance as 
well as variables such as CEO duality and financial indicators, which were used as the 
theoretical framework for the study, are well known. Furthermore, Creswell asserted that 
quantitative approaches best address problems in situations in which researchers want to 
understand what variables or factors influence an outcome. Therefore, for this study, the 
quantitative approach was more appropriate than the qualitative approach to determine 
whether there was a significant relationship between CEO duality, the presence of 
physicians on governance boards, hospital size, hospital age, board size, and financial 
performance of not-for-profit hospitals.  
 Although quantitative approaches have limitations, such as possible assumptions 
that may interfere with outcomes, its several advantages outweighed its limitations. As I 
investigated the relationships among CEO duality, the presence of physicians on 
governance boards, hospital size, hospital age, board size, and financial performance of 




and financial data available from public databases and annual proxy statements of 
targeted not-for-profit hospitals. The use of the quantitative research method and archived 
data allows unbiased approaches and statistical IBM SPPS software for data analysis, 
which are rigors that qualitative approaches lack, making the qualitative approach less 
suitable for the objective of this study. Most importantly, the large sampling of not-for-
hospitals contained in the databases of OSHPD helps achieve reliable outcomes and 
generalize the findings of the study to larger population (Anderson, Prause, & Silver, 
2011). 
Researchers have used combinations of qualitative and quantitative approaches 
for CEO duality studies. Brickley and Jarrell (1997) used qualitative research to advocate 
for combining the positions of the CEO and chairperson of the board by addressing the 
costs associated with the separation of CEO duality leadership structures. Brickley and 
Jarrell expanded the study with the quantitative method, using regression analysis of 
characteristics and effects of leadership structures of large U.S. firms to show the 
efficiency of combining the title of CEO and chairperson of the board. However, the 
limitation of Brickley and Jarrell’s study lies within the qualitative component of the 
study. Specifically, Brickley and Jarrell’s study did not qualitatively demonstrate the 
costs and benefits of dual leadership in order to provide clear and definitive evidence that 
combining titles would provide a better leadership structure. Compared with a 
quantitative approach, qualitative design is viewed to be less scientific and less rigorous 
(Meadow, 2003). Furthermore, findings of studies using qualitative approaches are (a) 




unable to test hypotheses, and (d) influenced by the researcher’s personal biases and 
idiosyncrasies (Anderson, 2010). Therefore, the mixed method, which is comprised of 
both qualitative and quantitative approaches, is not appropriate for this study.  
In quantitative approaches, researchers have used cross-sectional designs, quasi-
experimental designs, preexperimental designs, and secondary data in social sciences 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). According 
to Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008), cross-sectional designs are used 
predominantly in studies using surveys. The quasi-experimental designs are similar to the 
cross-sectional designs except that they usually involve more than one sample and are 
appropriate in studies examining participants or events over extended periods of time. 
The preexperimental designs are ideal for case study and for studies where 
experimentation is impossible. Because the survey method and case study were not 
applicable to this study, the cross-sectional, quasi-experimental, and preexperimental 
designs were not selected as the research designs for this study.  
Researchers use secondary data or archived data collected by others and used in 
various disciplines to make comparisons and derive interferences concerning events or 
issues or to advance prior studies (Singleton & Straits, 2005). Secondary data include 
public records and private records (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). The public 
records include actuarial records (e.g., records of birth, deaths, marriages, and divorces), 
legislative and other official records, governmental documents, and mass media. The 
private records include autobiographies, diaries, letters, essays, and the like (Frankfort-




According to Singleton and Straits (2005), the advantages of using secondary data 
are that secondary data are available in vast quantities, previously collected and used by 
others from within the field or from various fields, and much less expensive to obtain 
than collecting primary data. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008) emphasized that 
some research problems can be investigated using only secondary data. From a 
methodological point of view, secondary data allow replications and advancement of past 
studies and increase sample sizes and representativeness, increasing the validity of the 
findings and encompassing generalizations. Researchers have examined the effects of 
CEO duality on financial performance of firms across different industries. This study 
advanced past related research studies in that the goal was to examine specifically the 
relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, and 
financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. Therefore, research based on secondary 
data was determined to be the most appropriate method for this study.  
Researchers have used multiple regression models in studies of the relationship 
between CEO duality and firm performance. For instance, Boyd (1995) used regression 
analysis to study the effects of CEO duality on the return on investment  of firms 
operating in three business environmental conditions, such as munificence (abundance of 
resources), dynamism (environmental volatility), and complexity (inequalities among 
competitors). Amba (2013) used ordinary least square regression analysis to study the 
relationship between a CEO who is a member or the chairperson of the board and firm 
performance (e.g., return on assets, return on equity, and assets turnover). Bliss (2011) 




the level of independence of board of directors along with other control variables of 
financial indicators to determine how CEO duality constrains and affects board 
independence. Using a regression model, Braun and Sharma (2007) measured ownership 
levels, shareholder return, and other control variables pertaining to firm characteristics to 
conclude whether CEOs should also be the chairs of boards of family-controlled public 
firms. Cashen (2011) used logistic regression analysis to examine the relationship 
between CEO duality and return of assets along with moderating variables of time, 
restructuring, or nonrestructuring to explore whether portfolio-restructuring firms exhibit 
a decrease in CEO duality in the postrestructuring period.  
Because the goal of this study was to understand the relationship between several 
independent and dependent variables, the multiple regression model was chosen over 
other statistical models, including analysis of variance (ANOVA), correlation analysis, 
bivariate linear regression analysis, and nonparametric analysis. While the ANOVA test 
evaluates whether the group means on the dependent variables differ significantly among 
each other, the nonparametric tests are useful for measurement of nominal and ordinal 
levels (Field, 2009; Green & Salkind, 2011). Furthermore, according to Field, Green, and 
Salkind (2011), correlation analysis does not distinguish between independent and 
dependent variables. Both correlation analysis and bivariate linear regression analysis 
examine only two variables, a dependent variable and an independent variable, making 




Setting and Sampling 
In this section, I discuss the population from which the targeted not-for-profit 
hospitals were drawn, the sampling method and the associated sampling frame that were 
used in the selection of targeted organizations, the sample size, and the rationale for the 
sample size. Furthermore, I illustrate the eligibility criteria that were used to select 
organizations for the study and the characteristics of the selected not-for-profit hospitals. 
Target Population  
The target population for this study was the healthcare organizations that were 
listed in the OSHPD, which comprehensively contains nonprofit, for-profit, and publicly 
owned hospitals in the State of California. The not-for-profit hospitals were drawn from 
the target population. Angst and Agarwal (2009) and Young et al. (2000) have used 
OSHPD to study the adoption of electronic health records and the adoption of CEO 
performance evaluation processes of healthcare organizations, respectively. Information 
about governance and board information of the targeted hospitals were retrieved from the 
website of each hospital and the Healthcare Atlas website. 
Sampling Method and Frame 
Researchers often use partial information to provide inferences or generalizations 
of their studies, and conclusions based on the outcomes of current research are often 
generalized to a population rather than the sample being studied (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 2008). According to Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008), because 
generalizations are not always possible based on collecting data from all organizations 




inferences based on the results for the larger population of healthcare organizations of 
interest. In order to arrive at proper inferences, the sampling strategy appropriate for the 
research plan was the one that ensured that errors commonly found in sampling frames, 
such as incomplete frames, clusters of elements, and blank foreign elements, which often 
lead to results’ inaccuracy (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008, p. 165), were 
avoided.  
The nonprobability sampling or convenience sampling in which targeted 
organizations are chosen based on convenience and availability was not an appropriate 
sampling method for this study. Instead, the simple random sampling strategy, as part of 
probability sampling, was appropriate for the study and its outcomes’ generalizability, as 
the random probability sampling could provide a relatively accurate estimation of the 
probability that each sampling hospital was included in the samples being investigated. 
Furthermore, in the context of sampling frame, the number of targeted not-for-profit 
hospitals was potentially large; thus, using the simple random sampling strategy was 
more appropriate. Lastly, because systematic sampling, stratified sample, and cluster 
sample strategies involve selecting samples based on interval, sizes, and levels of 
clusters, these characteristics of sampling were not analytical considerations of the 
current study, making these probability sampling techniques irrelevant strategies. 
Screening and eligibility criteria. To narrow the scope of the study to a more 
manageable number of target organizations and to select a representative sample for the 
population, I performed a screening process and a simple random process from the 




not-for-profit hospitals from the list containing both not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals 
from the OSHPD database. Then, I performed an additional screening to choose not-for-
profit hospitals that had complete data appropriate for testing the proposed model using 
the following characteristics:  
 Corporate governance structure information listed in reports for the period of 
2009-2012, such CEO duality or nonCEO duality, and presence or absence of 
physicians on boards. 
 Reports of financial data, such as total margin, operating margin, and cash free 
flow in financial reports for the period of 2009-2012. 
 Market value of at least $50 million. 
The assumption was that large not-for-profit hospitals, defined in this study as 
organizations having market value of $50 million or more, were more likely to consider 
and adopt corporate governance structures than were small and newly established 
organizations.  
Sampling frame. Regarding the sampling process, I used a simple random 
process to draw the final targeted not-for-profit hospitals from the population generated 
from separating the not-for-profit hospitals from their counterparts within the OSHPD 
database and by selecting the not-for-profit hospitals that have enough data for testing the 
proposed model. Probability sampling is more scientifically acceptable than 
nonprobability sampling (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). According to 
Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008), compared to systematic sampling, stratified 




every organization among the population has equal and known probability to be included 
in the sampling for analysis. Probability sampling helps avoid the possibility of 
introducing systematic biases in the selection procedure (Babbie, 2005; Singleton & 
Strait, 2005; Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). Furthermore, using probability 
sampling indicates the selected organizations represent the target population, thereby 
making it possible to generalize research findings to the entire population with 
confidence. 
Sample size and rationale. According to Hektner, Smidt, and Csikszentmihalyi 
(2006), the sample size determination is dependent on the standard error value and on the 
confident interval width established by the researcher. However, Sherperis (2010) 
explained that researchers could rely on statistical power to determine the likelihood that 
results obtained from statistical tests are statistically significant and truly different. 
Furthermore, Burkholder (2009) suggested one way to compute an effect size is to use 
past related research. Zhang, Lu, and Li (2011) conducted a similar study to examine the 
effects of CEO duality on customer satisfaction. The effect size was reported to be 0.14 
(Zhang, Lu, & Li, 2011, p.291), which is a medium effect, suggesting that it may require 
a medium sample size to detect the effect. Using an Alpha level of .05 and the accepted 
value for power or the probability that a test will detect a real relationship (Burkholder, 
2009) of .80, I determined the sample size of this study should be 107. The general 
formula for determining the sample size is 104 + k in a multiple regression test (Field, 
2009, p.222), where k is the number of predictors. Therefore, the calculated sample size 




the samples, I assigned consecutive numbers to each not-for-profit hospital in the 
preselected list in a spreadsheet, and then randomly choose 146 hospitals by using the 
RAND function in Microsoft Excel, which returned an evenly distributed random 
number.  
Instrumentation 
There are no generally accepted CEO duality mechanisms, and rigorous empirical 
research directed at CEO duality and corporate and clinical governance is nonexistent. 
Consequently, numerous definitions and categorizations have been developed depending 
the purpose and interests of researchers. Therefore, several instruments have been used in 
studies in the past that measured CEO duality, corporate and clinical governance, and 
financial performance. 
Measurement 
As noted by Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008), measurement is linked to 
operational definitions. For the study of the effects of CEO duality and presence of 
physicians on governance boards on financial performance, CEO duality, the presence of 
physicians on the governance board, and the financial performance are operationally 
defined. The three levels of measurement that are important to the study include nominal, 
interval, and ratio levels. 
First, the nominal level, the lowest level of measurement, which classifies objects 
or events into categories possessing qualitative characteristics, was the measurement used 
to link the operational definition of the independent variables, which were CEO duality 




classify firms into two categories, with a value of 1 for firms with CEO duality or a value 
of 0 for firms without CEO duality. The presence of physicians on governance boards 
was measured by assigning 1 to each physician present on the board. If no physician was 
present on the board, a value of 0 was assigned. 
When calculating and analyzing data that contain properties of fixed and equal 
units and values that possess natural, absolute, and fixed zero points, measurement at 
interval and ratio levels should be used (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008, p. 147). 
Therefore, the measurement of the dependent variables, including financial indicators, 
such as operating margin, total margin, and free cash flow, involved the measurement of 
the interval and ratio levels. Similarly, the calculation of the remaining variables, such as 
hospital size, hospital age, and board size, involved the measurement of the interval and 
ratio levels.  
When variables exhibit some relation to each other (e.g., higher, greater, more 
desired, and more difficult), they can be measured at the ordinal level. However, none of 
the identified independent and dependent variables for this study possesses the relational 
characteristics of the ordinal level. Therefore, measurement of the ordinal level was not 
appropriate for this study. 
Measurement validity. To ensure that a change in the dependent variables is a 
result of a genuine change in the independent variables, researchers have to establish the 
measurement validity, which includes content, empirical, and construct validity 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachimas 2008). The content validity means the measurement 




the content validity, the sampling validity is the primary concern. This study accounted 
for cases or samples representing the targeted population of not-for-profit hospitals and 
selected organizations with corporate governance structures and financial performance 
that met criteria set by the research design addressed earlier in this research proposal.  
Regarding empirical validity of a measurement instrument, researchers are often 
concerned with the relationship between a measuring instrument and the measured 
outcomes (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachimas, 2008, p.150). Some researchers may 
compare outcomes generated by the study undertaken with results generated in similar 
past studies in the field, while others model measurement instruments used by other 
previous related study. This study measured the financial outcomes, such as total margin, 
operating margin, and free cash flow, which are the common financial indicators of 
hospitals (Joseph, Thomas, & Robert, 2009; Love, Revenue, & Black, 2008; Prince, 
1991). Therefore, with respect to empirical validity, the identified measurement 
instrument for the study did address the validity aspect that the instrument should 
measure what it is intended to measure. 
The construct validity was not a concern of validity measurement for this study. 
The construct validity is a concern only when questionnaires are administered to 
participants (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachimas, 2008, p.153). Questionnaires were not 
used for this study. The analysis of this study used secondary data of financial indicators 
and corporate board information for generating descriptive statistics and testing a 
multiple regression model. Moreover, Zhang, Lu, and Li (2011), in a study of the 




Zardkoohi (2005), in a study of board leadership and firm performance, did not address 
the establishment of construct validity of measurement instruments because these studies 
did not employ questionnaires. Therefore, it was reasonable theoretically to claim that the 
construct validity concern was not applicable for the study undertaken.   
Measurement reliability. Each measurement for a study contains “a true 
component and an error component” (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachimas, 2008, p.154), 
and variable errors are mostly associated with factors, for instance monetary incentives 
and instruction ambiguity that influence the response of participants filling questionnaires 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). This study did not employ questionnaires to seek responses 
from participants. Therefore, measurement validity due to influencing factors 
aforementioned was not a concern.  
Researchers address measurement reliability by examining the variance called 
reliability measure, which indicates the extent of the errors of the measurement used in 
research studies (Shultz & Whitney, 2005). Reliability measures range from 0 to 1, with 
value 0 or 1 suggesting the measurement contains all variable errors or no variable errors 
at all, respectively. Other research studies on the effects of boards, ownership, and CEO 
duality on firm performance and other associated indicators of organizational 
effectiveness, such as studies by Brookman and Thriste (2009), Dahya, McConnell, and 
Travlos (2002), Fee and Hadlock (2004), Kang and Zardkooki (2005), Pandya (2011), 
and Rechner and Dalton (1991), used secondary data to test hypotheses. In these studies, 
to address measurement reliability, the authors examined the multicollinearity analysis to 




high correlation between independent variables, there is possible bias relation between 
two independent variables that may affect the accuracy of multiregression test results 
(Shultz & Whitney, 2005). The independent variables in the multiple regression model 
used to test hypotheses in this study were CEO duality, presence of physicians on 
governance boards, hospital age, hospital size, and board size were separate and different 
sets of measurement. Therefore, the concern of measurement reliability that the 
measurement of the independent variables was similar was addressed in the statistical test 
of assumption of this study as presented in Chapter 4. 
Operating Margin 
The operating margin (OMARG) is the dependent variable of the study. It 
compares the total operating revenue against the total operating expenses of a hospital 
(Cleverley, Song, & Cleverley, 2010). The OMARG was calculated by dividing the 
difference between total operating revenue and total operating expenses by the total 
operating revenues. OMARG was expressed in the formula below: 
OMARG = (TOEPR –TOEPE) / TOEPR 
Where: 
TOEPR = Total operating revenue 
TOPE = Total operating expense 
Total Margin  
The total margin (TMARG) is another dependent variable. It compares net 




of a hospital (Cleverley, Song, & Cleverley, 2010). TMARG was calculated by dividing 
net income by total operating revenue and was expressed in the formula below: 
TMARG = NICOM / TOPER 
Where: 
NICOM = Net income 
TOPER = Total operating revenue 
Free Cash Flow  
Free cash flow (FCF) is the third dependent variable. It represents cash inflow and 
outflow rather than accounting earnings of a hospital. It shows the amount of cash left 
over after accounting for all of the expenses to operate the hospital and making all 
necessary investments to ensure its continuous operation (Horngren et al., 2006). The free 
cash flow was calculated by subtracting the change in net assets plus interest and noncash 
expenses from the investments in fixed assets and net working capital (Singh, Wheeler, & 
Roden, 2012). Alternatively, the free cash flow can be estimated by averaging the current 
and two prior periods and multiplying by an average annual growth rate of 7.3%, which 
is based on data from the American Hospital Association (Singh, Wheeler, & Roden, 
2012, p.330). This study adopted the calculation method of the free cash flow used by 
Sigh et al. (2012). FCF was expressed in the formula below: 
FCF = ((cFCF + priop1FCF +priop2FCF)/3) * 0.073 
Where: 
cFCF = current FCF 




priop2FCF = prior period 2 FCF 
CEO Duality  
CEO duality (DUAL) is the independent variable representing a CEO who is also 
the chairperson of the governance board. This variable is categorical. If CEO duality was 
present for a hospital, then 1 was assigned to the organization. If CEO duality is not 
present, a 0 was assigned.  
Physicians on Governance Board  
Presence of physicians on board (PHYGOB) is second independent variable and a 
continuous variable, representing the numbers of physicians present on the boards. 
Physicians, who are considered to possess clinical experience, often promote clinical 
governance, which results in increased hospital performance on quality and finance 
(Gauld, Horsburg, & Brown, 2011). A value of 1 was assigned if there was one doctor on 
the governance. Similarly, if a board had two doctors serving on the board, then a value 
of 2 was given. A value of 0 would be assigned to firms without physicians on 
governance boards.  
Hospital Size 
Past research has shown that size has a positive influence on the performance of a 
firm for various reasons including diversification, economic scale, and access to cheaper 
resources (Kota & Tomar, 2010). The hospital size (HOSIZE) is the third independent 
variable. HOSIZE was measured by the logarithm of total assets as suggested by (Peng, 





 Older hospitals are considered more efficient than younger firms “because of the 
effect of learning curve and survival bias” (Abebe, Angriawan, & Liu, 2010, p.272). The 
hospital age (HOSAGE) is the fourth independent variable. HOSAGE was derived from 
the logarithm of the difference from the year of this study and the year of the hospital’s 
incorporation.  
The Board Size 
For hospitals, an effective board size is from 8 to 20 members, large enough for 
the board to contain an adequate number of members to fulfill responsibilities (Moody’s 
Investor Service, 2014). The size of the board should be limited to fewer than 20 
members to promote efficiency (Chubb Group of Insurance Companies, 2014). The board 
size (BOSIZE) is another independent variable. BOSIZE was measured by number of 
directors of the governance board. 
Data Collection  
The data collection was driven by the need to test three proposed hypotheses and 
three alternative hypotheses in an attempt to answer research questions examining the 
relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, hospital 
size, hospital age, board size, and financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. As 
substantiated in the literature review, the expectations were that (a) CEO duality was 
positively related to financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals, (b) presence of 
physicians on governance boards was positively related with financial performance of 




performance of not-for-profit hospitals, (d) hospital age was positively related with 
financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals, and (e) board size was positively related 
with financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. 
The analysis involved secondary data. I searched for not-for-profit hospitals, 
financial data, and disclosure reports in the OSHPD database. I retrieved financial 
snapshots and websites of not-for-profit hospitals from Healthcare ATLAS websites. 
Information on governance members and board structures were retrieved from each 
hospital website.  
Financial data for statistical analysis included financial reports for a 4-year period 
from January 2009 to December 2012. I collected data of financial data such as operating 
margins (percentage), current ratio, cash on hands (days), total operating revenue, net 
income, total operating expenses, net from operating, market values of assets, and total 
assets that were reported by each hospital in the period of 2009 to 2012. Then, I 
calculated the average values of these financial data. The financial data, such as operating 
margin, total margin, and free cash flow were derived from the average values of the 
calculated financial data. Other data included CEO duality, number of physicians on the 
board, board size, hospital age, and hospital size. One hundred and forty six not-for-profit 
hospitals were determined to be the sample for the analysis of this study.  
Data Analysis 
Once all the relevant data were collected, analyzed, and calculated for each 
variable, the data were entered and analyzed using SPSS statistical software. 




OMARG = a0 + a1 DUAL + a2 PHYGOB + a3 HOSIZE + a4 HOSAGE + a5 BOSIZE + ɛ 
TMARG = a0 + a1 DUAL + a2 PHYGOB + a3 HOSIZE + a4 HOSAGE + a5 BOSIZE + ɛ 
FCF = a0 + a1 DUAL + a2 PHYGOB + a3 HOSIZE + a4 HOSAGE + a5 BOSIZE + ɛ 
Where, a0 = the intercept of the model, DUAL = CEO duality, PHYSGOB = physicians 
on governance board, HOSIZE = hospital size, HOSAGE = hospital age, BOSIZE = 
board size, a1...a5 are the beta coefficients of the regression model, ɛ is a random error, 
OMARG = operating margin, TMARG = total margin, and FCF = free cash flow. The 
same independent variables were used in three equations to determine their effects on 
operating margin, total margin, and free cash flow of not-for-profit hospitals. 
Statistical Analysis 
The data were screened to make sure the following conditions and assumptions 
were met:  
 There were no significant outliers in the data sets of dependent variables. 
 The dependent variable was normally distributed in the population for each 
combination of levels of the independent variables. 
 The residuals in the model were random, normally distributed with a mean of 
zero. 
 The scores on variables were independent of other scores on the same variables. 
Before conducting interferential statistics, the data was checked to make sure that 
no outliers existed in the data set. To check for the normality of variable, descriptive data 
such as mean, mode, median, standard deviations, range, minimum, maximum, 




multicollinearity were also conducted to account for the integrity and reliability of the 
data.  
After all stated assumptions are met, regression outputs including multiple 
correlation coefficient, F-ratio, R-squared, adjusted R-squared values were examined. 
The F-ratio of ANOVA is reported to indicate the overall regression model used for the 
statistical analysis of data and whether the independent variables statistically significantly 
predict the dependent variables. The R value, the multiple correlation coefficient, 
provides the indication of the quality of the prediction of the dependent variables of 
OMARG, TMARG, and FCF. The R-squared (R
2
) and adjusted R-squared (adj. R
2
), the 
coefficient of determination, which varies from 0 to 1, suggest the proportion of variance 
in the OMARG, TMARG, and FCF that can be explained by the independent variables of 
DUAL and PHYGOB. Furthermore, the statistical significance of the DUAL and 
PHYGOB variables was determined by analyzing the t value and the corresponding p 
value that suggest whether their coefficients are statistically significantly different from 
0.  
Hypothesis Formulation  
A statistical hypothesis f test was used to determine whether there was a linear 
relationship between the operating margin, total margin, free cash flow, and any of the 
independent variables. The statistical hypotheses were expressed as: 
Hypothesis 1, H10: a1= a2 = a3 = a4 = a5 = 0 
 H1a: Not all the ai (i = 1…5) were zero 




 H2a: Not all the ai (i = 1…5) were zero 
Hypothesis 3, H30: a1= a2 = a3 = a4 = a5 = 0 
 H3a: Not all the ai (i = 1…5) were zero 
I established a level of significance level α of 5%, which means that the null 
hypothesis was rejected if the calculated p value less than α, .05 (Field, 2009). If the null 
hypothesis held true, there was no linear relationship between the financial performance 
and any of the independent variables in the proposed regression equation. However, if the 
null hypothesis was rejected, there was statistical evidence of a regression relationship 
between the financial performance and at least one of the independent variables in the 
model. If such a regression relationship existed, I then conducted five t tests for each of 
the beta coefficients (a1, a2, a3, a4, a5) to determine which independent variables helped 
explain the variation in the values of the dependent variables. The independent variables 
having no explanatory power (i.e., if they do not make a statistically significant 
contribution to how well the model predicts the outcome variable, the dependent 
variable) were removed from the regression model using the stepwise method.  
Protection of Selected Organizations of the Study 
Walden University requires every study to comply with the University’s ethical 
standards of research and with U.S. federal regulations and any applicable international 
guidelines. The Walden University Internal Review Board (IRB) granted the permissions 
to conduct this study (approval number 12-03-14-0275589). Regarding ethical issues, the 
study did not involve human subjects. However, it involved collecting data about 




financial reports of multiple years and board structures of not-for-profit hospitals 
obtained from public and private databases. Specifically, the proxy statements and 
financial statements reflecting board structures and financial indicators were used to 
compile statistical analysis using SPSS software. There was a need to anticipate and 
address any ethical dilemmas that might arise in this study. Therefore, data integrity and 
confidentiality were built into the study to prevent unexpected consequences that might 
affect the targeted institutions. Names of the analyzed organizations were blinded to 
maintain their confidentiality. For data integrity, the committee chair, the methodologist, 
and I were the only individuals who could have access to the raw and analyzed data. I 
guarded the data and did not share data with individuals who were not involved in this 
project. Data will be stored for 5 years. Afterward, the data will be discarded 
appropriately so that they do not fall into hands of others who might misuse them.  
Dissemination of Findings 
Presenting posters at conferences will provide an opportunity for me to develop 
professional experiences and to network with other faculty and students with similar 
research interests. As part of attempt to promote scholarly activity and positive social 
change, I might present this dissertation or disseminate the results if Walden University 
offers me the opportunity to share the study in poster sessions at research symposia. I 
ensured I did not engage in fraudulent practices, such as suppression, falsification, or 





Chapter 3 addressed the research design to test hypotheses formulated from 
research questions grounded in the literature review and indicated there is need to 
examine the relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians, and financial 
performance of not-for-profit hospitals. Chapter 3 showed rationales for choosing 
quantitative research using secondary data as the most appropriate approach for the study. 
This chapter addressed all components associated with quantitative study and specified 
the multiple regression model as the statistical model used to test the proposed 
hypotheses and the alternative hypotheses.  
Chapter 4 shows the results of this study. Chapter 5 indicates an entire overview 
of this study, findings, and implications that might be valuable for not-for-profit hospitals 
and their administrators seeking appropriate governance models to enhance the 




Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I present the research findings of the study. The research questions 
of the study were whether there were positive, statistically significant relationships 
between CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, and not-for-
hospitals’ financial performance, namely total margin, operating margin, and total cash 
free. The statistical analysis of this study involved descriptive and inferential statistics. 
The descriptive statistical analysis was used to generate frequency distribution and 
central distribution, as these techniques provided effective methods to organize, describe, 
summarize, and quantitatively visualize the data of this study. To show the frequency 
distribution and central tendencies associated with descriptive statistics, the mean, 
medium, mode, range, minimum, maximum, and standard deviation of financial 
performance as well as other data related to CEO duality and governance boards of the 
sampled not-for-profit hospitals were tabulated and plotted. The inferential statistical 
analysis was used to test the hypotheses of the study and make generalizations from the 
sampled not-for-profit hospitals to the population of the not-for-profit hospitals. 
Specifically, the inferential statistics based on the results generated from the multiple 
regression provided assessment of the relationship between CEO duality, presence of 
physicians on hospital governance boards, and the financial performance of not-for-profit 
hospitals. 
This chapter is organized in three major sections. In the first section, I present the 




addresses the analysis of inferential statistics of sampled not-for-profit hospitals. Within 
the second major section, the findings regarding a relationship between CEO duality, 
presence of physicians on governance board, and each of three financial performance 
indicators are explained. 
Data Collection 
One hundred and seven not-for-profit hospitals were determined to be the sample 
size for the study as presented in Chapter 3. However, I decided to select 146 not-for-
profit hospitals listed in the OSHPD websites and database. The OSHPD stores and 
administers the reported financial data, governance data, and other healthcare information 
of 4,840 healthcare organizations comprising hospitals, long-terms care facilities, home 
health and hospice, and primary and specialty clinics located in the State of California. 
Financial and governance data for the period of January 2009 to December 2012 were 
retrieved from Excel files available from OSHPD and hospitals’ websites. A detailed 
description of the OSHPD identification number, facility name, hospitals’ websites, 
relevant financial data, and governance information of the sampled not-for-profit 
hospitals are documented in Appendices A, B, C, and D.  
Study Results 
Analysis of Descriptive Statistics of Sampled Not-For-Profit Hospitals 
 In this section, I report the descriptive statistics of sampled not-for-profit hospitals 
based on the mean, median, mode, range, and standard deviation of operating margin, 
total margin, free cash flow, CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance board, 




central tendency and dispersion that are appropriate for categorical and continuous 
variables. 
Total Margin Variable 
 As Table 2 shows, 146 hospitals reported their total margins. On average, the 
sampled hospitals had a 6% total margin. Based on the mode value, more hospitals had a 
4% total margin compared with other groups of hospitals. The median total margin of 
4.8% divided the total margin distribution into two equal parts. The total margins were 
between -.28 and .40, suggesting that some hospitals operated with a negative 28% total 
margin while some hospitals gained a maximum total margin of 40%. There was a large 
range and a large dispersion of total margin (standard deviation of .086 or 8.6%). 
However, the central half of the total margin was between 2% and 3%, based on the 
interquartile range determined by the lower and upper quartiles values. Figure 2 shows 
approximately 2.7 % of hospitals had a 4% total margin as the largest group. Also, as 
shown in Figure 2 with the mean value greater than the median value, the total margin 
distribution is a positively skewed distribution, suggesting there were more hospitals 





Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics-All Variables except DUAL Variable 
 
TMARG OMARG FCF PHYGOB HOSIZE HOSAGE BOSIZE 
N 
Valid 146 146 146 145 146 146 146 
Missing 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Mean .0599 .0525 1,343,739 3.38 8.2580 1.8062 17.32 
Median .0480 .0300 377,908 3.00 8.2750 1.8100 15.00 
Mode .04 .00 1 4 7.94 1.77
a
 15 
Std. Deviation .08636 .05971 2,647,112 2.024 .47551 .21718 9.357 
Range .68 .29 15,768,673 13 2.11 1.28 64 
Minimum -.28 .00 0 0 7.23 .90 4 
Maximum .40 .29 15,768,673 13 9.34 2.18 68 






Figure 2. Bar graph showing central tendency and dispersion of total margin. 
 
Operating Margin 
 As shown in Table 2, 146 of the sampled hospitals reported their operating 
margin. On average, the sampled hospitals had 5.3% of operating margin. Based on the 
mode value, more hospitals had a 0% total margin compared with other groups among 
the sampled hospitals. The median value of 3% divided the operating margin distribution 




that some hospitals operated with 0% of operating margin while some hospitals gained a 
maximum operating margin of 29%. Figure 3 shows approximately 29% of hospitals had 
a 0% operating margin as the largest group. There was a large range and a large 
dispersion of operating margin (standard deviation of .06 or 6%). However, the central 
half of the operating margin was between 1% and 7%, based on the interquartile range 
determined by the lower and upper quartiles values. Moreover, as shown in Figure 3 and 
with the mean value greater than the median value, the operating margin distribution is a 
positively skewed distribution, suggesting for hospitals with operating margins greater 






Figure 3. Bar graph showing central tendency and dispersion of operating margin. 
Free Cash Flow 
 As shown in Table 2, all the 146 sampled hospitals reported their total assets for 
the period of 2009 to 2012. On average, the sampled hospitals had $1,340,000 of free 
cash flow. The median free cash flow of $378,000 divided the free cash flow distribution 
into two equal parts. The free cash flow was between $0 and $15,768,000, suggesting that 
some hospitals had free cash flow of $0 while some hospitals operated with a free cash 




a large range and a large dispersion of free cash flow (standard deviation of $2,647,000). 
However, as shown in Figure 4, the central half of free cash flow was between $94,180 
and $1,364,600.  
 
Figure 4. Bar graph showing central tendency and dispersion of free cash flow. 
CEO Duality 
 Table 3 and Figure 5 reveal information about CEO duality of hospitals. Thirty-
two out of 146 hospitals had CEOs who were also the chairpersons of their respective 
















Presence of Physicians on Governance Board 
 As shown in Table 2, one hospital did not report governance board information. 
On average, the sampled hospitals had more than three physicians (mean = 3.38) on their 
governance boards. The median number of physicians on governance board (3) divided 
the distribution of the number of physicians on the board into two equal parts. There was 
a large range and a large dispersion of number of physicians on boards (standard 
deviation of 2). Based on the mode value, Figure 6, 27%, 16%, 21%, and 16% of 
hospitals had four, three, two, and one physician(s) on their governance boards, 
respectively. The number of physicians present on board was between 0 and 13. One 
hospital did not have physicians on its governance board, while another hospital had 13 





Figure 6. Bar graph showing central tendency and dispersion of presence of physicians 
on governance board. 
Hospital Size 
 All the hospitals reported their total assets, which are used as a measurement of 
hospital size expressed in a logarithm value. As shown in Table 2, on average, hospitals 
had total assets of 180 million dollars. The median total assets of $500 million dollars 
divided the distribution of the hospital size into two equal parts. The smallest and biggest 
hospitals had total assets of 16 million dollars and 2 billion dollars, respectively. The 




hospital size distribution is an even distribution. As shown in Figure 7, about 4% of 




Figure 7. Bar graph showing central tendency and dispersion of hospital size. 
Hospital Age 
 The hospital age was derived from the logarithm of the difference from the year 
of this study and the year of the hospital’s incorporation. All the hospitals reported the 
years of their establishment, which is used for calculating the hospital age expressed in 




63, and more hospitals were 60 years old compared with other groups of hospitals. The 
hospital age was between 8 and 150 years, a range of difference of 142 years between the 
youngest and the oldest hospitals. The group of hospitals that were 65 years old divided 
the hospital age distribution into two equal parts. Even though there was a large range of 
hospital ages, most hospitals were between 50 and 90 years of age, which was determined 
based on the interquartile range determined by the lower and upper quartiles values. 
Figure 8 shows that three major groups, each including 9% of hospitals, were 60, 90, and 
110 years old.  
 





As shown in Table 2, all the values of the board size variables of hospitals were 
accounted for. On average, governance boards had 17 members. The median number of 
members (15) divided the distribution of board sizes into two equal parts. Based on the 
mode value, more hospitals (11%) had 15 board members compared with other groups of 
hospitals. The board size was between 4 and 68, a range of 62 of difference in board size 
between the smallest and the biggest governance board. As shown in Figure 9, one 
hospital has only four members while another hospital has 68 board members. The 
second largest boards had between 46 or 48 members. There was a large range, and a 
large dispersion of the size of governance board (SD = 9.0). However, most hospitals had 






Figure 9. Bar graph showing central tendency and dispersion of board size. 
Analysis of Statistical Assumptions 
  There are underlying assumptions associated with a statistical test of multiple 
regression. The following assumptions were evaluated for the regression model Yi = bo + 
b1X1i + b2X2i + … + bnXni+ ɛi: 
 All the predictor variables were categorical level or continuous level. 
 The dependent variables were distributed normally in the population for each 




 All the predictors had some non-zero values of variation. 
 No predictors were highly correlated, meaning there was no perfect 
multicollinearity. 
 The residual terms were uncorrelated for any two observations.  
 The predictors were uncorrelated with external variables. 
 The residuals at each level of predictors had the same variance, meaning 
homoscedasticity did exist. 
Categorical or Continuous Level Assumption of Independent Variables. 
  The predictor variables of CEO duality and the presence of physicians (the 
independent variables) were categorical variables. The hospital size, hospital age, and the 
board size variables were continuous variables. Therefore, the assumption of categorical 
or continuous level of predictor variables was met for the regression analysis. 
Normal Distribution of the Dependent Variables  
Figures 10 to 15 show the histograms and the normal P-P plots of the dependent 
variables of total margin, operating margin, and free cash flow. The histograms and the 
normal P-P plots suggest nearly normally distributed residual; thus, the assumption of 



































Figure 15. Normal P-P plot of nearly normally distributed residuals of free cash flow. 
Independent Errors Assumption 
 The Durbin-Watson statistic informs whether the independent errors assumption 
is violated. The Durbin-Watson varies between 0 and 4, with a value of 2 meaning the 
residuals are uncorrelated. As shown in Tables 4, 5, and 6, the Durbin-Watson values 


























 .001 -.006 .08622 .001 .116 1 143 .734  
2 .128
b
 .016 .003 .08585 .016 2.249 1 142 .136  
3 .139
c
 .019 -.002 .08603 .003 .411 1 141 .523  
4 .220
d
 .048 .021 .08504 .029 4.277 1 140 .040  
5 .233
e
 .054 .020 .08508 .006 .896 1 139 .345 2.064 
Note. a. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL 
b. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL, PHYGOB 
c. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL, PHYGOB, HOSIZE 
d. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL, PHYGOB, HOSIZE, HOSAGE 
e. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL, PHYGOB, HOSIZE, HOSAGE, BOSIZE 




Model Summary-Operating Margin as Dependent Variable 















 .003 -.004 .05987 .003 .450 1 143 .504  
2 .141
b
 .020 .006 .05957 .017 2.410 1 142 .123  
3 .146
c
 .021 .000 .05974 .002 .217 1 141 .642  
4 .239
d
 .057 .030 .05885 .036 5.303 1 140 .023  
5 .247
e
 .061 .027 .05894 .004 .567 1 139 .453 2.073 
Note. a. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL 
b. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL, PHYGOB 
c. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL, PHYGOB, HOSIZE 
d. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL, PHYGOB, HOSIZE, HOSAGE 
e. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL, PHYGOB, HOSIZE, HOSAGE, BOSIZE 







Model Summary-Free Cash Flow as Dependent Variable 
































 .237 .210 2,359,230 .001 .224 1 139 .637 2.118 
Note. a. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL 
b. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL, PHYGOB 
c. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL, PHYGOB, HOSIZE 
d. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL, PHYGOB, HOSIZE, HOSAGE 
e. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL, PHYGOB, HOSIZE, HOSAGE, BOSIZE 
f. Dependent Variable: FCF 
 
Multicollinearity Assumption 
 Tables 7, 8, 9 show correlation matrix of the multiple regression test, which was 
used to test if there was high correlation between the CEO duality and presence of 
physicians on board governance predictors, as well as other independent variables. If 




.955 and the Sig (1-tailed) of .000 < .05. There were no Pearson correlations greater than 
.50, suggesting the CEO duality and presence of physicians on board governance 
predictors and the governance board and hospital characteristic predictor variables were 
not highly correlated. Therefore, the assumption that there was no perfect 
multicollinearity existing in the regression test for the model was met. 
Table 7 
Correlation-Total Margin as the Dependent Variable 
 
TMARG DUAL PHYGOB HOSIZE HOSAGE BOSIZE 
Pearson 
Correlation 
TMARG 1.000 -.028 .124 .072 -.132 -.037 
DUAL -.028 1.000 .032 .035 .017 .015 
PHYGOB .124 .032 1.000 .163 .045 .375 
HOSIZE .072 .035 .163 1.000 .383 .219 
HOSAGE -.132 .017 .045 .383 1.000 .194 
BOSIZE -.037 .015 .375 .219 .194 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
TMARG . .367 .069 .195 .057 .329 
DUAL .367 . .352 .336 .421 .431 
PHYGOB .069 .352 . .025 .294 .000 
HOSIZE .195 .336 .025 . .000 .004 
HOSAGE .057 .421 .294 .000 . .010 
BOSIZE .329 .431 .000 .004 .010 . 
N 
TMARG 145 145 145 145 145 145 
DUAL 145 145 145 145 145 145 
PHYGOB 145 145 145 145 145 145 
HOSIZE 145 145 145 145 145 145 
HOSAGE 145 145 145 145 145 145 







Correlation-Operating Margin as the Dependent Variable 
 
OMARG DUAL PHYGOB HOSIZE HOSAGE BOSIZE 
Pearson Correlation 
OMARG 1.000 -.056 .127 .057 -.155 -.026 
DUAL -.056 1.000 .032 .035 .017 .015 
PHYGOB .127 .032 1.000 .163 .045 .375 
HOSIZE .057 .035 .163 1.000 .383 .219 
HOSAGE -.155 .017 .045 .383 1.000 .194 
BOSIZE -.026 .015 .375 .219 .194 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
OMARG . .252 .064 .247 .031 .378 
DUAL .252 . .352 .336 .421 .431 
PHYGOB .064 .352 . .025 .294 .000 
HOSIZE .247 .336 .025 . .000 .004 
HOSAGE .031 .421 .294 .000 . .010 
BOSIZE .378 .431 .000 .004 .010 . 
N 
OMARG 145 145 145 145 145 145 
DUAL 145 145 145 145 145 145 
PHYGOB 145 145 145 145 145 145 
HOSIZE 145 145 145 145 145 145 
HOSAGE 145 145 145 145 145 145 







Correlations-Free Cash Flow as Dependent Variable 
 
FCF DUAL PHYGOB HOSIZE HOSAGE BOSIZE 
Pearson Correlation 
FCF 1.000 .029 .058 .482 .134 .123 
DUAL .029 1.000 .032 .035 .017 .015 
PHYGOB .058 .032 1.000 .163 .045 .375 
HOSIZE .482 .035 .163 1.000 .383 .219 
HOSAGE .134 .017 .045 .383 1.000 .194 
BOSIZE .123 .015 .375 .219 .194 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
FCF . .366 .244 .000 .054 .070 
DUAL .366 . .352 .336 .421 .431 
PHYGOB .244 .352 . .025 .294 .000 
HOSIZE .000 .336 .025 . .000 .004 
HOSAGE .054 .421 .294 .000 . .010 
BOSIZE .070 .431 .000 .004 .010 . 
N 
FCF 145 145 145 145 145 145 
DUAL 145 145 145 145 145 145 
PHYGOB 145 145 145 145 145 145 
HOSIZE 145 145 145 145 145 145 
HOSAGE 145 145 145 145 145 145 
BOSIZE 145 145 145 145 145 145 
 
Analysis of Inferential Statistics of Sampled Not-For-Profit Hospitals 
This section reports inferential statistics based on the multiple regression analysis 
of the relationship between the CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance 
boards, governance board and hospital characteristics, and financial performance of 
sampled not-for profit hospitals. It begins with linear relationship analysis and regression 
results of CEO duality, presence of physicians, hospital size, hospital age, board size, and 




CEO Duality, Presence of Physicians on Boards, Board Size, Hospital Size and Age, 
and Total Margin 
Research Question 1 asked whether there was a positive, statistically significant 
relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, 
board size, hospital size and age, and total margin of not-for-profit hospitals. The 
multiple regression equation model with the total margin as the dependent variable and 
CEO duality, presence of physicians on boards, board size, hospital size, and age as the 
independent variables, and other control variables was: 
TMARG = a0 + a1 DUAL + a2 PHYGOB + a3 HOSIZE + a4 HOSAGE + a5 BOSIZE + ɛ 
Where 
a0 = the intercept of the model,  
DUAL = CEO duality,  
PHYSGOB = physicians on governance board,  
HOSIZE = hospital size,  
HOSAGE = hospital age,  
BOSIZE = board size,  
a1...a5 = the beta coefficients of the regression model,  
ɛ is a random error, and  
TMARG = total margin 
The prediction of the outcome of total margin by the weighted combination for 
CEO duality and presence of physicians on governance, hospital size, hospital age, and 




of alpha level of 5%. The null hypothesis stated that there was no significant statistical 
relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, hospital 
size, hospital age, board size, and total margin of not-for-profit hospitals, meaning that all 
of the coefficients are zero. So,  
H1o: a1 = a2 = a3 = a4 = a5 = 0 
 The alternative hypothesis stated that there was a positive, statistically significant 
relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, and 
total margin of not-for-profit hospitals, meaning at least one of the variables belongs in 
the regression model or at least one ai (i = 1… 5) is not zero. So,  
H1a: At least one ai is not zero 
The multiple regression analysis using the Enter procedure and Stepwise model 
was conducted to evaluate whether CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance 
board, hospital size, hospital age, and board size predict the total margin of the sampled 
not-for-profit hospitals. The multiple regression results are shown in Table 4 and Table 
10. The multiple regression equation with total margin as the dependent variable is 
presented as follows:  
TMARG = -0.022 - 0.007*DUAL + 0.006*PHYGOB + 0.024* HOSIZE – 
 0.068*HOSAGE – 0.01*BOSIZE + ɛ 
The correlation matrix resulting from the multiple regression indicated that the 
independent variables were not highly correlated (Pearson correlation r < .955, p > .05). 
Thus, all of the independent variables were included in the analysis. Table 4 shows that 




hospital size (HOSIZE), and board size (BOSIZE) is >.05. Therefore, I cannot reject the 
null hypotheses that a1, a2, a3, and a5 are 0. Thus, CEO duality, presence of physicians on 
board, hospital size, and board size are statistically insignificant and cannot be used to 
predict the total margin (TMARG) of the sampled not-for-profit hospitals.  
The hospital age (HOSAGE) is significantly related to the total margin 
(TMARG), F (1, 146) = 4.277, p = .04 < .05). The correlation coefficient was .220, and 
the hospital age accounts for 4.8 % of the variation in total margin. The constant, 
standardized errors, the standardized betas, and their significance value are summarized 






Bivariate and Parial Correlation of Predictors With Total Margin 
Step 1 B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) .062 .008 
 
DUAL -.006 .017 -.028 
2 
(Constant) .044 .014 
 
DUAL -.007 .017 -.032 
PHYGOB .005 .004 .125 
3 
(Constant) -.035 .125 
 
DUAL -.007 .017 -.034 
PHYGOB .005 .004 .116 
HOSIZE .010 .015 .054 
4 
(Constant) -.009 .124 
 
DUAL -.007 .017 -.033 
PHYGOB .005 .004 .113 
HOSIZE .023 .016 .125 
HOSAGE -.073 .035 -.185 
5 
(Constant) -.022 .125 
 
DUAL -.007 .017 -.034 
PHYGOB .006 .004 .143 
HOSIZE .024 .016 .135 
HOSAGE -.068 .036 -.173** 
BOSIZE -.001 .001 -.086 
Note. R
2 
= .019 for Step 4, ΔR
2 




CEO Duality, Presence of Physicians on Boards, Board Size, Hospital Size and Age, 
and Operating Margin 
Research Question 2 asked whether there was a positive, statistically significant 
relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, 
board size, hospital size and age, and operating margin of not-for-profit hospitals. The 
multiple regression equation model with the operating margin as the dependent variable 
and the CEO duality, and presence of physicians on boards, board size, hospital size, and 
age as the independent variables, and other control variables is below: 
OMARG = a10 + a11 DUAL + a12 PHYGOB + a13 HOSIZE + a14 HOSAGE + a15 
BOSIZE + ɛ Where 
a10 = the intercept of the model,  
DUAL = CEO duality, 
PHYSGOB = physicians on governance board,  
HOSIZE = hospital size,  
HOSAGE = hospital age,  
BOSIZE = board size,  
a11...a15 = the beta coefficients of the regression model,  
ɛ = a random error, and  
OMARG = operating margin 
The prediction of the outcome of operating margin by the weighted combination 
for CEO duality, and presence of physicians on governance was tested using f distribution 




stated that there was no significant statistical relationship between CEO duality, presence 
of physicians on the governance boards, and operating margin of not-for-profit hospitals, 
meaning that all of the coefficients are zero. So,  
H2o: a11 = a12 = a13 = a14 = a15 = 0 
 The alternative hypothesis stated that there was a positive, statistically significant 
relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, and 
operating margin of not-for-profit hospitals, meaning at least one of the variables belongs 
in the regression model or at least one ai (i = 11… 15) is not zero. So,  
H2a: At least one ai is not zero 
The multiple regression analysis using Enter procedure and Stepwise model was 
conducted to evaluate whether CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance 
boards, hospital size, hospital age, or board size predict the operating margin of the 
sampled not-for-profit hospitals. The multiple regression results are shown in Table 5 
(Model Summary-Operating Margin as Dependent Variable), and Tables 11. The 
multiple regression equation with total margin as the dependent variable is presented as:  
OMARG =0.015 - 0.009*DUAL + 0.004*PHYGOB + 0.016* HOSIZE – 
 0.054*HOSAGE – 0.00*BOSIZE + ɛ 
The correlation matrix resulted from the multiple regression indicated that the 
independent variables were not highly correlated (Pearson correlation r < .955, p > .05). 
Thus, all of the independent variables were included in the analysis. Table 5 shows that 
the p value for CEO duality (DUAL), presence of physicians on board (PHYGOB), 




null hypotheses that a11, a12, a14, and a15 are 0. Thus, CEO duality, presence of physicians 
on board, hospital size, and board size are statistically insignificant and cannot be used to 
predict the operating margin (OMARG) of the sampled not-for-profit hospitals.  
The hospital age (HOSAGE) is significantly related to the operating margin 
(OMARG), F (1, 140) = 5.303, p = .023 < .05). The correlation coefficient was .239, and 
the hospital age accounts for 5.7% of the variation in operating margin. The constant, 
standardized errors, the standardized betas, and their significance values are summarized 






Bivariate and Parial Correlation of Predictors With Total Margin 
Model B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) .055 .006 
 
DUAL -.008 .012 -.056 
2 
(Constant) .042 .010 
 
DUAL -.009 .012 -.060 
PHYGOB .004 .002 .129 
3 
(Constant) .002 .087 
 
DUAL -.009 .012 -.061 
PHYGOB .004 .002 .123 
HOSIZE .005 .011 .039 
4 
(Constant) .022 .086 
 
DUAL -.009 .012 -.061 
PHYGOB .004 .002 .119 
HOSIZE .015 .011 .118 
HOSAGE -.056 .024 -.205 
5 
(Constant) .015 .086 
 
DUAL -.009 .012 -.061 
PHYGOB .004 .003 .143 
HOSIZE .016 .011 .126 
HOSAGE -.054 .025 -.195** 
BOSIZE .000 .001 -.068 
Note. R
2 
= .021 for Step 4, ΔR
2 




CEO Duality, Presence of Physicians on Boards, Board Size, Hospital Size and Age, 
and Free Cash Flow 
Research Question 3 asked whether there was a positive, statistically significant 
relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, 
board size, hospital size, age, and free cash flow of not-for-profit hospitals. The multiple 
regression equation model with free cash flow as the dependent variable and the CEO 
duality, presence of physicians on boards, board size, hospital size, and age as the 
independent variables, and other control variables was: 
FCF = a20 + a21 DUAL + a22 PHYGOB + a23 HOSIZE + a24 HOSAGE + a25 BOSIZE + ɛ 
Where 
a20 = the intercept of the model,  
DUAL = CEO duality,  
PHYSGOB = physicians on governance board,  
HOSIZE = hospital size,  
HOSAGE = hospital age,  
BOSIZE = board size,  
a21….a25 = the beta coefficients of the regression model,  
ɛ = a random error, and  
FCF = free cash flow 
The prediction of the outcome of total margin by the weighted combination for 
CEO duality and presence of physicians on governance was tested using an f distribution 




stated that there was no significant statistical relationship between CEO duality, presence 
of physicians on governance boards, and free cash flow of not-for-profit hospitals, 
meaning that all of the coefficients are zero. So,  
H3o: a20 = a21 = a23 = a24 = a25 = 0 
 The alternative hypothesis stated that there was a positive, statistically significant 
relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, and free 
cash flow of not-for-profit hospitals, meaning at least one of the variables belongs in the 
regression model or at least one ai (i = 21… 25) is not zero. So,  
H3a: At least one ai is not zero 
The multiple regression analysis using the Enter procedure and Stepwise model 
was conducted to evaluate whether CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance 
board, hospital size, hospital age, and board size predict the free cash flow of the sampled 
not-for-profit hospitals. The multiple regression results are shown in Table 6 and Table 
12. The multiple regression equation with total margin as the dependent variable is 
presented as:  
FCF = 0.015 - 0.009*DUAL + 0.004*PHYGOB + 0.016* HOSIZE – 
 0.054*HOSAGE – 0.00*BOSIZE + ɛ 
The correlation matrix resulting from the multiple regression indicated that the 
independent variables were not highly correlated (Pearson correlation r < .955, p > .05). 
Thus, all of the independent variables were included in the analysis. Table 6 shows that 
the p value for CEO duality (DUAL), presence of physicians on board (PHYGOB), 




null hypotheses that a20, a21, a24, and a25 are 0. Thus, CEO duality, presence of physicians 
on board, hospital age, and board size are statistically insignificant and cannot be used to 
predict the free cash flow (FCF) of the sampled not-for-profit hospitals.  
The hospital size (HOSIZE) is significantly related to the free cash flow (FCF), F 
(1, 141) = 42.059, p < .01). The correlation coefficient was .233, and the hospital age 
accounts for 21.7 % of the variation in free cash flow. The constant, standardized errors, 





Bivariate and Parial Correlation of Predictors With Total Margin 
Step B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 1312779.496 250427.938 
 
DUAL 182277.911 533079.264 .029 
2 
(Constant) 1061766.086 444930.774 
 
DUAL 170656.919 534346.978 .027 
PHYGOB 75038.400 109844.117 .057 
3 
(Constant) -20879763.074 3405888.922 
 
DUAL 76973.486 470843.209 .012 
PHYGOB -27941.635 98038.751 -.021 
HOSIZE 2701015.968 416482.693 .485 
4 
(Constant) -20620381.550 3428841.002 
 
DUAL 78309.903 471585.328 .012 
PHYGOB -29333.442 98210.226 -.022 
HOSIZE 2829537.365 451190.333 .508 
HOSAGE -729349.325 975858.854 -.060 
5 
(Constant) -20438610.158 3459815.533 
 
DUAL 78995.790 472900.749 .012 
PHYGOB -47160.481 105454.694 -.036 
HOSIZE 2805875.399 455206.151 .504* 
HOSAGE -793644.657 987979.728 -.065 
BOSIZE 10948.612 23156.692 .039 
Note. R
2 
= .004 for Step 3, ΔR
2 





 The results showed that some of the independent variables identified in this study 
had significant impact on financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. The findings 
of the study are summarized as follows: 
1. No significant relationships were found between CEO duality, presence of 
physicians on governance boards, hospital size, board size, and total margin of 
not-for-profit hospitals. The results showed a significant relationship between 
hospital age and total margin of not-for-profit hospitals, although it was 
negative relationship. 
2. No significant relationships were found between CEO duality, presence of 
physicians on the governance boards, hospital size, board size, and operating 
margin of not-for-profit hospitals. The results showed a significant 
relationship between hospital age and operating margin of not-for-profit 
hospitals. 
3. No significant relationships were found between CEO duality, presence of 
physicians on the governance boards, hospital age, board size, and free cash 
flow of not-for-profit hospitals. The results showed a significant positive 
relationship between hospital size and free cash flow of not-for-profit 
hospitals. 
 The results of the study showed that hospital age and hospital size have an impact 
on the total margin and free cash flow of not-for-profit hospitals. Chapter 5 will present 




in the field to pursue to investigate further other factors or variables that can impact the 





Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
Good corporate governance is critical to the survival and growth of organizations. 
Due to immoral management and poor governance that have triggered corporate scandals 
and debacles as well as the recent global financial meltdown, both professionals and 
academics have searched more proactively for more appropriate corporate governance 
structures and thus have identified CEO duality as one of critical aspects of corporate 
governance of modern companies. Agency theorists and administrative theorists have 
divergent views of CEO duality. Agency theorists have argued that because executives 
and managers do not always act in the best interests of owners, but rather for their own 
benefits, CEO duality may lead to dominant CEOs who undermine the effectiveness and 
the independence of board of directors (Aguilera et al., 2008; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Rechner & Dalton, 1991). Thus, CEOs may adversely affect organizational performance. 
In contrast, stewardship or administrative theorists have upheld the proposition that 
because executive and managers act for organizational objectives rather than for their 
personal agendas, CEO duality allows CEOs to lead organizations with unified authority 
and unambiguous leadership, resulting in improved performance for organizations (Boyd, 
1995; Carty, 2012; David et al., 1997; Kang & Zardkoohi, 2005; Nicholson & Kiel 
2007).  
The opposing views between agency and stewardship theories have stimulated 
scientists to conduct research for more than 2 decades to examine the influences of CEO 




results have been ambiguous. Moreover, researchers have not conducted empirical 
studies to understand the effects of CEO duality on the organizational performance of 
hospitals, especially of not-for-profit hospitals. Considering the economic size, potential 
impacts on society and people, and unique nature and challenges of not-for-profit 
hospitals, an appropriate and effective healthcare governance board is integral to their 
survival and growth.  
In this study, I examined the effects of CEO duality, the presence of physicians on 
healthcare governance boards, hospital size, hospital age, and board size on not-for-profit 
hospitals’ financial performance, as measured by total margin, operating margin, and free 
cash flow. Comparing and contrasting the outcomes of past research studies grounded in 
the divergent views of agency and stewardship theories, this study reconciled these views 
with the argument that the agency and stewardship theories could work complementarily, 
thus serving as the theoretical framework that guided the study. In addition, I 
hypothesized that CEO duality and clinical governance as perceived attributes of 
effective healthcare governance would improve financial performance of not-for-profit 
hospitals.  
I used a screening process and a simple random sampling process to choose 146 
not-for-profit hospitals from comprehensive public databases and websites of OSHPD. 
This office administers financial reports and governance information of more than 4,840 
healthcare organizations comprising of hospitals, long-terms care facilities, home health 
and hospice, and primary and specialty clinics in the State of California. Other relevant 




sampled hospital. The research questions sought to establish whether there was linear 
relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on healthcare governance 
boards, hospital size, hospital age, and board size, and financial performance of not-for-
profit hospitals. In measuring CEO duality, the independent variable, I assigned 1 to the 
hospitals whose CEOs were also the chairpersons of their governance boards. Otherwise, 
a 0 was assigned. To measure the second independent variable, the presence of 
physicians on the governance board, a value of 1 was assigned for each doctor serving on 
governance boards of hospitals. A 0 was assigned when no physician was present on the 
board. Financial performance was measured using operating margin, total margin, and 
total cash free of the selected hospitals. Hospital age, hospital size, and board size were 
collected from the website of hospitals and incorporated in the multiple linear regression 
models examining the relationship between the variables of interest.  
The results of the study showed that, as measured by total margin and operating 
margin, CEO duality, presence of physicians on the governance boards, hospital size, and 
board size have no relationship to financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. 
However, the results indicated hospital age is negatively significantly related to financial 
performance of not-for-profit hospitals, as measured by total margin and operating 
margin. When measuring free cash flow of not-for-profit hospitals, the results suggested 
that CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, hospital age, and board 
size have no relationship with financial performance. However, the results indicated 
hospital size is positively and significantly related to financial performance of not-for-





Interpretation of Findings 
In this dissertation, I sought to answer the following research questions: 
Research Question 1: Was there a positive, statistically significant relationship 
between CEO duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, 
hospital size, board size, and total margin of not-for-profit hospitals? 
Research Question 2: Was there a positive, statistically significant relationship 
between CEO duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, 
hospital size, board size, and operating margin of not-for-profit hospitals? 
Research Question 3: Was there a positive, statistically significant relationship 
between CEO duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, 
hospital size, board size, and free cash flow of not-for-profit hospitals? 
CEO Duality, Presence of Physicians on Boards, Hospital Age, Hospital Size, Board 
Size, and Total Margin 
Considering that extensive past studies have been done to examine the 
relationship between CEO duality and firm performance across industries, that empirical 
results of these studies have not been conclusive, and that CEO duality and firm 
performance are contextually specific to each type of industry, I sought to examine 
effects of CEO duality on financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. Based on 
literature review, my rationale was that the CEO duality is good for governance boards of 
not-for-profit hospitals because with specialized knowledge, CEOs who also serve as 




influence on the performance of the hospitals. However, as indicated by the statistical test 
results presented in Chapter 4, CEO duality was not significantly related to financial 
performance of not-for-profit hospitals, as measured by total margin. Although I did not 
reach a conclusion consistent with my hypothesized outcomes, the results of the CEO 
duality effects of this study were consistent with conclusions of some past studies that 
CEO duality had no relationship to organizational performance. 
As presented in the literature review of this dissertation, some healthcare scholars 
argued that because an effective healthcare board needs to execute both corporate and 
clinical governance, physicians serving on boards would provide effective governance. 
Therefore, I hypothesized that having doctors as healthcare board members could be 
positively related to financial performance of the not-for-profit hospitals. However, the 
results of this study suggested that the presence of physicians on governance boards was 
not significantly related to financial performance, as measured by total margin. Although 
I did not reach a conclusion consistent with my hypothesized prediction, the finding that 
presence of doctors on governance board is not related to organizational performance can 
be considered an incremental contribution to the field because I have not found any study 
examining the relationship between having doctors on boards and financial performance.  
Past studies suggested that the size of an organization could have a positive 
influence on organizational performance. Moreover, a small board would not have 
adequate numbers of board members to fulfill diverse responsibilities. In contrast, large 
boards tend to succumb to inefficiency due to too divergent views for making effective 




did not confirm the preceding conclusions. Based on the results of the statistical test, I did 
not find any significant relationship between hospital size, board size, and financial 
performance, as measured by total margin.  
Hospital age plays a role in the efficiency of organizations because older hospitals 
tend be more efficient than younger hospitals. Therefore, I expected there would be 
positive significantly relationship between hospital age and financial performance. 
However, the results of the study showed the opposite outcome, suggesting that hospital 
age is significantly negatively related to financial performance. The negative relationship 
between hospital age and financial performance may be explained by suggesting that 
when a hospital exists for a long time, it can become bigger and develop high 
expenditures, thus reducing net income and consequently decreasing its total margin.  
CEO Duality, Presence of Physicians on Boards, Hospital Age, Hospital Size, Board 
Size, and Operating Margin 
Based on the literature review and rationale discussed in Chapter 2 that the effects 
of CEO duality on firm performance can be contextually dependent on the type of 
industry, and that CEO duality may provide a positive influence on performance of not-
for-profit hospitals, I expected there would be a significant relationship between CEO 
duality and financial performance of hospitals. However, the statistical test results 
presented in Chapter 4 showed CEO duality on hospital governance boards was not 
significantly related to financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals, as measured by 
operating margin. Although the conclusion does not match the hypothesized outcomes, 




some past studies that CEO duality had no relationship with organizational performance 
(Baliga et al., 1996; David & Dalton, 1993; Krause et al., 2013; Lawal, 2013; Shukeri, 
2012).  
Moreover, this study also shows that having physicians on hospital governance 
boards may not always affect the financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. As 
measured by operating margin, the results of this study did not confirm the predicted 
outcomes that organization size and board size would have positive effects on the 
financial performance. Nevertheless, the results of the study suggested hospital age is 
significantly negatively related to financial performance, which is the opposite of the 
predicted conclusion that hospital age would have positive effects on financial 
performance when using operating margin as a financial indicator. As operating margin is 
measured using total operating expenses, it is possible that when hospitals have been in 
business for a long time, they can grow bigger in size and number of employees and 
eventually incur high expenditures, causing high total operating expenses, and thus 
reducing operating margin. This negative relationship between higher operating 
expenditure and lower operating margin when organizations grow bigger perhaps 
explains the negative relationship between hospital age and financial performance as 
measured by operating margin.  
CEO Duality, Presence of Physicians on Boards, Hospital Age, Hospital Size, Board 
Size, and Free Cash Flow 
Through the literature review presented in Chapter 2, I postulated that there would 




governance boards, and the financial performance of hospitals, as measured by total cash 
free. The rationale for this assumption is that CEO duality and presence of physicians on 
board governance may facilitate an effective performance of not-for-profit hospitals. 
However, as the statistical test results presented in Chapter 4 indicated, CEO duality and 
presence of physicians on hospital governance boards were not significantly related to 
free cash flow. It is important to note that although this finding differs from the 
hypothesized claim, the results that CEO duality had no relationship to financial 
indicators of total cash free of not-for-profit hospitals was consistent with conclusions of 
some past studies that CEO duality had no relationship with organizational performance 
across industries (Baliga et al., 1996; David & Dalton, 1993; Krause et al., 2013; Lawal, 
2013; Shukeri, 2012).  
Similarly, the results also suggested that having physicians on hospital 
governance boards may not have any impact on total cash free of not-for-profit hospitals. 
As measured by free cash flow, board size was not significantly related to financial 
performance. There was evidence in the literature that an inefficient board or a board 
with divergent views may not have any impact on financial performance of an 
organization. Because free cash flow was calculated by subtracting the change in net 
assets plus interest and noncash expenses from the investments in fixed assets and net 
working capital, I expected that old or new hospitals may have varied investment and 
working capitals used for growth opportunities. However, the results showed otherwise, 
suggesting that hospital age was not related to free cash flow. Importantly, the finding 




flow of not-for-profit hospitals was consistent with the fact that bigger organizations have 
larger total assets, which is often used to calculate the size of an organization. 
Other Interpretations 
According to Monks and Minow (2008), 54% of American companies practiced 
CEO duality. Recently, Abels and Martelli (2011) provided an update regarding CEO 
duality and suggested the percentage of companies with CEO duality governance 
structures has increased to 61%. Based on the descriptive analysis presented in Chapter 4 
of this study, 23% of the sampled not-for-profit hospitals had CEOs who also held 
chairperson positions of the governance boards. I did not reach the conclusion that CEO 
duality had a positive influence on financial performance, as measured by total margin or 
operating margin, or free cash flow. However, CEO duality can be good for governance 
boards of not-for-profit hospitals because of the specialized knowledge of CEOs, which 
may result in greater sharing of information and opportunities and reduced coordination 
costs (Brickley et al., 1997), and the overall trend of increased adoption of CEO duality 
among companies (Abels & Martelli, 2011). Therefore, I anticipate that the number of 
not-for-hospitals having CEO duality will likely increase in the future.  
Study results presented in Chapter 4 showed that, on average, the sampled not-
for-hospitals had more than three physicians (mean = 3.38) on their governance boards. 
The average number of physicians present on hospital boards in this study is consistent 
with the fact that healthcare boards in the United States tend to have two to three doctors 
as board members (Orlikoff & Totten, 2006). Moreover, the results of this study showed 




governance boards. However, only 67% of healthcare organizations reported the presence 
of physicians serving on their boards in the survey by the United States Center for 
Healthcare Governance (Bennington, 2010). The much higher number of hospitals 
bringing physicians to their boards in this study may suggest that in reality hospitals have 
more actively recruited physicians to serve on their governance boards.    
The results showed that, on average, governance boards had 17 members, and 
most hospitals had between 11 and 20 members. These data confirm that an effective 
hospital board size should be eight to 20 members and not more than 20 members in 
order for the board to have an adequate number of members to fulfill responsibilities 
(Moody’s Investor Service, 2014) and to promote efficiency (Chubb Group of Insurance 
Companies, 2014).  
Limitations of the Study 
This study had limitations. The primary limitation was the use of secondary data, 
which were not originally collected for the purpose of this study. This is a potential 
problem because secondary data only approximate the kind of data intended for testing 
the proposed hypotheses. Using secondary data can potentially introduce errors to the 
conclusions and the generalization of this study. The second limitation was that 
triangulation of data to reduce the potential error, thus enhancing the accuracy of the 
outcomes of the study, was not possible. All the financial data and other relevant data of 
the sampled not-for-profit hospitals were collected only from the Excel files available on 




Another limitation is related to possibly missing of relevant variables that may 
generate different outcomes or may change the findings of this study. Variables relevant 
to corporate governance constructs, such as organizational leverage, market 
environments, board independence, and organizational identification of CEO, were not 
included in the regression model used in the research design and the analysis of this 
study. Moreover, the outcomes of this study cannot be generalized to all not-for-profit 
hospitals in the United States and worldwide because the not-for-profit hospitals were 
sampled in the list of all hospitals operating in the State of California. Perhaps, future 
researchers can contribute to the field by studying hospitals in other states rather than 
California.  
Recommendations for Further Study 
First, because triangulation of data was not possible in this study, to enhance the 
accuracy of the outcome of this study and reduce potential errors, other researchers can 
collect and compare archived data from other databases or websites that may store the 
same financial reports of the hospitals listed in the OSHPD database. Second, future 
researchers can investigate the effects of other variables relevant to corporate governance 
constructs on the financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. For instance, research 
questions examining whether organizational leverage, market environments, board 
independence, and organizational identification of CEO affect the financial indicators of 
not-for-profit hospitals in California or in the United States of America would be 




other corporate governance mechanisms or constructs could generate new research 
findings.  
The financial indicators included in the statistical model used for the analysis of 
this study were only the total margin, the operating margin, and the free cash flow. Future 
researchers can investigate the effects of CEO duality, presence of physicians, and other 
independent variables relevant in this study on other financial performance indicators 
such as Approximate Tobin’s q, return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), Z score, 
and liquidity ratios (current ratios, quick ratios, and cash ratios). 
This study analyzed financial data available in OSHPD database of California for 
the period of 2009 to 2012. OSHPD is a comprehensive database that stores governance 
and financial data covering report periods from 1995 to 2013. This study can be 
expanded using a more comprehensive methodology by analyzing financial data covering 
a report period longer than 4 years (2009-2012) as the outcomes may suggest new 
findings.  
The OSHPD also contains information and financial data of other for-profit and 
not-for-profit healthcare organizations, including long-term care facilities, primary care 
and special clinics, home health and hospice, and professional providers. It would be a 
worthy effort to duplicate this study with other not-for-profit healthcare organizations 
listed in the OSHPD, beyond not-for-profit hospitals. Moreover, because this study 
focused on not-for-profit hospitals, future researchers may want to study for-profit 




The implications of CEO duality and the presence of physicians on governance 
boards can be significant for the overall performance rather than simply the financial 
performance for not-for-profit hospitals. Because this study used the archived data and 
focused on measurement of financial performance, a recommendation for further research 
regarding the effects of CEO duality and presence of physicians on boards on other 
performance measurements of not-for-profit hospitals, such as employee satisfaction and 
development, leadership development, clinical governance, community services, and 
other charity efforts. This can be accomplished using research methodologies such as 
surveys and interviews. 
In addition, the outcomes of this study can be applied only to not-for-profit 
hospitals providing healthcare in the State of California. It would be beneficial to further 
this study by using more comprehensive data so that the outcomes can be generalized to 
all not-for-profit hospitals operating in the United States and worldwide. 
Implications for Social Change 
This study is different from past studies examining corporate governance and 
financial performance. No prior researchers examined specifically the implication of 
CEO duality, the presence of physicians, other characteristics pertaining to hospital size 
and age, and board size on the financial performance of healthcare organizations, 
especially not-for-profit hospitals. Moreover, in addition to corporate governance, 
successful healthcare governance boards will need to incorporate clinical governance as 
part of their functions to monitor and transform their organizations (Colin-Thome, 2013). 




by considering of the role of clinical governance provided by physicians serving on 
hospital governance boards. By examining the effects of CEO duality and exploring the 
impacts of the presence of physicians on governance boards, this study was an attempt to 
generate results that might provide insights for not-for-profit hospitals to become 
successful and efficient with their governance and financial management, thus enhancing 
their organizational effectiveness to commit to charitable missions of community services 
and transformation of local communities and societies. 
Although initiated and mainly applied to corporations, the implementation of the 
Sarbanes-Oxly Act of 2002 has affected not-for-profit hospitals in meeting external 
regulations and adopting appropriate board governance structures (Greene, 2005). The 
results of this study can assist not-for-profit hospitals or their administrators to justify and 
explain why they opt to operate with current governance structures. Specifically, as 
presented in Chapter 4, the outcomes of this study suggested that not-for-profit hospitals 
can choose to operate with or without CEO duality and with or without physicians 
serving as members of hospital boards. It is important for administrators of not-for-profit 
hospitals to understand that while board size does not affect total margins, operating 
margins, or free cash flow, hospital size and hospital age do affect financial performance.  
Conclusions 
Good corporate governance is critical to the growth and sustainability of modern 
corporations. Some companies operate with a governance structure in which the CEO is 
also the chairperson of the board of directors, a structure called CEO duality. Some 




and chairperson of corporate board, a CEO might become too powerful and adversely 
influence the monitoring function of the board. Therefore, CEO duality can potentially 
interfere with a board’s effectiveness in governing the organization and evaluating the 
performance of the top executive team, negatively affecting organizational performance 
(Aguilera et al., 2008; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Rechner & Dalton, 1991). In contrast, 
other researchers considered CEO duality as a way to allow executive teams to manage 
organizations with clear and unambiguous leadership and facilitate an effective 
communication between shareholders, boards of directors, and managers (Boyd, 1995; 
David et al., 1997; Kang & Zardkoohi, 2005; Nicholson & Kiel 2007). Therefore, CEO 
duality may help lead to a system that is more effective and efficient in reaching 
organizational objectives and financial performance. 
For more than two decades, researchers have focused substantial work on the 
influences of roles, size, structure, composition of boards, and CEO duality on firm 
performance and still generated ambiguous results (Krause, 2013; Lawal, 2012). 
However, no researchers have examined specifically the relationship between CEO 
duality and financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. The focus of this study was 
to fill this gap. Furthermore, this study is different from other studies in that it included 
an exploration of the impact of the presence of physicians on governance boards. 
The outcomes of this study are consistent with the results generated by other 
studies that CEO duality had no relationship with organizational performance. 
Specifically, I found CEO duality and presence of physicians on boards were not related 




integral to the healthcare system and the well-being of people and communities, it is 
important for these not-for-profit organizations to operate with efficiency, sustainability, 
and with a desired governance structure. The results of this study suggest that not-for-
profit hospitals can choose to operate without having a CEO duality governance structure 
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1 106400466 ARROYO GRANDE COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
2 106150722 BAKERSFIELD MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 
3 106184008 BANNER LASSEN MEDICAL CENTER 
4 106190052 BARLOW HOSPITAL 
5 106090793 BARTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 
6 106330120 BETTY FORD CENTER OF EISENHOWER 
7 106190081 BEVERLY HOSPITAL 
8 106010776 
CHILDRENS HOSPITAL & RESEARCH CENTER AT 
OAKLAND 
9 106304113 CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL AT MISSION 
10 106204019 CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL CENTRAL CALIFORNIA 
11 106190170 CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL OF LOS ANGELES 
12 106300032 CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL OF ORANGE COUNTY 
13 106190636 CITRUS VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER - QV CAMPUS 
14 106190176 CITY OF HOPE HELFORD CLINICAL RESEARCH HOSPITAL 
15 106100005 CLOVIS COMMUNITY MEDICAL CENTER 
16 106361323 COMMUNITY HOSPITAL OF SAN BERNARDINO 
17 106270744 COMMUNITY HOSPITAL OF THE MONTEREY PENINSULA 
18 106560473 
COMMUNITY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL - SAN 
BUENAVENTURA 
19 106100717 COMMUNITY REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER 
20 106390846 DAMERON HOSPITAL 
21 106440755 DOMINICAN SANTA CRUZ HOSPITAL - SOQUEL 
22 106190243 DOWNEY REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER 
23 106196168 EARL & LORRAINE MILLER CHILDRENS HOSPITAL 
24 106010805 EDEN MEDICAL CENTER 
25 106331168 EISENHOWER MEDICAL CENTER 
26 106430763 EL CAMINO HOSPITAL 
27 106500867 EMANUEL MEDICAL CENTER 
28 106190280 ENCINO HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER 
29 106040962 ENLOE MEDICAL CENTER - ESPLANADE CAMPUS 
30 106040875 FEATHER RIVER HOSPITAL 
31 106190298 FOOTHILL PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL 




33 106270777 GEORGE L. MEE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 
34 106190323 GLENDALE ADVENTIST MEDICAL CENTER 
35 106190522 GLENDALE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CENTER 
36 106420483 GOLETA VALLEY COTTAGE HOSPITAL 
37 106190392 GOOD SAMARITAN HOSPITAL- LA 
38 106160725 HANFORD COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
39 106190949 HENRY MAYO NEWHALL MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 
40 106301205 HOAG MEMORIAL HOSPITAL PRESBYTERIAN 
41 106190400 HUNTINGTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 
42 106380842 JEWISH HOME 
43 106071018 JOHN MUIR MEDICAL CENTER-CONCORD CAMPUS 
44 106070988 JOHN MUIR MEDICAL CENTER-WALNUT CREEK CAMPUS 
45 106196404 JOYCE EISENBERG KEEFER MEDICAL CENTER 
46 106361246 LOMA LINDA UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER 
47 106190525 LONG BEACH MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER 
48 106434040 
LUCILE SALTER PACKARD CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL AT 
STANFORD 
49 106201281 MADERA COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
50 106420493 MARIAN MEDICAL CENTER 
51 106211006 MARIN GENERAL HOSPITAL 
52 106090933 MARSHALL MEDICAL CENTER 
53 106500939 MEMORIAL HOSPITAL MODESTO 
54 106340947 MERCY GENERAL HOSPITAL 
55 106150761 MERCY HOSPITAL - BAKERSFIELD 
56 106344029 MERCY HOSPITAL - FOLSOM 
57 106450949 MERCY MEDICAL CENTER 
58 106240942 
MERCY MEDICAL CENTER MERCED-COMMUNITY 
CAMPUS 
59 106340950 MERCY SAN JUAN HOSPITAL 
60 106340951 METHODIST HOSPITAL OF SACRAMENTO 
61 106190529 METHODIST HOSPITAL OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 
62 106190524 MISSION COMMUNITY HOSPITAL - PANORAMA CAMPUS 
63 106301262 MISSION HOSPITAL REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER 
64 106361166 MONTCLAIR HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER 
65 106190552 MOTION PICTURE & TELEVISION HOSPITAL 
66 106481357 NORTH BAY MEDICAL CENTER 
67 106190568 NORTHRIDGE HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER 
68 106430837 O'CONNOR HOSPITAL 




70 106190630 POMONA VALLEY HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER 
71 106190631 PRESBYTERIAN INTERCOMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
72 106281047 QUEEN OF THE VALLEY HOSPITAL 
73 106370673 RADY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL - SAN DIEGO 
74 106361308 REDLANDS COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
75 106580996 RIDEOUT MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 
76 106150782 RIDGECREST REGIONAL HOSPITAL 
77 106190796 RONALD REAGAN UCLA MEDICAL CENTER 
78 106361318 SAN ANTONIO COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
79 106150788 SAN JOAQUIN COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
80 106420514 SANTA BARBARA COTTAGE HOSPITAL 
81 106190687 
SANTA MONICA-UCLA MEDICAL CENTER & 
ORTHOPAEDIC HOSPITAL 
82 106491064 SANTA ROSA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 
83 106371256 SCRIPPS GREEN HOSPITAL 
84 106371394 SCRIPPS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL - ENCINITAS 
85 106370771 SCRIPPS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL-LA JOLLA 
86 106370744 SCRIPPS MERCY HOSPITAL 
87 106410891 SEQUOIA HOSPITAL 
88 106410817 SETON MEDICAL CENTER 
89 106370875 SHARP CHULA VISTA MEDICAL CENTER 
90 106370689 SHARP CORONADO HOSPITAL & HEALTHCARE CENTER 
91 106370714 SHARP GROSSMONT  HOSPITAL 
92 106370694 SHARP MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 
93 106370745 SHARP MESA VISTA HOSPITAL 
94 106190708 SHERMAN OAKS HOSPITAL & HEALTH CENTER 
95 106344114 
SHRINERS HOSPITALS FOR CHILDREN NORTHERN 
CALIFORNIA 
96 106291023 SIERRA NEVADA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 
97 106560525 
SIMI VALLEY HOSPITAL & HEALTH CARE SERVICES - 
SYCAMORE 
98 106554011 SONORA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER-GREENLEY 
99 106100899 ST. AGNES MEDICAL CENTER 
100 106361339 ST. BERNARDINE MEDICAL CENTER 
101 106521041 ST. ELIZABETH COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
102 106190754 ST. FRANCIS MEDICAL CENTER 
103 106380960 ST. FRANCIS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 
104 106281078 ST. HELENA HOSPITAL 
105 106190756 ST. JOHN'S HEALTH CENTER 




107 106560529 ST. JOHN'S REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER 
108 106121080 ST. JOSEPH HOSPITAL - EUREKA 
109 106301340 ST. JOSEPH HOSPITAL - ORANGE 
110 106391042 ST. JOSEPH'S MEDICAL CENTER OF STOCKTON 
111 106301342 ST. JUDE MEDICAL CENTER 
112 106434138 ST. LOUISE REGIONAL HOSPITAL 
113 106190053 ST. MARY MEDICAL CENTER 
114 106190053 ST. MARY MEDICAL CENTER - LONG BEACH 
115 106190053 ST. MARY MEDICAL CENTER - LOS ANGELES 
116 106380965 ST. MARY'S MEDICAL CENTER-SAN FRANCISCO 
117 106010967 ST. ROSE HOSPITAL 
118 106190762 ST. VINCENT MEDICAL CENTER 
119 106430905 STANFORD UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 
120 106034002 SUTTER AMADOR HOSPITAL 
121 106310791 SUTTER AUBURN FAITH HOSPITAL 
122 106084001 SUTTER COAST HOSPITAL 
123 106574010 SUTTER DAVIS HOSPITAL 
124 106070934 SUTTER DELTA MEDICAL CENTER 
125 106444012 
SUTTER MATERNITY & SURGERY CENTER OF SANTA 
CRUZ 
126 106341051 SUTTER MEDICAL CENTER - SACRAMENTO 
127 106490919 SUTTER MEDICAL CENTER OF SANTA ROSA 
128 106311000 SUTTER ROSEVILLE MEDICAL CENTER 
129 106481094 SUTTER SOLANO MEDICAL CENTER 
130 106391056 SUTTER TRACY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
131 106190782 TARZANA TREATMENT CENTER 
132 106190422 TORRANCE MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER 
133 106190159 TRI-CITY REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER 
134 106381154 UCSF MEDICAL CENTER 
135 106231396 UKIAH VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER - HOSPITAL DRIVE 
136 106370782 UNIVERSITY OF CALIF - SAN DIEGO MEDICAL CENTER 
137 106341006 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA DAVIS MEDICAL CENTER 
138 106301279 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE MEDICAL CENTER 
139 106194219 USC UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 
140 106484001 VACA VALLEY HOSPITAL 
141 106190812 VALLEY PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL 
142 106014050 VALLEYCARE MEDICAL CENTER 
143 106190818 VERDUGO HILLS HOSPITAL 




145 106190878 WHITE MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER 








Appendix B: Hospitals and Websites 
Hospital Name Websites 
ARROYO GRANDE COMMUNITY HOSPITAL http://www.arroyograndehospital.org 
BAKERSFIELD MEMORIAL HOSPITAL http://www.bakersfieldmemorial.org  
BANNER LASSEN MEDICAL CENTER http://www.BannerHealth.com  
BARLOW HOSPITAL http://barlowhospital.org  
BARTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL http://www.bartonhealth.org  
BETTY FORD CENTER OF EISENHOWER http://www.emc.org/body.cfm?id=140 
BEVERLY HOSPITAL http://Beverly.org  
CHILDRENS HOSPITAL & RESEARCH CENTER AT 
OAKLAND http://www.childrenshospitaloakland.org 
CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL AT MISSION http://www.choc.org  
CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL CENTRAL CALIFORNIA http://www.childrenscentralcal.org  
CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL OF LOS ANGELES http://www.childrenshospitalla.org  
CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL OF ORANGE COUNTY http://www.choc.org  
CITRUS VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER - QV CAMPUS http://cvhp.org  
CITY OF HOPE HELFORD CLINICAL RESEARCH 
HOSPITAL http://www.coh.org  
CLOVIS COMMUNITY MEDICAL CENTER http://www.communitymedical.org/ 
COMMUNITY HOSPITAL OF SAN BERNARDINO http://www.chsb.org  
COMMUNITY HOSPITAL OF THE MONTEREY 
PENINSULA http://www.chsb.org  
COMMUNITY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL - SAN 
BUENAVENTURA http://www.cmhshealth.org  
COMMUNITY REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER http://www.communitymedical.org  
DAMERON HOSPITAL http://www.cmhshealth.org  
DOMINICAN SANTA CRUZ HOSPITAL - SOQUEL http://www.dominicanhospital.org 
DOWNEY REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER http://www.drmci.org 
EARL & LORRAINE MILLER CHILDRENS HOSPITAL http://www.memorialcare.org  
EDEN MEDICAL CENTER http://edenmedcenter.org  
EISENHOWER MEDICAL CENTER http://www.emc.org  
EL CAMINO HOSPITAL http://www.elcaminohospital.org  
EMANUEL MEDICAL CENTER http://www.emanuelmedicalcenter.org  
ENCINO HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER http://www.encinomed.com  
ENLOE MEDICAL CENTER - ESPLANADE CAMPUS http://www.enloe.org  
FEATHER RIVER HOSPITAL http://www.frhosp.org  
FOOTHILL PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL http://cvhp.org  
FRENCH HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER http://www.frenchmedicalcenter.org  
GEORGE L. MEE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL http://www.meememorial.com  








GOLETA VALLEY COTTAGE HOSPITAL http://www.cottagehealthsystem.org  
GOOD SAMARITAN HOSPITAL- LA http://www.goodsam.org  
HANFORD COMMUNITY HOSPITAL http://www.adventisthealthcv.com  
HENRY MAYO NEWHALL MEMORIAL HOSPITAL http://www.henrymayo.com  
HOAG MEMORIAL HOSPITAL PRESBYTERIAN http://www.Hoaghospital.org  
HUNTINGTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL http://www.huntingtonhospital.com  
JEWISH HOME http://jhsf.org 
JOHN MUIR MEDICAL CENTER-CONCORD CAMPUS http://www.johnmuirhealth.com  
JOHN MUIR MEDICAL CENTER-WALNUT CREEK 
CAMPUS http://www.johnmuirhealth.com  
JOYCE EISENBERG KEEFER MEDICAL CENTER http://www.jha.org  
LOMA LINDA UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER http://www.lomalindahealth.org  
LONG BEACH MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER http://www.memorialcare.org  
LUCILE SALTER PACKARD CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL 
AT STANFORD http://www.lpch.org  
MADERA COMMUNITY HOSPITAL http://www.maderahospital.org  
MARIAN MEDICAL CENTER http://www.marianmedicalcenter.org  
MARIN GENERAL HOSPITAL http://www.maringeneral.org  
MARSHALL MEDICAL CENTER http://marshallmedical.org  
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL MODESTO http://memorialmedicalcenter.org  
MERCY GENERAL HOSPITAL http://www.mercygeneral.org  
MERCY HOSPITAL - BAKERSFIELD http://www.mercybakersfield.org  
MERCY HOSPITAL - FOLSOM http://www.mercyfolsom.org  
MERCY MEDICAL CENTER http://www.mercymercedcares.org  
MERCY MEDICAL CENTER MERCED-COMMUNITY 
CAMPUS http://www.mercymercedcares.org  
MERCY SAN JUAN HOSPITAL http://www.mercysanjuan.org  
METHODIST HOSPITAL OF SACRAMENTO http://www.methodistsacramento.org  
METHODIST HOSPITAL OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA http://www.methodisthospital.org 
MISSION COMMUNITY HOSPITAL - PANORAMA 
CAMPUS http://mchonline.org  
MISSION HOSPITAL REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER http://www.mission4health.com  
MONTCLAIR HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER http://www.montclair-hospital.org 
MOTION PICTURE & TELEVISION HOSPITAL http://www.mptvfund.org  
NORTH BAY MEDICAL CENTER http://www.northbay.org  
NORTHRIDGE HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER http://www.northridgehospital.org  
O'CONNOR HOSPITAL http://www.oconnorhospital.org 
PENINSULA MEDICAL CENTER http://www.mills-peninsula.org  




PRESBYTERIAN INTERCOMMUNITY HOSPITAL http://www.whittierpres.com 
QUEEN OF THE VALLEY HOSPITAL http://www.thequeen.org  
RADY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL - SAN DIEGO http://www.rchsd.org  
REDLANDS COMMUNITY HOSPITAL http://www.redlandshospital.org  
RIDEOUT MEMORIAL HOSPITAL http://www.frhg.org  
RIDGECREST REGIONAL HOSPITAL http://www.rrh.org  
RONALD REAGAN UCLA MEDICAL CENTER http://uclahealth.org  
SAN ANTONIO COMMUNITY HOSPITAL http://www.sach.org  
SAN JOAQUIN COMMUNITY HOSPITAL http://www.sanjoaquinhospital.org  
SANTA BARBARA COTTAGE HOSPITAL http://www.cottagehealthsystem.org  
SANTA MONICA-UCLA MEDICAL CENTER & 
ORTHOPAEDIC HOSPITAL http://uclahealth.org  
SANTA ROSA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL http://stjosephhealth.org  
SCRIPPS GREEN HOSPITAL http://www.scripps.org  
SCRIPPS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL - ENCINITAS http://www.scripps.org  
SCRIPPS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL-LA JOLLA http://www.scripps.org  
SCRIPPS MERCY HOSPITAL http://www.scripps.org  
SEQUOIA HOSPITAL http://www.sequoiahospital.org  
SETON MEDICAL CENTER http://www.setonmedicalcenter.org 
SHARP CHULA VISTA MEDICAL CENTER http://www.sharp.com  
SHARP CORONADO HOSPITAL & HEALTHCARE 
CENTER http://www.sharp.com  
SHARP GROSSMONT  HOSPITAL http://www.sharp.com  
SHARP MEMORIAL HOSPITAL http://www.sharp.com  
SHARP MESA VISTA HOSPITAL http://www.sharp.com  
SHERMAN OAKS HOSPITAL & HEALTH CENTER http://www.shermanoakshospital.com  
SHRINERS HOSPITALS FOR CHILDREN NORTHERN 
CALIFORNIA http://shrinershq.org 
SIERRA NEVADA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL http://www.snmh.org/  
SIMI VALLEY HOSPITAL & HEALTH CARE SERVICES 
- SYCAMORE http://www.simivalleyhospital.com  
SONORA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER-GREENLEY http://www.sonoramedicalcenter.org  
ST. AGNES MEDICAL CENTER http://www.samc.com  
ST. BERNARDINE MEDICAL CENTER 
http://www.stbernardinemedicalcenter.or
g  
ST. ELIZABETH COMMUNITY HOSPITAL http://redbluff.mercy.org 
ST. FRANCIS MEDICAL CENTER http://www.stfrancismedicalcenter.org  
ST. FRANCIS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL http://www.saintfrancismemorial.org  
ST. HELENA HOSPITAL http://www.sthelenahospital.org  
ST. JOHN'S HEALTH CENTER http://stjohn.org  




ST. JOHN'S REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER http://www.stjohnshealth.org  
ST. JOSEPH HOSPITAL - EUREKA http://www.stjosepheureka.org  
ST. JOSEPH HOSPITAL - ORANGE http://www.sjo.org  
ST. JOSEPH'S MEDICAL CENTER OF STOCKTON http://www.stjosephscares.org  
ST. JUDE MEDICAL CENTER http://www.stjudemedicalcenter.org  
ST. LOUISE REGIONAL HOSPITAL 
http://www.saintlouiseregionalhospital.or
g  
ST. MARY MEDICAL CENTER http://www.stmarymedicalcenter.org  
ST. MARY MEDICAL CENTER - LONG BEACH http://www.stmarymedicalcenter.org  
ST. MARY MEDICAL CENTER - LOS ANGELES http://www.stmarymedicalcenter.org  
ST. MARY'S MEDICAL CENTER-SAN FRANCISCO http://www.stmarymedicalcenter.org  
ST. ROSE HOSPITAL http://www.StRoseHospital.org  
ST. VINCENT MEDICAL CENTER http://www.stvincentmedicalcenter.com  
STANFORD UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL http://www.stanfordhospital.com  
SUTTER AMADOR HOSPITAL http://sutteramador.org  
SUTTER AUBURN FAITH HOSPITAL http://sutterauburnfaith.org  
SUTTER COAST HOSPITAL http://www.suttercoast.org  
SUTTER DAVIS HOSPITAL http://sutterdavis.org  
SUTTER DELTA MEDICAL CENTER http://www.sutterdelta.org  
SUTTER MATERNITY & SURGERY CENTER OF 
SANTA CRUZ http://www.suttersantacruz.org/  
SUTTER MEDICAL CENTER - SACRAMENTO http://www.suttermedicalcenter.org  
SUTTER MEDICAL CENTER OF SANTA ROSA http://www.suttersantarosa.org  
SUTTER ROSEVILLE MEDICAL CENTER http://sutterroseville.org  
SUTTER SOLANO MEDICAL CENTER http://suttersolano.org  
SUTTER TRACY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL http://www.suttertracy.org  
TARZANA TREATMENT CENTER http://www.tarzanatc.org  
TORRANCE MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER http://www.torrancememorial.org  
TRI-CITY REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER http://tri-cityrmc.org  
UCSF MEDICAL CENTER http://www.ucsfhealth.org  
UKIAH VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER - HOSPITAL 
DRIVE http://www.uvmc.org  
UNIVERSITY OF CALIF - SAN DIEGO MEDICAL 
CENTER http://health.ucsd.edu/  
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA DAVIS MEDICAL 
CENTER http://www.ucdmc.ucdavis.edu  
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE MEDICAL 
CENTER http://www.ucihealth.com  
USC UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL http://www.uscuniversityhospital.org/  
VACA VALLEY HOSPITAL http://www.northbay.org  
VALLEY PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL http://ValleyPres.org  




VERDUGO HILLS HOSPITAL http://www.vhhospital.org  
VICTOR VALLEY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL http://vvgmc.com/ 
WHITE MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER http://www.whitememorial.com  



















1 106400466  -0.04 -0.043 42,146 
2 106150722  0.08  0.098 5,397,651 
3 106184008  0.22  0.287 13,020 
4 106090793  0.18  0.087 475,842 
5 106330120  -0.05 -0.054 44,144 
6 106190081  -0.01 -0.004 414,168 
7 106304113  0.06  0.061 361,654 
8 106204019  0.13  0.179 383,124 
9 106190170  -0.03 0.020 94,180 
10 106190636  0.04  0.048 748,496 
11 106190176  0.01  0.059 1,211,918 
12 106100005  0.15  0.172 101 
13 106270744  0.09  0.103 1,171,622 
14 106560473  0.07  0.101 188,593 
15 106100717  0.05  0.070 2,262,248 
16 106440755  0.10  0.126 1,406,347 
17 106190243  -0.07 -0.044 242,346 
18 106196168  0.02  0.028 173 
19 106331168  -0.09 -0.016 2,508,987 
20 106430763  0.07  0.090 1,617,166 
21 106500867  0.01  0.036 270,301 
22 106040962  0.04  0.048 487,508 
23 106040875  0.03  0.033 3 
24 106190298  0.04  0.045 171,461 
25 106270777  0.00  0.015 15,541 
26 106190323  0.02  0.031 1,364,598 
27 106190522  -0.08 -0.070 11,713 
28 106190392  -0.02 0.043 446,017 
29 106160725  0.08  0.099 405,214 
30 106190400  0.02  0.056 1,270,849 
31 106380842  -0.17 0.016 149,411 
32 106071018  0.00  0.012 237,416 




34 106361246  0.07  0.071 2,494,723 
35 106190525  0.12  0.153 3,116 
36 106201281  0.06  0.065 581,802 
37 106420493  0.03  0.043 2,158,073 
38 106211006  0.07  0.013 1,142,201 
39 106500939  0.13  0.162 837,532 
40 106340947  0.06  0.074 24,279 
41 106150761  0.08  0.112 2,472,349 
42 106450949  0.10  0.147 2,480,452 
43 106240942  0.05  0.031 477,917 
44 106340950  0.03  0.037 267 
45 106190529  0.00  0.004 1,235,923 
46 106190524  0.02  0.023 259,013 
47 106301262  0.08  0.094 2,755,548 
48 106190552  -0.21 -0.088 83,189 
49 106481357  0.00  0.014 260,822 
50 106190568  0.08  0.086 10,989,273 
51 106410852  0.04  0.082 219,273 
52 106190630  0.03  0.030 1,423,959 
53 106190631  0.08  0.101 94,374 
54 106370673  0.14  0.077 272,657 
55 106361308  0.01  0.032 231,768 
56 106580996  0.00  0.030 338,517 
57 106190796  0.13  0.141 13,096,582 
58 106361318  0.02  0.090 1,364,558 
59 106190687  0.15  0.174 726,712 
60 106491064  0.05  0.059 2,656,471 
61 106371256  0.22  0.276 4 
62 106370771  0.15  0.180 17 
63 106370744  0.05  0.056 7 
64 106410891  0.07  0.103 2,218,726 
65 106370875  0.01  0.035 64,059 
66 106370689  0.04  0.064 24,987 
67 106370714  0.03  0.048 1,514,872 
68 106370745  -0.03 -0.016 0 
69 106190708  0.05  0.084 142,750 
70 106344114  -0.08 -0.072 1 




72 106554011  0.06  0.070 1,253,286 
73 106100899  -0.00 0.000 3,296,167 
74 106521041  0.14  0.181 1,462,536 
75 106190754  0.03  0.050 631,343 
76 106380960  -0.02 0.015 239,643 
77 106190756  -0.39 -0.283 984,745 
78 106560508  -0.01 -0.002 567,818 
79 106560529  -0.05 -0.046 452,241 
80 106301340  0.01  0.044 5,255,429 
81 106391042  0.02  0.040 2,813,767 
82 106301342  0.07  0.111 3,132,764 
83 106190053  0.07  0.076 64,682 
84 106190053  -0.03 -0.035 43,129 
85 106190053  -0.02 -0.039 43,131 
86 106190762  -0.06 -0.046 607,428 
87 106430905  0.08  0.061 15,768,673 
88 106310791  0.03  0.043 213,756 
89 106084001  -0.01 -0.006 96,824 
90 106574010  0.20  0.248 159,502 
91 106444012  0.29  0.400 81,848 
92 106341051  0.11  0.127 1,043,315 
93 106490919  0.02  0.017 112,832 
94 106481094  -0.04 -0.032 198,056 
95 106391056  0.19  0.242 134,484 
96 106190782  -0.03 0.044 614,340 
97 106190159  -0.03 0.017 276,110 
98 106381154  0.06  0.073 8,388,210 
99 106231396  0.06  0.054 620,514 
100 106341006  0.07  0.084 5,220,523 
101 106301279  0.11  0.133 896 
102 106194219  -0.10 -0.091 15,668,038 
103 106190812  0.04  0.049 156,177 
104 106014050  0.03  0.028 529,300 
105 106190818  0.00  0.019 18,129 
106 106190878  0.04  0.087 9,433,091 
108 106121080  0.05  0.053 346,697 
109 106301340  0.01  0.044 5,255,429 




111 106301342  0.07  0.111 3,132,764 
112 106434138  -0.01 -0.017 137,097 
113 106190053  0.07  0.076 64,682 
114 106190053  -0.03 -0.035 43,129 
115 106190053  -0.02 -0.039 43,131 
116 106380965  -0.01 0.005 2,196,091 
117 106010967  -0.09 -0.048 372,693 
118 106190762  -0.06 -0.046 607,428 
119 106430905  0.08  0.061 15,768,673 
120 106034002  0.04  0.044 155,409 
121 106310791  0.03  0.043 213,756 
122 106084001  -0.01 -0.006 96,824 
123 106574010  0.20  0.248 159,502 
124 106070934  0.01  0.029 286,508 
125 106444012  0.29  0.400 81,848 
126 106341051  0.11  0.127 1,043,315 
127 106490919  0.02  0.017 112,832 
128 106311000  0.17  0.221 697,422 
129 106481094  -0.04 -0.032 198,056 
130 106391056  0.19  0.242 134,484 
131 106190782  -0.03 0.044 614,340 
132 106190422  0.03  0.077 733,197 
133 106190159  -0.03 0.017 276,110 
134 106381154  0.06  0.073 8,388,210 
135 106231396  0.06  0.054 620,514 
136 106370782  0.08  0.108 144,760 
137 106341006  0.07  0.084 5,220,523 
138 106301279  0.11  0.133 896 
139 106194219  -0.10 -0.091 15,668,038 
140 106484001  0.17  0.234 24,965 
141 106190812  0.04  0.049 156,177 
142 106014050  0.03  0.028 529,300 
143 106190818  0.00  0.019 18,129 
144 106361370  0.02  0.020 122,701 
145 106190878  0.04  0.087 9,433,091 

















1 106400466 0 1 26,165,147 1.72 19 
2 106150722 1 1 301,528,141 1.76 23 
3 106184008 0 1 55,606,811 1.18 13 
4 106190052 0 6 23,957,662 2.05 11 
5 106090793 0 3 129,650,625 1.73 10 
6 106330120 1 4 54,082,630 1.63 32 
7 106190081 0 4 76,585,432 1.81 14 
8 106010776 1 4 431,074,500 2.00 12 
9 106304113 1 3 35,455,755 1.70 20 
10 106204019 1 2 482,307,792 1.81 24 
11 106190170 0 7 1,221,144,871 1.91 68 
12 106300032 1 3 222,835,435 1.70 20 
13 106190636 1 2 181,736,245 1.54 11 
14 106190176 1 1 513,760,115 2.00 11 
15 106100005 0 5 181,533,347 1.69 15 
16 106361323 0 4 59,628,945 2.02 15 
17 106270744 1 4 473,120,386 1.90 15 
18 106560473 1 7 212,975,808 2.05 21 
19 106100717 0 5 855,286,908 2.04 14 
20 106390846 0 1 178,254,074 2.01 12 
21 106440755 0 4 233,335,346 1.86 12 
22 106190243 0 2 108,767,558 1.74 24 
23 106196168 0 4 193,655,424 1.67 15 
24 106010805 1 5 106,342,858 1.78 15 
25 106331168 0 4 757,956,389 1.63 32 
26 106430763 0 3 957,592,720 1.70 9 
27 106500867 0 2 210,087,654 1.95 8 
28 106190280 0 5 25,033,124 0.90 8 
29 106040962 1 6 274,236,218 2.00 16 
30 106040875 1 4 87,168,421 1.81 12 
31 106190298 1 2 46,447,191 1.61 11 
32 106400480 0 4 45,379,332 1.45 22 




34 106190323 0 1 298,087,148 2.04 9 
35 106190522 1 4 132,407,998 1.94 15 
36 106420483 1 3 34,512,430 2.09 11 
37 106190392 1 3 237,760,337 1.83 16 
38 106160725 0 4 146,926,174 1.69 18 
39 106190949 1 3 215,028,172 1.59 13 
40 106301205 1 4 1,926,543,411 1.79 19 
41 106190400 0 6 635,009,818 2.08 24 
42 106380842 0 4 81,516,856 2.16 14 
43 106071018 0 10 187,434,486 1.92 20 
44 106070988 1 10 701,497,251 1.92 20 
45 106196404 0 6 78,685,066 2.01 25 
46 106361246 0 6 1,041,453,006 2.04 36 
47 106190525 0 4 553,885,160 2.04 30 
48 106434040 0 2 1,497,280,000 1.98 20 
49 106201281 0 4 58,162,409 1.63 25 
50 106420493 0 4 203,087,605 1.87 21 
51 106211006 0 3 112,604,986 1.79 10 
52 106090933 0 3 184,815,178 1.74 11 
53 106500939 0 3 462,533,687 1.64 18 
54 106340947 0 4 343,822,762 1.93 16 
55 106150761 0 1 189,566,238 1.34 21 
56 106344029 0 4 145,154,251 1.98 16 
57 106450949 0 2 352,862,876 1.96 15 
58 106240942 0 1 312,513,969 1.45 10 
59 106340950 0 2 357,912,611 1.65 15 
60 106340951 0 2 113,143,881 1.96 15 
61 106190529 0 4 221,858,541 2.00 37 
62 106190524 0 1 69,706,469 1.70 8 
63 106301262 0 3 426,652,774 1.81 13 
64 106361166 0 2 16,855,878 1.61 6 
65 106190552 0 0 209,213,585 1.97 15 
66 106481357 0 2 163,892,676 1.73 8 
67 106190568 1 1 310,615,626 1.77 10 
68 106430837 0 1 194,307,401 2.10 8 
69 106410852 0 9 710,781,940 1.78 21 
70 106190630 0 4 310,759,781 1.89 24 
71 106190631 0 3 794,491,000 1.74 24 




73 106370673 1 5 788,498,585 1.80 12 
74 106361308 1 2 195,489,996 2.04 22 
75 106580996 0 4 373,595,594 2.03 13 
76 106150782 0 2 128,832,079 1.84 11 
77 106190796 0 4 1,729,210,292 1.77 20 
78 106361318 0 2 365,410,966 2.03 9 
79 106150788 0 4 162,857,894 1.62 13 
80 106420514 0 2 918,537,866 2.09 11 
81 106190687 0 2 512,168,935 2.01 8 
82 106491064 0 2 341,673,496 1.81 21 
83 106371256 0 3 253,866,188 1.95 16 
84 106371394 0 3 87,522,406 1.95 16 
85 106370771 0 3 287,254,103 1.95 16 
86 106370744 0 3 226,711,502 1.95 16 
87 106410891 1 6 293,963,321 1.88 16 
88 106410817 0 1 178,512,770 2.01 9 
89 106370875 0 3 168,348,071 1.77 13 
90 106370689 0 4 26,154,407 1.77 15 
91 106370714 0 2 358,831,584 1.77 11 
92 106370694 0 4 655,499,956 1.77 17 
93 106370745 0 4 30,620,948 1.77 24 
94 106190708 0 2 32,669,021 1.30 6 
95 106344114 0   95,160,735 1.96 15 
96 106291023 0 2 182,333,397 1.75 11 
97 106560525 0 5 115,461,365 1.70 13 
98 106554011 1 3 83,406,335 1.69 13 
99 106100899 0 3 623,400,059 1.93 15 
100 106361339 0 1 134,038,630 1.92 10 
101 106521041 0 2 99,722,576 1.99 22 
102 106190754 0 2 352,349,324 1.84 13 
103 106380960 1 3 267,662,154 2.04 20 
104 106281078 1 1 77,629,872 2.13 7 
105 106190756 0 2 492,201,622 1.79 14 
106 106560508 0 1 65,937,134 2.01 19 
107 106560529 0 1 229,941,677 2.01 19 
108 106121080 0 4 112,230,888 1.78 18 
109 106301340 0 1 812,085,075 1.93 10 
110 106391042 0 2 307,890,920 2.06 17 




112 106434138 0 1 37,281,956 1.40 8 
113 106190053 0 4 87,098,778 1.96 46 
114 106190053 0 4 87,098,778 1.96 46 
115 106190053 0 4 87,098,778 1.96 46 
116 106380965 1 4 169,623,756 1.96 46 
117 106010967 1 3 70,636,995 1.57 24 
118 106190762 0 2 159,713,299 2.00 15 
119 106430905 0 5 2,200,740,192 1.74 22 
120 106034002 0 4 63,135,131 1.38 17 
121 106310791 0 4 69,107,522 1.68 17 
122 106084001 0 2 35,329,486 1.45 8 
123 106574010 0 4 41,008,316 1.30 17 
124 106070934 0 1 120,610,271 1.60 9 
125 106444012 0 6 24,391,450 1.26 22 
126 106341051 0 6 747,272,314 1.84 27 
127 106490919 0 8 74,109,047 1.89 32 
128 106311000 0 4 363,415,725 1.79 17 
129 106481094 0 4 87,460,963 1.97 17 
130 106391056 0 2 73,439,752 1.82 15 
131 106190782 0 2 28,293,124 1.62 15 
132 106190422 0 1 590,670,650 1.95 12 
133 106190159 0 1 29,478,406 1.72 6 
134 106381154 0 5 1,123,320,860 2.18 24 
135 106231396 1 6 46,522,614 1.20 16 
136 106370782 0 3 681,596,631 1.72 12 
137 106341006 0 5 1,356,407,816 2.04 48 
138 106301279 0 13 719,435,998 1.69 13 
139 106194219 0 7 415,233,114 2.10 27 
140 106484001 0 2 65,880,231 1.76 8 
141 106190812 0 7 111,929,340 1.75 19 
142 106014050 0 4 200,990,819 1.36 14 
143 106190818 0 4 41,564,433 1.83 16 
144 106361370 0 1 32,563,577 1.67 4 
145 106190878 0 3 500,677,247 1.82 16 





Appendix E: Communication With Lexie Bloyd of OSHPD Database 
 
Anh Pham < > 
11/27/14 
to lexie.bloyd  <> 
Dear Lexie Bloyd, 
My name is Anh Pham. I am a PhD student in the School of Management of Walden 
University, Minneapolis, Minnesota. I am undertaking a dissertation study examining the 
effects of CEO duality (CEO who is also Chairman of Boards of Directors) and presence 
of physicians on governance boards on financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. I 
am hoping the outcomes of this study could suggest an appropriate governance structure 
to administrators of not-for-profit hospitals seeking policies or processes that would help 
them sustain and enhance their finance performance and organizational missions. My 
dissertation committee includes Dr. Jeffrey Prinster, Dr. Thomas Spencer, and Dr. 
Godwin Igein, who are prestigious professors of the most excellent institute of Walden 
University. I feel so fortunate to have a committee that has been guiding and supporting 
me to a full extent, and has reviewed and approved my dissertation proposal. 
For data collection, I would like to be able to access publicly reported financial data such 
total margins, operating margins, and other financial indicators submitted by not-for-
profits listed in the databases of OSPH and SIERA. For data related to governance, I 
would like to be able to examine the governance structure of each of not-for-profit 
hospital to determine whether there is presence or absence of CEO duality or physicians 
on governance board. The collected data are entered into statistical software for running 
statistical tests using statistical correlation and multiple regression models, and the results 
will be used to determine whether CEO duality and presence of physicians on governance 
boards are good for financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. All data will be 
carefully safeguarded, kept confidential and will be disposed properly once the study is 
over.  
Regarding accessibility to public databases, I am aware that I can access to relevant 
information and data from the public OSPH database in the format of Excel files without 
any restriction of required user identification and password. However, the SIERA 
database requires that users need to be authorized and set up an account before having 
access to the SIERA database. 
Therefore, I am writing earnestly to request you to grant me permission to access the 
SIERA database. If my enquiry is not within your authority, I am very grateful if you can 
kindly direct me to appropriate individuals, offices, or institutes that can assist me in 
getting access to the SIERA database. Moreover, I also respectfully ask you to inform me 
whether the data contained in SIERA are similar and identical to those of the OSHPD 
database. 
 







Anh Pham  
Walden University 
Student ID#A00275579 




Anh Pham < > 
11/27/14 
 
to lexie.bloyd < > 
Dear Lexie Bloyd, 
 
I would like to add that I have proposed that I would use statistical correlation and 
multiple regression and SPSS software to analyze secondary data or archived data of 
financial indicators from 107 U.S not-for-profit organizations selected from the Office of 
Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) databases of States of California, 






Bloyd, Lexie@OSHPD < > 
12/1/14 
 
to me  
Anh – 
  





Here you will find information from several separate databases.  The SIERA system was 
designed to assist report preparer’s in the submission process only.  It is NOT for data 
dissemination.  If you would like to view a specific facility’s report, you can find 
individual financial disclosure reports here:  
https://siera.oshpd.ca.gov/FinancialDisclosure.aspx. 
  







Anh Pham < > 
12/1/14 
 
to Lexie.Bloyd  
Thank you, Lexie! 
  
This is a great news. I am most grateful for your offer to assist me in navigating through 
the data. I will defintely need help on this area. When the time comes, I would like to 
contact you. 
  





Bloyd, Lexie@OSHPD < > 
12/1/14 
 
to me  
Yes,  you may call me to go over the data.  Perhaps you can email me to let me know 




Anh Pham < > 
12/1/14 
 
to Lexie.Bloyd  
Hi Lexie, 
 
I have one question. Do not-for-profit hospitals report their governance information such 
CEO, CEO/Chairman, presence of physicians on the boards? In other words, does 
OSHPD database contain the governance information of not-for-profit hospital I am 
looking for? 
 





Bloyd, Lexie@OSHPD < > 
12/2/14 






Yes, on Page 3.2 on the Hospital Annual Disclosure Report, we collect a Statement of 
Compensation of Owners and their Relatives and on Page 3.3, we collect Hospital 
Owners and Governing Board Members.  We ask that they complete the occupation of 





Anh Pham < > 
12/2/14 
 
to Lexie.Bloyd  
Hi Lexie, 
  
Thank you so very much! I think all the data I need is available in the OSHPD database. 
 
 
Anh Pham < > 
12/3/14 
 
to Lexie.Bloyd  
Hi Lexie, 
 
Today, I just received an approval from my educational institute (Walden University) to 
go ahead and work on data collection and analysis. I am so thankful to get this far 
because I was able to show that you as the OSHPD administrator confirmed the 
availability and accessibility of the database. Thank you very much for your kindness and 
offer to help me! I am very grateful. 
 
I was wondering if you are available on Monday 12/04/14 for me to call you so you can 
assist me in going through the data. I am very flexible with day and time. Please pick any 





From: Anh Pham [ ]  
Sent: Saturday, December 06, 2014 11:15 AM 
To: Bloyd, Lexie@OSHPD 







Thanks again for your kindness and genuine offer to help me with data collection! 
  
As I am about to start the process of data collection and try understanding what data and 
its meaning, I would like to take the opportunity to explain the scope of my search of 
data. I will choose randomly 107 not-for-profit hospitals the list of not-profit hospitals 
listed in OHSPD database and examine the financial data and governance information of 
the selected hospitals. 
  
For financial data, I will analyze the annual financial reports for 2009 to 2012 for each 
hospital. The financial data that I will examine include operating margin, total margin, 
and free cash flow. Please correct me if I am wrong. Below are how I think I will 
calculate the operating margin, total margin, and free cash flow. So please provide me 
any comments you may have regarding the calculation of these variables. 
  
The Operating Margin is calculated by dividing the difference between total operating 
revenue and total operating expenses by the total operating revenues and expressed as 
ratio of [(Total operating revenue – Total operating expense)/ Total operating revenue] 
  
The Total Margin is calculated by dividing net income by total operating revenue and 
expressed as Net Income/ Total Operating Revenue 
  
Free Cash Flow represents cash inflow and outflow rather than accounting earnings of a 
hospital. It shows the amount of cash left over after accounting for all of the expenses to 
operate the hospital and making all necessary investments to ensure its continuous 
operation. The Free Cash Flow is calculated by subtracting the change in net assets plus 
interest and noncash expenses from the investments in fixed assets and net working 
capital (Singh, Wheeler, & Roden, 2012). Alternatively, the free cash flow can be 
estimated by averaging the current and two prior periods and multiplying by an average 
annual growth rate of 7.3%, which is based on data from the American Hospital 
Association (Singh, Wheeler, & Roden, 2012, p.330). I adopted the calculation method of 
the free cash flow used by Sigh et al. (2012). FCF is expressed in the formula below: 
  
FCF = ((cFCF + priop1FCF +priop2FCF)/3) * 0.073 
Where: 
cFCF = current FCF 
priop1FCF = prior period 1 FCF 
priop2FCF = prior period 2 FCF 
  
Actually, as a preliminary search and examination of the OHSPD website, I took the 
liberty and explored the Annual Financial Data Complete Data Set and Pivot Profiles 
contained in Healthcare Information Division/Data/Financial link of the OHSPD website. 




captured below) and realized that the report has some financial ratios, especially the 
Operating Margin, formulated and calculated already. 
  
I am respectfully hoping that you can direct me to where I can find the Total Margin and 
hopefully some hints about how to calculation the Free Cash Flow based on the data 
available and presented in the LTC Pivot report.  
Inline image 1 
  
Regarding the corporate governance data of hospitals, I will collect data such as CEO 
duality (CEO who is also the chairperson of the governance board), Physicians on 
Governance Board, hospital size, hospital age, board size. I would be very grateful if you 
can provide some tips on how to efficiently collect and download these information of the 
107 not-for-profit hospitals I will select from the OHSPD. 
  
Would you kindly inform if you are available on Tuesday 12/09 or Wednesday 12/10 or 
Thursday 12/11 or Friday for me to contact you via telephone for assistance with 
questions related to data? I am flexible with the dates and times. Please let me the date 
and time that are most convenient for you. Thank you for helping me, and I am excitedly 






Anh Pham  
Walden University 
Student ID#A00275579 
PhD Management, LOC  
 
Bloyd, Lexie@OSHPD < > 
12/11/14 
 
to me  
Dear Anh, 
  
Due to unforeseen circumstances, I was not able to be in the office this morning. I 
sincerely apologize about missing today’s telephone conference. I will reschedule once I 
get back in office. As a recap, you are correct in your assumption of the total operating 
margin and total margin; however, I am unsure as to the LTC pivot profile providing you 








Healthcare Information Division 
 
 
Bloyd, Lexie@OSHPD < > 
12/11/14 
 
to me  
Hi Anh – 
  
Again, I apologize, but there is a severe storm in Sacramento today and things have been 
hectic.  Perhaps you can give me some times that are good for you? 
  




Bloyd, Lexie@OSHPD < > 
12/11/14 
 
to me  
Hi Anh – 
  
I tried calling and received an automated message saying that the number was 








Walden < > 
12/11/14 
 
to Lexie.Bloyd, bcc: me  
Hi Lexie 
No worries! You are doing me favor. So, I am absolutely very flexible with your 
schedule.  
I apologized for leaving you a wrong number to call back. The number is I think I will 
not come in to work tomorrow due to expected heavy rains because of storm. The 
highway to my workplace could be closed tomorrow, so I figured I should be home for 
safety reason. 
If you call me, please call my cell at. Otherwise I can call you if you don't mind. 






Anh Ph m 
 
 
Bloyd, Lexie@OSHPD < > 
12/17/14 
 
to me  
https://www.alirts.oshpd.ca.gov/default.aspx 
  
Enter FAC_NO in search box. 
  
I hope this helps!! 
 
Anh Pham < > 
Attachments 12/17/14 
 
to Lexie.Bloyd  
Dear Lexie, 
 
Thanks for your time and patience this afternoon to go over data from your website. I am 
very grateful for that. Also, thanks for the link. I will definitely check it out to search for 
other necessary data.  
 
Can you kindly do me a favor? Please view the Excel file enclosed and confirm with me 
the following things: 
 






Bloyd, Lexie@OSHPD < > 
12/22/14 
 
to me  
Anh – 
  








Anh Pham < > 
12/22/14 
 
to Lexie.Bloyd  
Thanks, Lexie. 
  





Bloyd, Lexie@OSHPD < > 
12/29/14 
 
to me  
No.  AW is total Healthcare expense.  DP is Housekeeping expense. 
 
 
Walden < > 
12/29/14 
 
to Lexie.Bloyd, bcc: me  
Thanks, Lexie. Would the total healthcare expenses be considered as the Total operating 
expenses? 
 
Anh Ph m 
 
Bloyd, Lexie@OSHPD < > 
12/29/14 
 




Anh Pham < > 
Jan 11 
 









I have another question. Based on past research, the hospital size was measured by the 
logarithm of total assets (Peng, Li, Xie, & Su, 2010). Would you please tell me what 
column of the files on the 2007 Excel Version on the link below that indicate total assets 










Bloyd, Lexie@OSHPD < > 
Jan 14 (12 days ago) 
 
to me  
Hi Anh – 
  
In the 38th Year Complete Data set for hospitals, Column BRB represents Total Hospital 





Appendix F: Communication With Kyle Rowert of OSHPD Database 
 
Anh Pham < > 
12/16/14 
to kyle.rowert  
Dear Kyle, 
  
It is Anh Pham, PhD student of Walden University. I had contacted you earlier regarding 
the access of data of OSHPD. Thanks again for your kindness and genuine offer to help 
me with data collection! 
As I am about to start the process of data collection and try understanding what data and 
its meaning, I would like to take the opportunity to explain the scope of my search of 
data. I will choose randomly 107 not-for-profit hospitals the list of not-profit hospitals 
listed in OHSPD database and examine the financial data and governance information of 
the selected hospitals. 
For financial data, I will analyze the annual financial reports for 2009 to 2012 for each 
hospital. The financial data that I will examine include operating margin, total margin, 
and free cash flow. Please correct me if I am wrong. Below are how I think I will 
calculate the operating margin, total margin, and free cash flow. So please provide me 
any comments you may have regarding the calculation of these variables. 
The Operating Margin is calculated by dividing the difference between total operating 
revenue and total operating expenses by the total operating revenues and expressed as 
ratio of [(Total operating revenue – Total operating expense)/ Total operating revenue] 
The Total Margin is calculated bydividing net income by total operating revenue and 
expressed as Net Income/ Total Operating Revenue 
Free Cash Flowrepresents cash inflow and outflow rather than accounting earnings of a 
hospital. It shows the amount of cash left over after accounting for all of the expenses to 
operate the hospital and making all necessary investments to ensure its continuous 
operation. The Free Cash Flow is calculated by subtracting the change in net assets plus 
interest and noncash expenses from the investments in fixed assets and net working 
capital (Singh, Wheeler, & Roden, 2012). Alternatively, the free cash flow can be 
estimated by averaging the current and two prior periods and multiplying by an average 
annual growth rate of 7.3%, which is based on data from the American Hospital 
Association (Singh, Wheeler, & Roden, 2012, p.330). I adopted the calculation method of 
the free cash flow used by Sigh et al. (2012). FCF is expressed in the formula below: 
FCF = ((cFCF + priop1FCF +priop2FCF)/3) * 0.073 
Where: 
cFCF = current FCF 
priop1FCF = prior period 1 FCF 
priop2FCF = prior period 2 FCF 
Actually, as a preliminary search and examination of the OHSPD website, I took the 
liberty and explored the Annual Financial Data Complete Data Set and Pivot Profiles 




I looked at the income statement and ratio data of a LTC Pivot report of a hospital (as 
captured below) and realized that the report has some financial ratios, especially the 
Operating Margin, formulated and calculated already. 
I am respectfully hoping that you can direct me to where I can find the Total Margin and 
hopefully some hints about how to calculation the Free Cash Flow based on the data 
available and presented in the LTC Pivot report. 
Inline image 1 
Regarding the corporate governance data of hospitals, I will collect data such as CEO 
duality (CEO who is also the chairperson of the governance board),Physicians on 
Governance Board, hospital size,hospital age, board size. I would be very grateful if you 
can provide some tips on how to efficiently collect and download these information of the 
107 not-for-profit hospitals I will select from the OHSPD. 
Would you kindly inform if you are available on Wednesday 12/17 or Thursday 12/18 or 
Friday 12/19 or Monday 12/22, or Tuesday 12/23 for me to contact you via telephone for 
assistance with questions related to data? I am flexible with the dates and times. Please let 
me the date and time that are most convenient for you. Thank you for helping me, and I 
am excitedly looking forward to hearing from you! 
  
Please provide me your office number to call me whenever it is convenient. Thanks! 
Sincerely, 
Anh Pham 
Rowert, Kyle@OSHPD < > 
12/18/14 
to me  
Hi Anh, 
I’m a little busy at the moment but will answer a few of your questions and give you 
some tips on where to find your data. 
Your formulas are correct. 
You can get Operating Margin and Total Margin from the “Profile” worksheet on our 
Pivot Profiles located here: 
http://www.oshpd.ca.gov/HID/Products/Hospitals/AnnFinanData/PivotProfles/default.asp 
Operating Margin would be found in cell G19 
Total Margin would be in cell G20 
For cash flows, I wanted to point out that we do have a statement of cash flows from the 
hospital that shows the beginning and ending cash amounts as well as the cash going in 
and out due to various activities. This can be found on our annual reports from the 
following link: 
https://siera.oshpd.ca.gov/FinancialDisclosure.aspx 
just type the hospital name and year range and click “go” to get a list of reports. Click on 
the PDF icon to download the report. 
The Statement of Cash Flows is on page 31. 
You can also find some of your other information on this report. 
Governing Board information would be on page 13. 




We wouldn’t have any data on hospital age. 
If you are looking to do only LTC hospitals then you should contact Lexie Bloyd at < > 
otherwise I can help you with the acute hospital financial data. 
I have meetings today and tomorrow but would be available to talk on Monday, 
December 22. 
Thank you Anh 
  
Kyle Rowert 
Hospital Unit Supervisor 
Healthcare Information Division 
Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development 
400 R Street, Suite 250 
Sacramento, CA  95811 
E-mail:  
Web Page: www.oshpd.ca.gov 
Walden < > 
12/18/14 
 
to Kyle.Rowert, bcc: me  
Hi Kyle, 
You have provided me great info on what areas I can maneuver to search the data I need 
from the database. I am grateful for your help. 
For now I will analyze the data, and if you don't mind, I would like to email you 
questions I have as I progress. That way, I will not occupy your time with telephone calls. 
Thank you! 
Best, 
Anh Ph m 
Anh Pham < > 
12/18/14 
Hi Kyle, 
I have a question 
 
If I defined the free cash flow is calculated by subtracting the change in net assets plus 
interest and non-cash expensesfrom the investments in fixed assets and net working 
capitals, then I am looking at the item 225 (cash at the end of year) pulled from the 





Rowert, Kyle@OSHPD < > 
12/23/14 
 





You are close, line 225 is the cash the hospital has at the end of the reporting period and 
would be the result of Net Income, change in assets and liabilities for operating activities 
during the year, cash flows from investing and financing activities, and the beginning 
cash balance at the start of the year. 
  




Anh Pham < > 
12/23/14 
 





I am looking at Licensed Beds, Available Beds, and Staffed Beds. Could you please tell 






Anh Pham < > 
12/23/14 
 
to Kyle.Rowert  
Regarding your answer below: 
  
"For cash flows, I wanted to point out that we do have a statement of cash flows from the 
hospital that shows the beginning and ending cash amounts as well as the cash going in 
and out due to various activities. This can be found on our annual reports from the 
following link: 
https://siera.oshpd.ca.gov/FinancialDisclosure.aspx 
just type the hospital name and year range and click “go” to get a list of reports. Click on 
the PDF icon to download the report. 
The Statement of Cash Flows is on page 31." 
  
My question is: Is there a report containing the statement of cash flow  of each of 
hospital. In other words, I have list of more 100 hospitals. I am looking for a file that 
helps me retrieve of Free Cash Flow from a file instead of typing each name of hospital 






Rowert, Kyle@OSHPD < > 
Jan 2 
 
to me  
Hi Anh, 




Rowert, Kyle@OSHPD < > 
Jan 2 
 
to me  
Hi Anh, 
Unfortunately there isn’t a report that just gets you cash flow for all hospitals but we do 
have a datafile that includes all data items for all hospitals for a particular reporting year. 
The file can be found here: 
http://oshpd.ca.gov/HID/Products/Hospitals/AnnFinanData/CmplteDataSet/index.asp 
  
The Statement of Cash Flows starts on column CZR on the 2007 Excel version. Row 1-3 
shows the page, column and line number of the annual report respectively. For example, 
if you were looking for cash at the end of the year, which is on page 9, column 1, line 225 
of the report, you would find that data on column DBJ. 
  




Anh Pham < > 
Jan 11 
 
to Kyle.Rowert  
Dear Kyle, 
 
Based on past research, the hospital size was measured by the logarithm of total assets 
(Peng, Li, Xie, & Su, 2010). Would you please tell me what column of the files on the 












Rowert, Kyle@OSHPD < > 
Jan 13 (13 days ago) 
 
to me  
Hi Anh, 
Total Assets can be found on column BRB. 
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